Proper Procedure in the Event of a Loss...

[MyNameIsNobody]

I believe it is human nature to want to know: "Why"?

That said, what do others feel is the way to express grief/respond to a loss?  Is there a "right" way?  Is there a "Don't go there" criteria?  Timeframe?  It certainly appears to vary from person to person.  What is the consensus MS way?

-Should names be stated? within <24 hours of an event?  Should they be stated at all?

-Should N-Numbers be communicated <24 hours from event?  At all?

-Should there be conjecture on How, Why it occured?

-Should we state our opinions on what we would have done?

-Or should we just state, pilot to pilot, our true sadness in the loss of a "brother-in passion" for our Mooney's?

I too want to know WHY?  I don't want to be the source for discussion for having done or not done something "right".  THAT is a HUGE benefit to "learn" lessons of others based on their decision-making, the accident chain etc.

I don't know the answers to the above questions, but do understand why those ask why and try and answer "their questions"...and the need to know/reach out to others...

Nothing worse than a loss of life.  We ALL want to know, but I personally would prefer at an early stage to just let facts come in from media to be shared and express sadness in the loss of a fellow Mooney driver.  There will be time to answer the whys and discuss/celebrate their life and passion.

[chrisk]

Should I go in a plane crash, I would hope all are respectful.  As for speculation and/or suspicions on my lack of judgement, its the only way others learn.  I don't have a problem with it.  On a personal note, I try to avoid the speculation on others judgement, mostly because I am not 100% perfect

Edited September 11, 2015 by chrisk

[Andy95W]

I'm really torn about this also, and I'm not sure what the right answer is.

I know I don't want to wait for the media. The media "experts" usually seem like they are almost as stupid about aviation as the rest of them.  ("Bill took some flying lessons 25 years ago.  He's an expert...")

We have some really smart and experienced people on this site.  In less than a day, the analysis of those people certainly seems to suggest that hypoxia may very well be the cause of the recent accident.  If just one turbo-Mooney pilot double checks his oxygen system, or decides to buy a pulse oxymeter, maybe someone's life will be saved as a result.  That's certainly better than waiting 6 months for the NTSB to simply tell us that it was pilot error.

 I think we as pilots are prone to speculating about things.  We like to bundle things in nice, neat packages with a definite cause/result.  Lacking that, we fill in the gaps as best as we can.

 Still not sure what the right answer is.

[kortopates]

Personally I don't believe their is a right or wrong answer since it's a really personal issue for everyone.

From my own perspective I am always interested to learn from these events. For me at least personally now is the time when the most learning can take place while the reality of loss of life is so strong. Most of us won't even care to read the final accident report when the NTSB finally publishes it a year from now. I wish it was more like 6 months but that is very rare! So I find healthy speculation about what could have gone wrong insightful reasoning valuable. I think we all learn by considering the what it's even though they turn out to be immaterial to the specific accident that inspired the discussion- as long as we don't forget that. The least valuable commentary IMO though is the judgmental statements like "I would never have allowed getting into that or I wouldn't have taken off. Learning kinda stops as soon as we adopt the It couldn't happen to me. And of course in hindsight the pilot would never have taken off either. I do think though in most of these accidents that they are great opportunities if you will, to sharpen our individual ADM skills. Probably not to this specific case as it is really looking like the accident cause was likely a couple hours before the descent. At least at this stage I am really thinking medical issue or hypoxia.

I personally believe that many of us can be blinded by our own conformational biases preventing us from delaying accepting the reality of the changes we are seeing (e..g weather, fuel, etc) that allows us to continue in deeper till we have no outs left. Therefore i try took at accidents more in the light as to how I could better realize the gravity of the changing environment sooner despite the similar external pressures we are faced with. I am always looking for such example pitfalls I can pass onto my CFI clients as well because just telling to not do something is unhelpful. You have to help inspire the necessary reasoning or thought process to continuously stay ahead of the airplane and ask yourself does it continue to look ahead as I had planned for and if not how are the differences going to effect me and what alternatives do I need to start planning for NOW.

p>

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[Marauder]

I believe it is human nature to want to know: "Why"?

That said, what do others feel is the way to express grief/respond to a loss?  Is there a "right" way?  Is there a "Don't go there" criteria?  Timeframe?  It certainly appears to vary from person to person.  What is the consensus MS way?

-Should names be stated? within <24 hours of an event?  Should they be stated at all?

-Should N-Numbers be communicated <24 hours from event?  At all?

-Should there be conjecture on How, Why it occured?

-Should we state our opinions on what we would have done?

-Or should we just state, pilot to pilot, our true sadness in the loss of a "brother-in passion" for our Mooney's?

I too want to know WHY?  I don't want to be the source for discussion for having done or not done something "right".  THAT is a HUGE benefit to "learn" lessons of others based on their decision-making, the accident chain etc.

