Two Lessons From The DCA Crash

[Hank]

4 hours ago, Igor_U said:

Pete, in my neck of woods, Paine field uses two frequencies for it's two runways (16R/34L=132.95 and 16L/34R= 120.2) and often using one controller when traffic is "light". BFI has the same, however I am not sure how often they use one controller nowadays. They certainly did in the past when I frequent the field. I think it's not that unusual on bigger airport.  

Even KLAL uses different frequencies for the two runways during Sun n Fun (two runways means the large, fast planes use the runway, and us little folk use the taxiway).

[Schllc]

I know it’s overly simple but the helo could have had a bad baro setting.  Or both aircraft could have for that matter.

Even so, not sure why the controllers would have allowed them to get that close in  an approach corridor. 

[GeeBee]

13 hours ago, MikeOH said:

I've heard the collision occurred above 300 feet.  The part I'm confused by is that an approach slope of 3 degrees would put the RJ at around 200' 1/2 mile from the threshold.  1/2 mile is nearly on the EAST side of the Potomac.  Is this some kind of 6 degree 'slam dunk' visual approach that would explain how the RJ was over 300 feet?

I would not put a lot of trust in a/c position right now until a more substantive survey has been completed.

[EricJ]

2 hours ago, Schllc said:

I know it’s overly simple but the helo could have had a bad baro setting.  Or both aircraft could have for that matter.

Even so, not sure why the controllers would have allowed them to get that close in  an approach corridor. 

That my question, why are they even allowed to converge on short final to a runway?    Especially at night?    Usually the only place I see helos crossing a busy runway centerline is over mid-field, which makes more sense to me.

[Hank]

2 hours ago, EricJ said:

That my question, why are they even allowed to converge on short final to a runway?    Especially at night?    Usually the only place I see helos crossing a busy runway centerline is over mid-field, which makes more sense to me.

Because of airspace restrictions, FRZ, etc., is my best guess. These things make good sense to the bureaucratic hive mind.

[Ragsf15e]

5 hours ago, GeeBee said:

I would not put a lot of trust in a/c position right now until a more substantive survey has been completed.

Is TCAS turned off at some point during the approach?  Say like with gear down or below a certain altitude?  I would have thought the airliner would be getting a continuous RA?

[Ragsf15e]

Even if the helicopter was at 500’ instead of 200’, and assuming the crj was right on glideslope, do we really use 300’ “separation” as a standard at night on approach in busy airspace??  Seems like a recipe for many more accidents.  Clearly there should be some other type of separation built in.  

[Ibra]

52 minutes ago, Ragsf15e said:

Is TCAS turned off at some point during the approach?  Say like with gear down or below a certain altitude?  I would have thought the airliner would be getting a continuous RA?

I think TCAS do not work (inhibited) for RA/TA bellow 1000ft/500ft agl both aircraft were under these heights, so beyond most TCAS specs

Edited 21 hours ago by Ibra

[Ibra]

I don’t know how visual self-separation works at nights with more than 3 aircrafts in vicinity of Bravo type airport with multiple runway in operation? then how that works when adding night IFR circling at 350ft-450ft MDH on wide 2nm circling area? then adding other things like tower staffing, crew fatigue after long night flight, 100ft bust of altitude, pilot errors, flight paths under engine failures…it sounds like that route was running with very tight margins (even if 200ft separation was deemed enough for visual “traffic separation”, it’s not enough for “wake separation” for helicopter to fly 200ft under or behind airliner on landing config).

An instruction to orbit or delay crossing would have allowed helicopter to properly identify traffic or judge distance to traffic, both are hard to do at night, or even build a tiny margin, although, it’s easier to “over analyse” after events.

A very sad accident, all my thoughts for civilian and military victimes and their families !

 

Edited 21 hours ago by Ibra

[Ibra]

19 hours ago, MikeOH said:

I've heard the collision occurred above 300 feet.  The part I'm confused by is that an approach slope of 3 degrees would put the RJ at around 200' 1/2 mile from the threshold.  1/2 mile is nearly on the EAST side of the Potomac.  Is this some kind of 6 degree 'slam dunk' visual approach that would explain how the RJ was over 300 feet?

My understanding they were circling with other traffic were on straight ILS, so them being at 350ft (MDH) during such manoeuvre is normal as long as they stay in 2nm circling radius

Circling at night is a whole topic on its own, are the CRJ LPV equipped? are Part121 operators required to fly at say 400ft MDH and stay within 2nm radius? I mean is it ok to do instrument circling at 1000ft agl from 3nm distance if weather permits, like a pattern in good night VMC

Edited 20 hours ago by Ibra

[MikeOH]

Just now, Ibra said:

My understanding they were circling, so them being at 350ft (MDH) during such manoeuvre is normal as long as they stay in 2nm circling radius

Circling at night is a whole topic on its own, are these CRJ LNAV/LPV equipped? does Part121 are required to fly at MDH and stay within 2nm? I man doing CTL at 1000ft agl and 3nm in good VMC is ok?

