M20M Crash near Pomona, CA

[drmarkflies]

 

The recent fatal M20M accident near Pomona, CA appears as though it may have been a manuvering stall-spin on the base-to-final leg. The statistics for fatal pattern accidents certainly support this hypothesis.

If this hypothesis is correct, it seems odd the pilot was flying NNE and cleared to land on 26R (according to the NTSB eye witness and ATC, respectively).

Has anyone flown into Brackett Field and been given left traffic for 26R?

Does anyone have an alternate hypothesis?

Of course, we would all like to know if there is anyting "Mooney" in this accident or whether it was a misjudgement by the pilot, so I'm not seeking a speculation-fest, just food for thought.

 

[carqwik]

Stall spin is likely culprit.  But why so slow or did he overbank?  One potential problem is a faulty or stuck ASI.  I've seen this before in my bird where the ASI hung at 100 kts on the power reduction abeam the numbers...thankfully it was VFR and I recognized the problem on base when the airspeed did not align with the power/flap configuration.  Thought it was an insect in the pitot tube...then it happened again (again, VFR thankfully) and I sent the ASI out for overhaul.  Turns out there was an accumulation of dirt in the gearing.  I can see a scenario where the ASI is reading too fast and one pulls the power way out and puts out all the anchors yet indicated airspeed does not change...you know the rest.

[drmarkflies]

An ASI problem would explain the event, and something to which I will pay careful attention in the future. Under that scenario the pilot could have let the ASI trump the stall horn. It is peculiar how one can mix up the relative importance of warnings when under stress. We have all done it.

[flyboy0681]

If something is suspected with the ASI then all eyes should be on the GPS. But that's a BIG if.

[jetdriven]

I bet for every airspeed indicator that sticks there are 100 pilots in the grave who simply got distracted and stalled the airplane.  Distractions are the number one thing.  Stall a laminar flow wing mooney below 1500 feet and you're dead it is as simple as that.  It got Joel Smith.  

[aviatoreb]

Quote: jetdriven

I bet for every airspeed indicator that sticks there are 100 pilots in the grave who simply got distracted and stalled the airplane.  Distractions are the number one thing.  Stall a laminar flow wing mooney below 1500 feet and you're dead it is as simple as that.  It got Joel Smith.  

[sreid]

Without regard to what did or did not happen in this accident, there is absolutely no reason a sticky airspeed indicator should ever result in losing control of a Mooney. The fact that it's sticky means that it's not going to be confusing, because you will notice that the needle is not moving appropriately when you change power and configuration. Even if it's not sticky but reads 10 kts high, the airplane will tell you by control response, pitch attitude, and of course stall warning that you are slow. Pitch+Power = Performance. Know what combinations of pitch attitude and power setting are required to keep your airplane at a safe airspeed.

[flyboy0681]

Quote: sreid

Without regard to what did or did not happen in this accident, there is absolutely no reason a sticky airspeed indicator should ever result in losing control of a Mooney.

[PTK]

In the Performance section of every POH there is a neat little graph called STALL VS ANGLE OF BANK.

Seems to me that we all need to take this opportunity to review and study this graph and undestand it.  As an example, for my airplane, I take the highest possible stall speed which is at full gross, full dirty (full flaps and gear down) and at a whopping 60 degrees of bank. It is 77 KIAS onto which I add an extra buffer of safety.  I certainly never feel the urge to bank 60 degrees during maneuvers to final and still never let my AS drop below 85 KIAS during the maneuvering to final. This way I know I will not stall the airplane when low and slow. 

Not second guessing the poor soul but it's what makes me happy.

[scottfromiowa]

Joel Smith was a multi-1,000 hour Mooney test pilot (factory) that was aboard (not necessarily PIC) in a well published Stall Spin multiple fatality accident in Texas while attempting to land (Mooney).  A good case study to review and reinforces base to final overshoot (bank angle), tail wind landings and adverse impact on stall speed.  Good review in MOA back issues.

[aviatoreb]

Quote: scottfromiowa

Joel Smith was a multi-1,000 hour Mooney test pilot (factory) that was aboard (not necessarily PIC) in a well published Stall Spin multiple fatality accident in Texas while attempting to land (Mooney).  A good case study to review and reinforces base to final overshoot (bank angle), tail wind landings and adverse impact on stall speed.  Good review in MOA back issues.

[Shadrach]

I have on several occasions seen birds circling off of the approach end of the runway and considered the potential for disaster if a pilot reacts/overreacts to a bird in the flight path while low and slow in a bank.  