I don't know the answers to the above questions, but do understand why those ask why and try and answer "their questions"...and the need to know/reach out to others...

Nothing worse than a loss of life.  We ALL want to know, but I personally would prefer at an early stage to just let facts come in from media to be shared and express sadness in the loss of a fellow Mooney driver.  There will be time to answer the whys and discuss/celebrate their life and passion.

Mr. MyNameIsNobody (BTW -- you are a Somebody!),

I thank you for posting this. I know it is on the minds of many of us and even especially harder for those to discuss for those who knew the accident pilot. My perspective is that if an accident does take the life of one of us, I hope they are all respectful over the loss but also committed to understand why it occurred to avoid it happening to another one of us.

When I bought my Mooney, the NTSB was already publishing accident reports. I went to the site, downloaded every F model Mooney incident/accident and analyzed the data. Was it morbid curiosity?  No. It was to understand what brought the fate to those F models so that I could learn. What I learned was that I needed to make sure I wasn't doing stupid things, that I had a training plan to maintain my 3Cs (currency, competency & confidence) and that I was proactive on maintenance. I want to stack the odds in my favor and I certainly don't want to hear while I'm headed to the Pearly Gates; "Marauder died doing what he loved".  

[Jim Peace]

Along these lines it helps the people you care about a lot if you leave a "If I should die" letter someplace at home that you update every year or so.

Not a will or a trust, I would hope you all have those.  This would be a letter specifically on the steps to take with names of phone numbers who they should call, where the will or trust can be found and how to handle taking money out of an account before the bank even knows your gone.  

[carusoam]

Some ideas...

we are all different from each other...

we handle tough situations differently...

try to be respectful of each other...

try to be forgiving of the person who types in a statement that is perceived as improper...

real basic human qualities are good to have during tough times.

know that there will be more tough times.

know that there is a person here with experise on this particular topic that you can PM. (Not me)

know that people are interested in the actual causes of an accident so that they can minimize the possibility of duplicating it.

know that some people will start the discussion earlier than others are comfortable with.

Expect that the pilots that have gone west before us, would have shared the details of their challenges so we would not have the same experience.

know that flying has inherent risks.

know that people are going to fly.

remember people kindly. Have I mentioned Patrick lately?

best regards,

-a-

Edited September 11, 2015 by carusoam

[gsxrpilot]

I agree that questioning a pilots judgement when we don't have all the facts is probably in poor taste.  

In this case, I'm comfortable speculating that the pilot was likely incapacitated very early in the flight long before any decisions about the weather were made.

I've on a couple of occasions, taken off when the weather at my destination (more than two hours away) was terrible. But I was fully planning to land short and wait it out, over night if needed, unless the weather improved prior to my arrival. 

[fantom]

I certainly don't want to hear while I'm headed to the Pearly Gates; "Marauder died doing what he loved".  

Yeah right.....crushed under two tons of heffer , and if that happens, you won't get any sympathy from me! 

[Marauder]

Yeah right.....crushed under two tons of heffer , and if that happens, you won't get any sympathy from me! 

I'll be safe. Daddy always told me to never trust the jack, always use jack stands.

[MyNameIsNobody]

Humour.  Nector to a heavy heart.

[ryoder]

I prefer not to post on those topics most of the time.

I watched two pilots die last year while I was speaking with their coworker at Sebring.  It was sobering to say the least.  I couldn't fly for two weeks.

[DXB]

Understanding tragedy is best approached with humility, but I am glad it is approached in this forum.  Maybe the urge to judge what was done wrong prematurely comes partly from wanting to reassure ourselves that we are not vulnerable in the same way.  But the best learning comes when we  act upon the ways that we share vulnerability with the pilot in the accident.  We don't even have to solve what happened in the actual case to derive benefit. One could look at the accident yesterday and decide to seek a better understanding  of one's 02 system, start choosing slightly lower altitudes when possible, decide to visit one's MD about some recent heart palpitations , reign in risky behavior around convective activity, and/or pursue better understanding of one's autopilot.  All of these are productive outcomes irrespective of what actually happened in the recent case.  And doing so provides fitting legacy for the pilot who lost his life. 

[Andy95W]

Along these lines it helps the people you care about a lot if you leave a "If I should die" letter someplace at home that you update every year or so.

Okay, so here's mine:

1.) I hope to God nobody died with me.

2.) Please know that I died doing something I truly loved doing, and I am grateful for that.

3.) If I died as the result of something that was not my fault, I hereby give authorization to speculate all you want, as long as you learn from what happened to me.  You also have my permission to question my judgement all you want, so long as you learn from me.  And please set the record straight when the facts come out.

