Virginia Accident

[Mooneymite]

On 10/11/2017 at 4:41 PM, daver328 said:

No disrespect or slight intended on any pilot or group of pilots

daver328, you hit a chord with me.

Not all aviation experience is transferable, and some of it may have a negative transfer when going between multi-engine and single engine ops.

For example, at work, takeoff distances are all based on losing the critical engine at the critical time.  As long as all the engines turn you have lots of margin...takeoff calculations in a single engine have virtually no margin.  It's  a different mindset.  Woe be to the airline guy who thinks there's plenty of margin for error when the only engine quits.

[gsxrpilot]

When I (300 hour GA Private/Instrument Pilot) bought my first Mooney, I added my younger brother (15,000 hour ATP Southwest Captain) to the insurance. Insurance required I have 5 hours dual/5 hours solo before passengers. My bother on the other hand was cleared to fly immediately. His comment, I think it's backward. We both did 5+ hours of transition training. I had an easier time with the landings from the beginning. He's a hell of a good pilot and is now very proficient in the Mooney, but he'd be the first to admit that thousands of hours of 737 time is of only limited benefit in an M20C.

[Guest]

5 hours ago, thinwing said:

Clarence,he has already categorized his mistakes,your comment is unnecessarily judgemental and redundant 

With all due respect, there are lots of even more pointed comments than mine.  You could be quite busy commenting on all of them.

Clarence

[aviatoreb]

3 minutes ago, daver328 said:

One thing I’ve noticed. Almost every time I call another pilot an idiot for doing something dumb ... I do something stupid myself, shortly afterwards. Karma?

Best to do like me and say how fantastic everyone.  Dave have I said how fantastic you are lately.  You are good looking.  Wise.  Smart.  You are an amazing pilot.  Handsome.  Smart.  Funny.  And you smell like elderberries.

[PMcClure]

I hesitate to say anything because the pilot is on here with us and vastly more experienced than I. But I still come back to personal minimums. My personal minimum is 50% more runway than needed and 3.000' minimum regardless. The way I approach minimums is not absolute, but do require myself to look deeper if I consider breaking one. My alarm bells would have already been firing with a 2200' runway and family on board. A controller suggesting an intersection runway would have been answered easily with no thank you because I would have already been in the red zone below a personal minimum. 

The knowledge gained by sharing the experience is invaluable. And I will follow his advice and discuss my decision making process with my non pilot and nervous wife. I will also share my personal minimums with her so that she can ask me questions if I decide to drop below them. This will also help her understand why we are still waiting for ceilings to lift or why we can't fly into an airport on one day that we have done another. 

 Thank you to to Cooperdog for sharing and allowing me the chance to evaluate my own practices. As I tell my kids all the time, experience is the best teacher, but learning from other's mistakes is a better value. 

[MyNameIsNobody]

3500 was once a close call (trees) with turkeys on runway, near gross on a high density day.  I still think about it.  I should have aborted when distraction occurred.  I learned and WILL now.  Others have mentioned that knowledge is often gained by "close calls".  You don't know what you don't know.  Just glad this experience gained had a positive outcome (No lives lost).  I would prefer for my survival outcome to not be as a result of "LUCK", but of sound decision-making.

CD, like Patrick gave us flying lessons to live by without living all that the lesson entailed.  He is aces with me for that.

[Southernpilot]

I could prob do that......but I would be very concerned during the let down about sudden airport closure bad weather etc...I fly for a company now that we land with well over 2 hours of gas every flight.....
My lear 24 days different story......The low fuel light came on almost every flight at Top of D.... 

When I was flying the Sabreliner, I heard stories about those lights coming on.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

[ragedracer1977]

On 10/10/2017 at 6:00 PM, Shadrach said:

 

piperpainter demonstrates in his C model what looks like a hot dog zoom climb here, but he's really just accelerating as long as possible in a low AOA/low drag attitude before increasing ROC.  Below is an image of the strip where this was clip was shot. 1600' from one end to the terminus at the tall pines...

 

I tried this yesterday, to see if it's a tool I want in my toolbox.  Flying out of P52 Cottonwood AZ (3560 MSL, DA was close to 6000, 4200' runway).  Full fuel, around 380lbs in the front seats (pass and me).  I used the full length of the runway, short field take-off.  According to my GPS log, I was off the ground in 994'.  I cleaned up and accelerated to 100 mph IAS and pulled.  By the end of the runway I was 214' AGL. In comparison to the day before, less than half tanks (about 20 gallons, so about 170lbs lighter), same folks in the front seats - standard takeoff, similar weather.  1216' takeoff roll.  131' AGL by the end of the runway.  

