Minnesota Crash

[exM20K]

From @Shadrach's plots, that must have been a harrowing, very violent ride. It's hard to contemplate.

Regardless of the cause, I will  be sure to emphasize partial panel in my IPC's and BFR's.  Complacency creeps in w/ G1000 and other glass AHRS systems, and the standby gauges in the G1000 are not well located all the way over on the right.  Everything can break.

-dan

[Shadrach]

1 minute ago, 1980Mooney said:

That has to be induced under power.  Gravity will add speed but will not do that alone in such a short time.  It also makes it hard to believe that the plane was in a non-aerodynamic condition that causes it to flutter like a shuttlecock or a leaf as some postulate in order to have such speed/rate of descent.

It was likely in an aerodynamic state during the acceleration to max descent rate. The only thing in question is when did the structure fail. Given the eyewitness accounts and the images from the security camera. All we know is that it happened below the cloud deck and before coming into view on the camera. The vertical speed exiting the clouds was likely in excess of 500 feet per SECOND. Even if he reacted immediately, he was pretty low when I came apart

[Shadrach]

The one thing that still perplexes me is the descent rate. It seems like it would require max power to achieve that kind of speed in a dive. The speed leading up to the loss of control indicated a low power setting.

Edited August 9, 2021 by Shadrach

[jlunseth]

15 minutes ago, 1980Mooney said:

And to echo jlunseth's comment that ceilings were 800 ft I don't understand why he was not flying an Instrument Approach.  Weather at KFCM had been IFR all day and just becoming MVFR at OVC011 when he took off.  Considering that he had passengers and was in IMC it surprises me.

Is there some evidence he was not on an approach or had not filed IFR? Flightaware does not have that information. I don’t see how that would have been possible that day. His cruise was at 5,000, there would have been a solid cloud deck between him and the ground, and at 5,000 he might have been in the clouds there also. As I mentioned earlier in this thread, all the approaches to 10R & L start in the vicinity of the crash and at the altitude he was flying (2,900 vs. intercept altitudes of 2,700 or 2,800 depending on the approach). The course he flew looks like a vtf to 10R at FCM with a light deviation left of course starting near Victoria, but could have been an RNAV to either 10R or L. 

@Shad, your graphic is very helpful. I have to say that I have experienced similar altitude excursions on approach into FCM because of heavy convective activity, although it was on the other side of the airport, south over the Minnesota River. If there was a cell passing through that area, and there may have been, then those altitude excursions are more violent and exaggerated for the most part, than what I experienced, but they do not surprise me. Down 600, up 400, all in less than a minute or so it seemed. FCM tower got me the heck out of there. In my case the autopilot disconnected because it could not maintain control, it is one thing to hand fly in those circumstances and another to have control turned over in those circumstances with no notice.

[MooneyMitch]

Such sadness for all with this.  Don’t let your flying partner read this thread.  

[Shadrach]

1 hour ago, exM20K said:

this one doesn't seem all that mysterious to me. LOC on an instrument approach (meandering across the LOC) due to incapacitation, vacuum / instrument failure, or other unknown, break out of the overcast at low altitude in unusual attitude at warp 9, big hard pull, and that's it.

Very sorry for the loss.

-dan

Agreed.  Initial observations from FlightAware gave a very benign picture of the final moments.  After looking at the detail from ADS-b Exchange, it's pretty obvious. 

Edited August 9, 2021 by Shadrach

[Davidv]

42 minutes ago, 1980Mooney said:

Does anyone have the actual LiveATC recording with time stamps?  When I go to the LiveATC Archive for Aug 7 for the time of accident at KFCM Tower all I get is a blank recording?

I would like to note his responses or non-responses with position on the ADSB-Exchange flight track.

What am I doing wrong?  

I found the live ATC link (but I’m not in a place where I can find it right now), not sure if you are looking at the right time?  In any case, the timing of the YouTube seemed to match the LiveATC.  It did not appear to be edited for time.