4.) If I died as the result of my own stupidity, you have my permission to rake me over the coals and call me out for what I did, as long as you learned from what I did wrong.

[cliffy]

N1395W  +1  :-)

[MyNameIsNobody]

+2

[Bravoman]

You know, to put it in perspective, what we do is very, very safe. When something happens it is typically not the result of equipment failure or even external forces but rather our own mistakes and lapses of judgement. We as pilots can control that. Compare flying to say motorcycle riding or even driving down the road in a car. So much more can and does happen, even with the best of care,  due to external forces that are realistically outside of ones control.

[bonal]

I think it's natural to want to understand all we can when we hear of such tragedy and we each do so in our own way. I for one read all the stories published on other flight accidents regardless of outcome as a way of gaining knowledge and how it relates to    my own flying skills. This latest incident happened in a realm of flight that I have no experience so the best I can offer is my condolences and prayers.

[Houman]

I know it is a bit over the top, but when fly, I always try to think what surprise it will trow me today, how can I get into trouble and what I need to do to avoid it. As a habbit and professional training, I'm paranoid. I usually do project management for big clients and a big part of my job is risk assesment and mitigation. I bring the same thinking to my flying.

On the recent accident in AC, it is early to judge, but if it is hypoxia, questions to ask and and I do myself everytime when I fly high are these :

1 ) Is my main O2 bottle full or near.

2 ) Is my emergency tank near by on the back seat, this tank has no valvues and no ajustement, yank the pin out and you get max O2 for 2 people for about 20 min with masks to save your life and descend, did he have one ?

3 ) Do I have oximeters for pilot and co-pilot and are they at full charge. I spent a bit more and got those with alarms, so anytime I go under 85%, I get a loud alarm on it.

4 ) Do I have my spare oximeter with me always in the pocket on the side for passengers or in case primary Oximeter runs out of battery. 

5 ) Do I have a plan in case my O2 goes under 90%, what do I do to stay abouve 90% all the time

6 ) Do I have an emergency plan in case my O2 goes under 80 and number 5 has not worked, descend or use emergency tank and descend.

Most of these are checked a day or 2 before the flight and rechecked on the day of flight, also am I physically and mentaly ready for a flight and high altitude. Have I made sure everything is within reach from the pilot or co-pilot seat during the flight in case of emergency.

 

I intend to go to an O2 chamber one of these days hopefully soon, I think it is a must as well if going over FL180. I have never gone higher because I don't have my IFR rating yet, but once I do, I will probably never go alone without a co-pilot to the FL240 max that my Rocket can go. That high, alone, too many things can go wrong and you might not have time to react alone...

 

Anyway, this is my thinking and I am fully open for any improvements and things I can learn....

 

 

 

[DonMuncy]

I would bet a lot of money that every one of the pilots that died as a result of hypoxia, thought they had a plan that involved sufficient back-up. It seems to me that the worst problem with hypoxia is that it is so insidious. I suspect that even if (as Don K suggested) you have been through a altitude chamber run, you still might get caught not recognizing the symptoms until it is too late.  

[kortopates]

I would bet a lot of money that every one of the pilots that died as a result of hypoxia, thought they had a plan that involved sufficient back-up. It seems to me that the worst problem with hypoxia is that it is so insidious. I suspect that even if (as Don K suggested) you have been through a altitude chamber run, you still might get caught not recognizing the symptoms until it is too late.  

Don, you must be right just given how often we see it repeated. Hypoxia is very insidious and one of its key symptoms of making us feel more elated just makes it worse. But its not really that hard to recognize if you know how you respond to lack of O2 and that's why I am so personally surprised by the frequency of these events. Especially the recent episode of a pressurized plane that apparently knew he had a pressurization problem and asked ATC for lower and then just waited for 10 minutes till it was to late. That had to be almost entirely because of the insidious nature of the symptoms that the pilot didn't feel it was an emergency.

Perhaps only because my life experiences including at lot of activities in the teens from rock climbing in the Sierra's and skiing that I personally didn't need a high altitude chamber course to learn the symptoms (and I am not referring to altitude sickness but symptoms from trying function with O2 Sats in the 80s). They're pretty obvious to any one that has spent time at altitude doing anything aerobic while not acclimated. I enjoyed the chamber course as I do any learning experience but except for getting to get some idea of what my own TUC would be at 25K I didn't learn anything new - I was  already very familiar with the symptoms. Plus I am not at all someone that does well at altitude till after days of acclimation aided by Diamox. I need the mask above 16.5K unlike my wife whom does far better and easily maintains a O2 saturation well into the mid 90's upto 23K with just a cannula alone. But she also has done a lot of high altitude mountaineering without O2 including Mt Aconcaqua at almost 23K' - so she seems to have the genes for it. while I do not.  And that is one of the other big issues - our individual tolerances seem to vary so much. 