[jetdriven]

http://www.moapilot.com/magazine_toc_2004.htm

[jlunseth]

I am coming to the conclusion that a major killer of GA pilots is the mantra to fly tight patterns.  Bruce Landsberg has an article on the AOPA website right now about it, clucking his tongue about a Mooney flying wide albeit quietly over his neighborhood.  Blog.aopa.org/leading edge .  He gave the standard rationale, saying that staying within gliding range in the event of an engine failure " seems like good advice." seems!!!

I hope the soul who died in Pomona had not just read that article.

This summer I landed at most of the airports in MN, about 100, mostly small rural airports.  Time and time again flying tight would cause a tight downwind to base, or base to final, and with it a drop in airspeed.  The good thing is I learned to (1) fly wider and (2)always check airspeed in those turns.  According to the Nall report, the number of stall/spin accidents during landing vastly outnumbers the engine failures in type certificated aircraft.

 

[drmarkflies]

Thanks to everyone for insight on the Pomona accident. I'm a low time Mooney pilot and definitely nervous about pattern maneuvering because I struggle to get my speeds right when the ASI is working correctly. I'd appreciate comments on the following.

One thing I know about my low wing lady is that she behaves very badly if I try to set her down too fast and fail to take out the flaps if I do. My general strategy has been to be at 95 kts abeam, 85 kts base-final and 75 kts over the numbers. Even if I pull the throttle full aft, I always have to pitch or slip out 10 kts or so on final (but never do it until wings are level).

 

 Am I just missing my power setting or is my strategy wrong?

 

[PTK]

Quote: jlunseth

I am coming to the conclusion that a major killer of GA pilots is the mantra to fly tight patterns.  Bruce Landsberg has an article on the AOPA website right now about it, clucking his tongue about a Mooney flying wide albeit quietly over his neighborhood.  Blog.aopa.org/leading edge .  He gave the standard rationale, saying that staying within gliding range in the event of an engine failure " seems like good advice." seems!!!

I hope the soul who died in Pomona had not just read that article.

This summer I landed at most of the airports in MN, about 100, mostly small rural airports.  Time and time again flying tight would cause a tight downwind to base, or base to final, and with it a drop in airspeed.  The good thing is I learned to (1) fly wider and (2)always check airspeed in those turns.  According to the Nall report, the number of stall/spin accidents during landing vastly outnumbers the engine failures in type certificated aircraft.

 

[Shadrach]

Dupe...

[Shadrach]

1) Know the numbers for your approximate weight and configuration.

2) Know your margins and maintain them.

3) Fly the airplane.

4) Right hand on the throttle at all times and ready to add power unless changing configuration.

Fail to do any of the above and there's a good chance that the size of the pattern your flying will be the least of your worries.

Moreover, just because someone flies a "tight pattern" (that means different things to different people) does not mean that margins are being cut close, nor does a large one mean they won't.  If you've got a tailwind on base, overshooting the intercept to final is still a possiblity even if you flew a 3 mile base.  

[John Pleisse]

There was mild windshear at my home base one evening about a month ago. 3000-130@40 and SFC 240@10. It was hard to carve out a pattern. The tail was kicked around downwind to base and you got blown down base leg so quickly, the turn to final was futile.

For a split second I saw the ball out of the cage and was almost suckered into saving it. I put the power in and went straight upwind. I was embarrassed and full of doubt getting rocked around in the turbulence. While I redid my pattern, 3 other aircraft had the same experience and had to go-around. My next pattern was nearly a mile and a half wide.

I feel real bad for this fellow.

[drmarkflies]

My take-home from you guys is to fly a Bravo pattern faster and wider with a longer stabilized final...  the same concept used by the MD-80s that land at my towerless GA airport. It sure sounds right to me. Gracias!

[aviatoreb]

Quote: allsmiles

This is an EXCELLENT point. It has been my observation as well. There are many CFI's out there who have very minimal if any Mooney time who instruct exactly this! It has been my impression that they assume the Mooney can't be that much different than a Cherokee or a 150 in this regard. Someone correct me if I'm wrong but the Mooney, in view of its wing, is indeed different! I too fly wider patterns in order to keep banks and AS away from stalls.

This illustrates the critical importance of Mooney specific training. Programs like the Mooney Safety Foundation are invaluable. They are worth their weight in gold! It would be interesting to do a study to determine how many of these unfortunate individuals actually had Mooney specific training beyond a check-out.