While that makes sense, my understanding was that the RJ was on final and would have been descending.  Unless they were using a much steeper approach, a 3 degree slope still puts them at 200 feet nearly on the east side of the river.  What I'm getting at is that BOTH the RJ and the helicopter could have been at 'legal' altitudes.  Just doesn't seem like a good idea to be using visual separation at night in that environment.  Based on the little information available, it seems like the helicopter had the WRONG traffic in sight.

[GeeBee]

50 minutes ago, Ibra said:

I think TCAS do not work (inhibited) for RA/TA bellow 1000ft/500ft agl both aircraft were under these heights, so beyond most TCAS specs

That is correct.

[Ibra]

31 minutes ago, MikeOH said:

Just doesn't seem like a good idea to be using visual separation at night in that environment.  Based on the little information available, it seems like the helicopter had the WRONG traffic in sight.

They probably had wrong traffic in sight, AAL was behind CRJ on same closure angle, one will have to wait and see what comes from NTSB/FAA 

Yes, visual separation at night and visual circling at night squeezed low level does not sound healthy (one can compare to the tons of rules for same mixing of IFR/VFR under low ceiling).

 

Edited 20 hours ago by Ibra

[ohdub]

I'm ATC in Canada, and when we are working multiple frequencies, we have the ability to "couple" the frequencies so that when a pilot transmits on one of my frequencies, the transmission is automatically re-broadcast on all my other frequencies so that everyone I'm working can hear all other transmissions from aircraft that are on my other frequencies. We've had this capability for about the last 25 years, and every time I fly in the US I can't believe the controllers there don't have that ability. I really hate not being able to hear all transmissions to the controller who is working me. You definitely have reduced situational awareness in these situations.

[PT20J]

If you think this is bad, you should check out the Anchorage AK procedures in the Alaska Supplement. There is Elmendorf AFB to the north, then Merrill Field, then Lake Hood SPB/Lake Hood Strip, then Anchorage Intl to the south + a number of private strips. Approaching Merrill from NW, you have to fly between Pt. Noname and Pt. MacKenzie in a specific corridor between 2200' and 2500'. This corridor crosses the final for Elmendorf Rwy 6 and there will often be F-15's crossing either below 2200 on an instrument approach or above 2500' in formation for the overhead break. Anchorage was the instigator of part 93 Special Air Traffic Rules.

[Grant_Waite]

I don’t see why they couldn’t have gone to any of the 1000s of MOAs to accomplish some silly checkride. The fact that we as GA pilots can’t hear them because they use UHF to transmit and we use VHF to transmit needs to end. I get way more information hearing from the aircraft itself than the controller. Isn’t that how we fundamentally fly and avoid traffic in all uncontrolled environments? You listen to other aircraft report positions and follow that up with adsb info to look for visual contact if able. You take not hearing and most times not seeing military aircraft on adsb out of the equation and our ability to see and avoid goes back to pre efb and adsb… NO THANKS! Safety has greatly increased because of both of those but most military traffic might as well be antiquated as a piper cub. NTSB said there were 5 controllers in the tower at the time. 2 of which were a supervisor and supervisor in training. Also why is that those American Airlines pilots had at least a minimum of 1500hrs but we have 500hr pilots flying a helicopter weighing 13000lbs into the busiest airspace in the country at NIGHT. It’s just absolute absurdity they even had these helicopter routes in the first place. It was a disaster waiting to happen. We’re fortunate it was only a 3 man helicopter and not 2 fully loaded wide bodies. This is bound to happen again if the FAA can’t get their shit together with controllers. 

[N201MKTurbo]

If the military wanted to fly this mission, it doesn’t seem like a stretch to call ATC and request that the airspace be cleared for 5 minute window and let the helicopter fly its mission. As soon as the helicopter was clear, operations could resume.

My understanding is it was a continuation of command training mission. Practicing taking high ranking pentagon officials to the bunker in Raven Mountain. The mission is flown assuming all navigation facilities are off line, so they are flying visually with NVGs following the rivers edge, which would be reliable pilotage.

The only time these procedures were used, was after 9-11 and if you remember, all air traffic was stopped. So practicing with approaches going on does not seem realistic.

[N201MKTurbo]

The highest ranking person on the helicopter was a captain, so I assume she was the pilot in command. News reports say she was extreamly experienced with 450 hours of flying time. That doesn’t sound that experienced to me. I have no idea how good a pilot the captain was or how much recent experience she had. There were numerous news stories about her attending high ranking socal events in DC including escorting foreign dignatries. I don’t think this is typical duty for an army captain. I wonder if these events distracted her from her flying duties?

[N201MKTurbo]

The news has been reporting that the helicopter was doing this continuation of command mission. I just looked this up on the map and if the mission was to take people from the Pentagon to Raven Rock Mountain Complex, they were going the wrong way. Flying the river north would get you most of the way there, but they were flying south.

[PT20J]

I don’t think you can easily compare military flight time with civilian flight time. An airline pilot with 20,000 hours has spent most of that time cruising on the autopilot. A private pilot with 450 hours in one geographic area spread over ten years may not be very experienced. Military pilots are always training. Most people would consider the Blue Angels to be highly proficient but fleet pilots can apply with 1250 hours of jet time.