Edited September 12, 2015 by kortopates

[WardHolbrook]

I would bet a lot of money that every one of the pilots that died as a result of hypoxia, thought they had a plan that involved sufficient back-up. It seems to me that the worst problem with hypoxia is that it is so insidious. I suspect that even if (as Don K suggested) you have been through a altitude chamber run, you still might get caught not recognizing the symptoms until it is too late.  

I'm sure some do, but simply having a backup plan won't matter if it's not a viable one. If you're flying up in the FLs and you backup plan doesn't include an emergency bottle and the term "emergency descent" it's not a viable one and needs to be rethought. I'd also bet that a significant number of pilots haven't really given much more than a cursory thought. For example, by the show of hands, how many of you who venture - even if only occasionally - into the FLs carry an extra O2 bottle complete with extra mask and regulator? (You don't need the emergency bottle for everybody, just the pilot.) Nowadays, most guys seem to have a pulse oximeter, but I'd also bet that there are more than a few that haven't even sprung for one of those yet. While we're at it, by the show of hands, how many have ever practiced an emergency descent in your Mooney? It's not as easy as you might think. Just saying.

The altitude chamber was invaluable, in my case it showed me that I really don't notice that anything's wrong until I loose consciousness. I just set there feeling fat, dumb and above all - very happy. Because of this I check the PO frequently and I've also got a flow meter on the O2 tubing that I keep in my field of view. At FL250 I figure that I'd give myself about a minute to get the tubing back on the nib (about the only fixable O2 failure that I can think of) or I'd better be on my way down. We're not in a jet and we don't have quick-don masks so I'll break out the emergency bottle in the descent. 

Edited September 12, 2015 by WardHolbrook

[DXB]

Though the outlook for recovery from hypoxia at altitude sounds grim here, the bright spot is that modest decreases in altitude can produce  immediate and dramatic improvements in level of consciousness and mental ability. At the first thought of hypoxia, one might  plausibly hard-wire oneself well enough to act on getting lower in a controlled way as top priority above ATC and all else. Doing this alone without emergency descent rates or keeping other aspects of situational awareness may still make things exponentially more manageable.   In this regard, an autopilot that responds to an unresponsive pilot with a gradual descent sounds like an incredibly smart feature (of course accounting for altitude AGL). I think of the two recent presumed hypoxia related GA crashes into the ocean upon fuel exhaustion last year (the TBM 900, the SR22) and possibly this also one..  The TBM pilot had a notion of what was going on but got the priorities wrong by asking for  lower altitudes from FL250. 

[DonMuncy]

I certainly would not argue that one shouldn't have a back-up O2 bottle available. My only point is that if you didn't immediately recognize that you were hypoxic, you may well be so euphoric you wouldn't recognize you needed to reach back for your emergency O2 source. I have never flown my K above 18,000 ft., but that doesn't mean I can be complacent about the need for concern for hypoxia problems. I have practiced emergency descents. I can put out the speed brakes and descend at about 2000fpm. If one was at 25,000 and instantly recognized the problem, within 2 1/2 minutes (pretty well established this would still be in the conscious state) he could be at 20,000 and still descending. Almost certainly not in the fatal range. But, back to my original thought, neither using very high descent rates, trouble shooting a loose hose connection, nor grabbing the back-up cylinder will save you if you don't quickly recognize you are in trouble. Maybe we all need to avoid flying in the flight levels without someone else on board who has a different tolerance for hypoxia. That way, maybe the more hypoxia tolerant one would notice the less tolerant one was losing it, and take action.

[carusoam]

We have a couple threads going at the same time regarding anoxia, or lack of of oxygen...

when given a two or five minute time of usefulness consciousness.

1) there is a challenge to know you have a serious problem.

2) your ability to recognize the problem is becoming less.

3) your solution may not be readily available compared to the time that is left.

4) some of the newer AP have an emergency descent button to bring the plane back to a breathable attitude.

5) MS pilots are more aware of the challenge and have discussed the importance of how to act quickly.

6) if you wait, you will not be able to declare or to push the button. Your heart rate will have probably increased to try to deliver more O2 to the brain. Your sense of timing will be off.  Now you have less than two minutes...

I'm thinking there is a lot left on the table by the O2 systems people.  

1) Why are we discussing back up systems when the primary system is so at fault? 

2) dual tanks.

3) dual lines.

4) dual fittings.

4.5) All supplying the one mask constantly with no intervention.

5) alarms with flashing lights.

6) O2 saturation monitor improvements.

7) yes, I had an O2 problem once while on the ground. Two minutes is not a lot of time. At altitude, you are very alone.

a real, well designed, dual O2 system should be normal for the flight levels and it should not be astronomically priced.

 

 

Edited September 13, 2015 by carusoam
Best regards, -a-