[Shadrach]

5 hours ago, jlunseth said:

Is there some evidence he was not on an approach or had not filed IFR? Flightaware does not have that information. I don’t see how that would have been possible that day. His cruise was at 5,000, there would have been a solid cloud deck between him and the ground, and at 5,000 he might have been in the clouds there also. As I mentioned earlier in this thread, all the approaches to 10R & L start in the vicinity of the crash and at the altitude he was flying (2,900 vs. intercept altitudes of 2,700 or 2,800 depending on the approach). The course he flew looks like a vtf to 10R at FCM with a light deviation left of course starting near Victoria, but could have been an RNAV to either 10R or L. 

@Shad, your graphic is very helpful. I have to say that I have experienced similar altitude excursions on approach into FCM because of heavy convective activity, although it was on the other side of the airport, south over the Minnesota River. If there was a cell passing through that area, and there may have been, then those altitude excursions are more violent and exaggerated for the most part, than what I experienced, but they do not surprise me. Down 600, up 400, all in less than a minute or so it seemed. FCM tower got me the heck out of there. In my case the autopilot disconnected because it could not maintain control, it is one thing to hand fly in those circumstances and another to have control turned over in those circumstances with no notice.

If you look at 18:39:22 and 18:39:29. In 7 seconds the aircraft went from -2000FPM to +2000FPM.  I hope that you've never had a ride like that in IMC.  That kind of maneuvering, the associated affects on the inner ear and the instrument lag have the makings of severe spatial disorientation. Couple that with rusty instrument skills and the odds are not good.

Edited August 9, 2021 by Shadrach

[DXB]

18 minutes ago, Shadrach said:

Agreed.  Initial observations from FlightAware gave a very benign picture of the final moments.  After locking at the detail from ADS-b Exchange, it's pretty obvious. 

I didn't even realize that resource existed until this thread. There is truly nowhere left to hide in aviation.  I then thought the incredible descent rate that he had coming out of the clouds started after he lost the horizontal stab during the previously very high descent rate, causing him to pitch down hard.  But if one believes the unconfirmed eyewitness, he had the elevator authority upon exiting the clouds to pull up hard and snap the spar, at which point the plane, as you surmised, shuttlecocked into the ground. It still doesn't add up precisely, but the granular ADS-b data is incredibly insightful.  

[Shadrach]

4 hours ago, DXB said:

I didn't even realize that resource existed until this thread. There is truly nowhere left to hide in aviation.  I then thought the incredible descent rate that he had coming out of the clouds started after he lost the horizontal stab during the previously very high descent rate, causing him to pitch down hard.  But if one believes the unconfirmed eyewitness, he had the elevator authority upon exiting the clouds to pull up hard and snap the spar, at which point the plane, as you surmised, shuttlecocked into the ground. It still doesn't add up precisely, but the granular ADS-b data is incredibly insightful.  

I had never seen it either. @1980Mooney's post was the first time I'd heard of it or seen a screenshot.  It doesn’t have the most intuitive UI but after a few minutes of trial and error I was able to get an entirely different picture of the events leading up to this unfortunate crash.

Edited August 9, 2021 by Shadrach

[whiskytango]

Within a one month period we have been made aware of two incidents involving Mooneys and significant overspeed events, with very different outcomes.  

In the incident in Canada (reported in a separate thread in this section) an M20F was reported to have reached 235 kts in a loss of SA due to primary ADI failure in IMC.  The pilot was able to recover after breaking out and made a normal landing.

Hopefully the NTSB will be able to perform detailed metallurgical analysis on the structural components (wings, spar, empennage) and, combined with the flight data that has been presented here, develop a sequence of the failures.

I suspect I am not the only Mooney owner that, due to latency in Wx data, inadvertently entered a cell in IMC.  I have been amazed that the airplane could be in one piece after exiting.   Our aircraft of choice is extremely strong, but there are limits.

Prayers for the families and friends of those who died.

[Hank]

I do know that airspeed builds rapidly in descent with the gear up. In actual IMC, it would only take a momentary distraction to get out of whack and too fast.