I'd definitely add this tool to my box.  It's not very comfortable for the passengers, there is a little G load followed by less than 1G at the top, (he didn't mind though, I told him what we were doing so he was prepared - and he has lots of hours in the right seat with me), but it does work pretty well.  I was 50' AGL within ~2600'.  I could have got there sooner, but I was really letting the speed build.  And this with a pretty significant DA.  

Edited October 13, 2017 by ragedracer1977

[PTK]

4 hours ago, ragedracer1977 said:

I tried this yesterday, to see if it's a tool I want in my toolbox.  Flying out of P52 Cottonwood AZ (3560 MSL, DA was close to 6000, 4200' runway).  Full fuel, around 380lbs in the front seats (pass and me).  I used the full length of the runway, short field take-off.  According to my GPS log, I was off the ground in 994'.  I cleaned up and accelerated to 100 mph IAS and pulled.  By the end of the runway I was 214' AGL. In comparison to the day before, less than half tanks (about 20 gallons, so about 170lbs lighter), same folks in the front seats - standard takeoff, similar weather.  1216' takeoff roll.  131' AGL by the end of the runway.  

I'd definitely add this tool to my box.  It's not very comfortable for the passengers, there is a little G load followed by less than 1G at the top, (he didn't mind though, I told him what we were doing so he was prepared - and he has lots of hours in the right seat with me), but it does work pretty well.  I was 50' AGL within ~2600'.  I could have got there sooner, but I was really letting the speed build.  And this with a pretty significant DA.  

Two questions:

Did the OP even attempt a high perf. takeoff? I did not read that he did but I may have missed it.

How do you get a GPS log? Is there an app you use?

 

 

[Cruiser]

I haven't read ALL the responses to this thread so excuse my comments if this has already been covered.

In all the discussion I have read about what may and may not have happened, control of the plane, and most importantly Decision Making....... consider that the entire event took about 15 seconds from the end of the runway to the final stopping point. 15 seconds

Try it yourself. Go sit in the airplane and mentally go through the take-off roll and from wheels up to the crash count to 15. We all can learn from others mistakes.

I would suggest that all of us can benefit from training that focuses on our ability to react and take action. There is a HUGE difference between talking about it and actually doing it. The surprise factor alone will delay a reaction. I guess my message is BE PREPARED. Do you always pick an abort point on the runway before you start the take off ? Do you mentally think through the power loss on take off procedure every time you fly? 

15 seconds. What will you do in the first 15 seconds of an emergency?  

[MyNameIsNobody]

Talking about decision making on this thread because that is the factor that was not sound.  Don't disagree that another thread on pre-planning for an "abort point" is not good, but this had everything to do with the interjection by an outside influence that resulted in a bad decision that resulted in an off-field landing.  Everything that happened in that 15 seconds after power was "put in" at the intersection was a detail that led to an outcome.

I know what my take-away from this was/is and it is not: "What do I do after I make a bad decision".  I want to not make a bad decision in the first place.

The pre-planning was there.  Some say the decision to go to this field was the start of the chain...I don't dispute that.  Other factors could have mitigated or prevented the event...BUT if the original plan had been followed it is likely that this thread would not have been written.

[MyNameIsNobody]

2 minutes ago, daver328 said:

“Learning is defined as a change of ... behavior as a result of experience.” (Fundamentals of Instruction, FOI) 

Teachers hopefully, like the pilot that experienced this incident, impart knowledge for others, without "literally" experiencing "the experience".

[gsxrpilot]

33 minutes ago, daver328 said:

Unfortunately ... I think more often than not ... the human condition is that we usually learn after we make mistakes and we inherit the consequences. Some experiences are traumatic enough we only make that mistake once. But mostly humans make the same mistake several times before they learn. The human condition. It is the very wise and very few that are disciplined enough to learn from other’s mistakes .... 

And without any intention to offend here... the process of learning from other's mistakes involves understanding what we would/will do differently. For me, I can see a different course of action for every decision from before landing at the field and all the way through until hitting the tree.