[carqwik]

I think the wider and longer final of a Bravo is a function of airspeeds.  If you could fly a Bravo at the speeds of a 182 or PA28 in the pattern, then it would be closer in and shorter finals.  But as airspeed goes up, so does the pattern size.  I use 100 kts abeam, 90-95 kts on base, and full flaps slowing to 80-85 or so at 500' agl with additional speed reduction to 75 over the fence via trim.  There's no way to fly the same tight pattern as a PA28 at those speeds, especially as speed reduction in a Bravo is not instantaneous like in a 182 with a configuration change.  And if one was flying a jet, then the pattern would be even wider and longer...

The Bravo is a personal airliner and should be flown the same way...just my opinion.

[jlunseth]

There was a thread on the Red Board in Oct. that made me look at the Nall report statistics during the landing phase on stall/spin accidents v. engine failures.  Here is what I posted over there:

"According to the Nall Report (2010) there were 20 stall/spin accidents during approach and landing, 9 of those fatal. There were 3 loss of power accidents during approach and landing, none fatal.

In addition to that, if you look at the statistics on mechanical failures in the "GA" fleet, there were 89 (all phases of flight), 16 fatal. Of those mechanical failure accidents in the "GA" fleet, 56 were amateur built, or about 62%, and 13 of the 16 fatals were in amateur built aircraft.

Although it is not in the Nall Report, if you apply the "mechanical failure" percentage attributable to home builts, to the number of power failures during landing (3), there was only 1 mechanical failure accident in 2010 during approach and landing in type certificated aircraft, and that accident was not fatal.

The number of stall/spin accidents on approach and landing does not merely outnumber mechanical failure accidents in professionally maintained, type certificated aircraft, it absolutely overwhelms them. It also fits with the general statistic that most accidents are pilot caused accidents, not mechanical.

Frankly, this is one area where traditional teaching techniques ("tight pattern") are completely out of step with reality (unless you fly a homebuilt). And this, regretably, results in fatalities."

The 20:1 accident ratio convinced me.  There are obviously times when a tight pattern is needed.  Circle to land is one, some approaches at reliever airports require a close pattern to stay out of the Bravo airspace (KSGS here in St. Paul), but for everyday flying, I went to a wide pattern this summer and it works alot better.  As far as the risk of engine failure goes, I have a 13:1 glide ratio, I can be two miles out on downwind and still make it to the airport.  The risk is alot less in my estimation, than the chance that I will be momentarily distracted trying to fly a Skyhawk pattern.

[aviatoreb]

Quote: jlunseth

There was a thread on the Red Board in Oct. that made me look at the Nall report statistics during the landing phase on stall/spin accidents v. engine failures.  Here is what I posted over there:

"According to the Nall Report (2010) there were 20 stall/spin accidents during approach and landing, 9 of those fatal. There were 3 loss of power accidents during approach and landing, none fatal.

In addition to that, if you look at the statistics on mechanical failures in the "GA" fleet, there were 89 (all phases of flight), 16 fatal. Of those mechanical failure accidents in the "GA" fleet, 56 were amateur built, or about 62%, and 13 of the 16 fatals were in amateur built aircraft.

Although it is not in the Nall Report, if you apply the "mechanical failure" percentage attributable to home builts, to the number of power failures during landing (3), there was only 1 mechanical failure accident in 2010 during approach and landing in type certificated aircraft, and that accident was not fatal.

The number of stall/spin accidents on approach and landing does not merely outnumber mechanical failure accidents in professionally maintained, type certificated aircraft, it absolutely overwhelms them. It also fits with the general statistic that most accidents are pilot caused accidents, not mechanical.

Frankly, this is one area where traditional teaching techniques ("tight pattern") are completely out of step with reality (unless you fly a homebuilt). And this, regretably, results in fatalities."

The 20:1 accident ratio convinced me.  There are obviously times when a tight pattern is needed.  Circle to land is one, some approaches at reliever airports require a close pattern to stay out of the Bravo airspace (KSGS here in St. Paul), but for everyday flying, I went to a wide pattern this summer and it works alot better.  As far as the risk of engine failure goes, I have a 13:1 glide ratio, I can be two miles out on downwind and still make it to the airport.  The risk is alot less in my estimation, than the chance that I will be momentarily distracted trying to fly a Skyhawk pattern.

[jlunseth]

Not very likely.  If the cause was an engine out on landing causing a stall/spin, the NTSB would figure that out and it would be included in the mechanical failure accidents.