My wife talks in IMC only when I talk to her first, and she never talks on approach in IMC. 

There is always the possibility of equipment failure, too. There wasn't much time to troubleshoot or correct. 

[jlunseth]

30 minutes ago, Shadrach said:

If you look at 18:39:22 and 18:39:29. In 7 seconds the aircraft went from -2000FPM to +2000FPM.  I hope that you've never had a ride like that in IMC.  That kind of maneuvering and the associated affects on the inner ear have the makings of severe spatial disorientation. Couple that with rusty instrument skills and the odds are not good.

No, not that much, I remember the 600 down. There is a tower ride at an amusement park in that vicinity, which concerned me at the time. I experienced enough to say that it is very difficult to re-establish equilibrium in IMC when it becomes impaired. The AI is very important, partial panel is next to useless.

If I can put in a plug, I decided a couple of years ago that the main area in which my training was lacking was recovery of severe upset in IMC. I went to APS in Pheonix and took their excellent upset recovery course, which included incipient spins on instruments. It was costly, fun, and I have not regretted it. However, even they focus on stalls and stall/spin recovery. Regaining instrument control from an uncontrolled accelerated descent or dive in IMC in severe circumstances - I am not sure anyone trains it.

[ArtVandelay]

Does anyone have the actual LiveATC recording with time stamps?  When I go to the LiveATC Archive for Aug 7 for the time of accident at KFCM Tower all I get is a blank recording?
I would like to note his responses or non-responses with position on the ADSB-Exchange flight track.
What am I doing wrong?  

You want the 2230Z archive.

[Shadrach]

Juan Brown just released his prelim.

ceilings reported at 1100OVC at the time. Relatively new pilot earning his PPSEL in 2016. 

Edit: It appears Juan is mistaken about the pilot’s experience. He had owned the accident aircraft since 2012.

Edited August 11, 2021 by Shadrach

[Scott Dennstaedt, PhD]

1 hour ago, 1980Mooney said:

And to echo jlunseth's comment that ceilings were 800 ft I don't understand why he was not flying an Instrument Approach.  Weather at KFCM had been IFR all day and just becoming MVFR at OVC011 when he took off.  Considering that he had passengers and was in IMC it surprises me.

Yes, there was a RAOB taken pretty close to the time and location of the site of the crash.  This shows the bases of this stratocumulus deck were ~1200 ft AGL and tops were ~2700 ft MSL; so the clouds were less 1,000 feet deep.  The sky was overcast which is also seen on the IR satellite imagery.  So an instrument approach would be necessary given the weather at FCM. 

KFCM 072353Z 09007KT 9SM OVC012 22/19 A2977 RMK AO2 SLP077 T02220194 
KFCM 072253Z 06007KT 10SM OVC013 23/19 A2976 RMK AO2 SLP075 T02280194
KFCM 072153Z 08010KT 9SM OVC011 22/20 A2977 RMK AO2 SLP078 T02220200
KFCM 072100Z 08009G17KT 10SM OVC011 22/19 A2978 RMK AO2 T02220194  

[ArtVandelay]

You want the 2230Z archive.

17:36:17 checkin
:40 clear to land
:42 ctl again
:54 tail number call
:57 finally responds, get ctl
37:07 Check altitude alert, 2700’

The times are out of sync:
Adsb seems to show times in local time zones.
There is ~2:15 difference, ie add 2:15 to liveatc feed.

[jlunseth]

Thank you for the actual weather Scott. He was landing on 10R according to the ATC recording, that would have put the aircraft right at intercept altitude for the ILS or the RNAV 10R into FCM. 

There was a cell that had passed to the east by the time I heard about this accident and looked at the wx at around 8 pm. It was small in diameter but the top was 37k or better. Is there a way to retrieve the NEXRAD at the time of the accident, which apparently was around 6:40 CDT? This is speculation, but the pilot deviated left of the final approach course a little, and that may even have been before he penetrated the deck if the deck was 2900. It is possible he was trying to avoid a cell sitting on the final approach course or a little south of it. That would help explain a deviation to the north to avoid the cell, then a correction back south to get on the final approach course, and then an immediate turn to the north if he ran into the cell again.