1. When traveling with family, loaded, a full fuel... pick long runways at larger airports.
2. If required to land at a small field with a short runway, don't load full fuel to give a better margin of performance.
3. Always use the full runway length.
4. When runway length is in question, use short field technique, get off the ground, accelerate in ground effect, climb out at end of the runway.
5. Plan for an out on every takeoff. In this case, right instead of left would have been out over the water with plenty of time to climb.

I've got less than 1000 hours of Mooney time, but have made these very same five decisions many, many times. So far its working out.

 

[ragedracer1977]

8 hours ago, PTK said:

Two questions:

Did the OP even attempt a high perf. takeoff? I did not read that he did but I may have missed it.

How do you get a GPS log? Is there an app you use?

 

 

Foreflight records the data that you can output to an app called cloudahoy.  It converts the data into a 3d track.  Pretty neat app.

[mooniac15u]

There seems to be some mixing of soft-field and short-field techniques here.  Accelerating in ground effect is a soft-field technique used to minimize the additional drag of the soft surface.  On short, paved runways you should get maximum obstacle clearance by using close to normal rotation speed and climbing at Vx.

Accelerating in ground effect and pulling up hard will increase load factor which increases stall speed.  It's one of the dangers of buzzing.

[bradp]

I’ve been thinking about this a bit.  For your PTS there is short field and soft field.  In real life in my limited experience there are variations that require “maximal performance”.  There is short field technique.  There is confined field technique.  There is a mix.  Add to the matrix soft field.  

Clearly loading the wing with more than 1G is probably not a good idea with regard to the potential for accelerated stall near critical AOA.  Flying AOA for max lift is a good idea in a short / confined space.  Reducing drag as much as possible is also a good idea.  In the Mooney adoption of a modified soft field technique -meaning accelerating and cleaning up in ground effect - can enhance your performance with regard to decreasing drag and decelerating climbout for obstacle clearance.  Short field certification requirements in your POH say fly with the gear extended.  Why would you do that?  Might as well fly with your speed brakes deployed.  I believe this was discussed extensively in Patrick’s thread.  

Look at pelicans perch #22 - he pretty eloquently gets into the finer points.  https://www.avweb.com/news/pelican/182089-1.html

Maybe we should (in a safe way) develop and track some of these performance variables for various models in the fleet.  Or even more granular - for our individual aircraft using all the GPS data we carry around with us.  We know the conditions - we should be able to determine performance for various field and environmental conditions and get some evidence based best techniques / practices.  I don’t trust my book numbers or techniques. I don’t trust what my 20 year old primary instructor taught me about these techniques.  I did trust what my 10,000 hr 72 year old instructor retaught me about what was possible and not possible in a 172.  But that was a 172.  If piperpainter flew my right seat I’d trust what he would tell me because he’s been there and done that.  Until then - I’ll end up being on the conservative side.    

[gsxrpilot]

16 minutes ago, daver328 said:

Were you not already doing this? Were you not trained from the beginning to do this?

Yes I am, and yes I was. That's what I was trying to say in the last sentence. "but have made these very same five decisions many, many times. So far its working out."

But going through this thread, it seems that those are five decisions that went the other way and any one of which would have broken the accident chain.

[Hank]

31 minutes ago, gsxrpilot said:

But going through this thread, it seems that those are five decisions that went the other way and any one of which would have broken the accident chain.

It all depends on your definition of "long field."

I earned my license, bought the Mooney and was based for 7 years at a 3000' field with trees at both ends. Leaving on vacation with my wife, and everything behind us loaded to the ceiling, full tanks to travel on, was not unusual. My C never had a problem clearing the trees, and when I was looking down at them, it was time to raise the Takeoff flaps.

In the event of engine trouble, my choices on every takeoff were the trees, the Ohio River, or if I was high enough, the Walmart parking lot a couple miles away.

This is the departure end of 26; doesn't the number and stripe I repainted look good?

It was 3000' landing on 26; the asphalt is 75' wide, so judge the displacement for 8 accordingly.

Edited October 13, 2017 by Hank

[gsxrpilot]

34 minutes ago, Hank said:

It all depends on your definition of "long field."

I earned my license, bought the Mooney and was based for 7 years at a 3000' field with trees at both ends. Leaving on vacation with my wife, and everything behind us loaded to the ceiling, full tanks to travel on, was not unusual. My C never had a problem clearing the trees, and when I was looking down at them, it was time to raise the Takeoff flaps.