[jlunseth]

5 minutes ago, 1980Mooney said:

Thanks.

In the recording at 7:08 you can hear the low altitude alarm when the Tower Controller calls N9156Z to alert him.  If you line that up with the first "2700" on the ADSB-Exchange Map that is 17:39:22 just past Lake Auburn.  

His check-in at 6:15 on the recording is before he starts the S turn at 17:38:29 on the Map.

When the Tower asks "do you need help" at 7:41 in the recoding I think that is at 17:39:55 and I think he already had crashed.  The Tower could not see because he was 8-9 miles away.

KFCM2-Aug-07-2021-2230Z.mp3 3.4 MB · 0 downloads

It would be helpful to have the Approach tape that preceded the tower communications. Approach on that side of the airport is 134.7. Approach would have cleared the pilot for the approach and would have done any vectoring, then handed him off to the tower when he was on the final approach course. If there was a warning about a cell on final, approach might have done that rather than tower.

[ArtVandelay]

I have been downloading numerous LiveATC archive files and none are exactly 30 minutes long.  They don't exactly match the title.  So I would be careful.  That is why I tried to match to a known event.

Yeah, that’s why I updated, did the same and synced the low altitude alert to first time he drops to 2600’. The video images are closer to the ADSB times.

[David Lloyd]

There was another eyewitness fishing on a nearby lake.  He described the airplane as descending out of the clouds, swirling around.  Was that a link on KR?

The NTSB interview was very informative.  The airplane was on an IFR flight plan and cleared for the approach, 10L?

Flight aware show the flight from Alexandria at 5000, an IFR altitude.  A number of flights in the last 10 days, about 8 or 9 hours flying.  Looked like that was a normal thing for the last month.  About a third were filed IFR.

[jlunseth]

7 minutes ago, David Lloyd said:

The airplane was on an IFR flight plan and cleared for the approach, 10L?

The tower cleared him to land on 10R according to the tape. The main approaches are the 10R ILS and the 10R RNAV. There is an RNAV to 10L, but the approach lights are at 10R, that is a nice, big long runway compared to 10L, and the 10L approach is not used much if at all. I have never flown it. Not significant to the accident since all the one-zero approaches start out in the area where the crash occurred, just information. 

[carusoam]

It would be nice to compare the approach taped voice… to the control tower taped voice…

Looking for a change from normal IFR business style, or an unusual casual style…

 

We would be looking for changes in style of timing… serious to casual… quick and timely to slow and delayed…

In other situations we have heard people struggle unknowingly with CO poisoning… health issues like stroke can be subtle, but the time frame can be quick like minutes…

 

The Mooney spar IS legendary…  but, it takes a whole plane and a complete pilot to fly a successful approach…

PP thoughts only, not a mechanic or brain doctor…

Best regards,

-a-

[carusoam]

8 minutes ago, 1980Mooney said:

Is there a replay of the NTSB interview anywhere?  I cannot find anything.  If so please provide the link.  Thanks

Find the Kathryn’s report above… there is a video, with the ADSBexchange data as well…

[Shadrach]

28 minutes ago, 1980Mooney said:

Juan did not do his homework.  Dr Edney bought the Mooney in April 2012 from an owner in Las Vegas.  Here is the ad when it was for sale last in 2012 - N9156Z | 1991 MOONEY M20M BRAVO on Aircraft.com  Read the Inspection status and it notes that the Annual is due Jan 2012.

Below is a scan of the AviationDB history of ownership.

I think he got his Instrument Ticket in 2016.  The FAA Airman will show the date of the latest certification. Don't know when he got his Private.  I do not believe the statement that he got his Private in 2016 is creditable.

 

Good catch! I am sure that he will correct it in a subsequent video