In the event of engine trouble, my choices on every takeoff were the trees, the Ohio River, or if I was high enough, the Walmart parking lot a couple miles away.

This is the departure end of 26; doesn't the number and stripe I repainted look good?

It was 3000' landing on 26; the asphalt is 75' wide, so judge the displacement for 8 accordingly.

Hey, the paint looks great!

I got to be pretty comfortable in my C as well after a hundred hours or so. I knew exactly how much runway I needed for a given DA, Weight, surface, etc. But I certainly wouldn't have gone into our out of 2000 ft. fully loaded during the first few weeks of ownership.

[Bob_Belville]

I always worry about landing on a short field, particularly when my last landing at home ate up over half of our 5500' x 75' runway which it did coming home from Summit. So yesterday after a 4.7 hour non-stop MRN to 6B6 (Minuteman, Stow MA) I was really focused: altitude/speed on short final. we used about half of the 2700' x 45' runway. Feeling cocky. 

[Hank]

2 hours ago, Bob_Belville said:

I always worry about landing on a short field, particularly when my last landing at home ate up over half of our 5500' x 75' runway which it did coming home from Summit. So yesterday after a 4.7 hour non-stop MRN to 6B6 (Minuteman, Stow MA) I was really focused: altitude/speed on short final. we used about half of the 2700' x 45' runway. Feeling cocky. 

I was also worried coming home from Summit, with a gusting direct crosssind. Chose 13, just a little extra speed, missed my normal turnoff so rolled to the end of 3200' for a long taxi back. Could have made the turn, but I like my brakes . . . .

[Shadrach]

11 hours ago, mooniac15u said:There seems to be some mixing of soft-field and short-field techniques here.  Accelerating in ground effect is a soft-field technique used to minimize the additional drag of the soft surface.  On short, paved runways you should get maximum obstacle clearance by using close to normal rotation speed and climbing at Vx.

Accelerating in ground effect and pulling up hard will increase load factor which increases stall speed.  It's one of the dangers of buzzing.

What's Vx in your J? I'm not sure that there's any confusion. Vx is the target. The fastest way to get there is a clean airframe at the lowest AOA. The only place I've seen "pulling hard" mentioned is in your post. It does not take a great deal of pitch change to start a Mooney up hill at Vx. Gentle is best and additional elevator will be needed to prevent accerating beyond Vx.   If best gradient is the goal, there is nothing to be gained by accelating beyond Vx and zoom climbing. The PP Video looks dramatic, but he's also dealing with tall trees 1600' from where he started his take off roll.

Maybe it's  better to clarify what I'm not advocating...which would be nervously holding the plane nose high with the stall horn bleating while hoping ROC will increase because the plane isn't performing as hoped. Not a recipe for success. Pulling harder will just take the plane closer and closer to an accelerated stall. High AOA at takeoff speed + 15mph will not get you up and out the fastest. It will take longer to get to Vx and both ROC and gradient will be less. 

As for the "softfield confusion"...a true softfield technique involves a nose high lift off as soon as the plane will fly (which is something less than normal stall speed due to lift of ground effect). The plane is "unstuck" at high AOA, held in ground effect while AOA is reduced to maintain alt above the airstrip as speed builds in ground effect. When airspeed is adequate a normal climbout follows. That's a good way to get the gear up and out of the mud, but the early lift off will probably eat up more ground distance while accelerating to Vx. 

[Guest]

From the 1978 J PoH.

 

[Tommy]

I can understand if you hold the nose high and bleed the airspeed below 66k after rotation then you are not going to climb very much but what I am struggling to understand is how the technique shown in the video (hovering in the ground effect and build up speed then trade it with altitude by pulling some Gs) is going to beat POH in terms of obstacle clearance?

If you are not going to clear the obstacle with published technique, then nothing else is going to. Otherwise the POH will need a re-write? Or is it because this technique is difficult to pull off and, more often than not, the pilot will either miss the ground effect or miss time the pull up and end up hitting the obstacle at a greater speed?

Interesting how the POH says you leave the gear until you clear the obstacle!

 

Edited October 14, 2017 by Tommy

[Guest]

Only a guess, but I think gear retraction was left until clearing the obstacle to allow the pilot to concentrate on flying?  Its really only a matter seconds before the plane is clear and high enough.

I do agree that Mooney's test pilots and engineers knew what they were doing, or the manual would be written differently.

Clarence