M20R Accident Analysis

[gdwinc]

I fed all 13 of the fatal Ovation NTSB accident analysis into AI and had it create a table that included some of the pertinent facts, the NTSB's probable cause findings and a 100 word summary of the accident.  I then had the AI analyze the information to categorize the findings and provide some risk mitigation strategies.  

Both the AI derived table and the summarization are in the attached Excel file.

My own (non-AI) summary of how to avoid fatal accidents is use good ADM (like avoiding flying unairworthy aircraft or flying into ice in a plane not certified for it) and practice instrument flying enough to remain very proficient.

Take a look at the data and let me know what you think.

jamie

M20R Ovation Fatal Accident Analysis.xlsx

[NickG]

Vey interesting - I did a similar analysis a while back of all Ovation accidents, not just fatal (i'm looking for the results I know they're somewhere...) - A large percentage were landing accidents due to bouncing and botched go arounds. When I find it I'll post it. 

[gdwinc]

It would be great to see your analysis! 

My brief review of all Ovation accidents matched your description of landing and go arounds occurring at a much higher rate than the rest of the Mooney fleet.  Further, the rate of Ovation takeoff and cruise accidents are lower than the rest of the Mooney fleet.  

My Claude AI subscription choked on doing the analysis of the 13 fatal accident reports such that I had to break it up into multiple conversations and then pull it all together.  The total number of accidents is 3x the fatals so it would take me a fair amount of time to run the same analysis on all accidents.  If there is any interest among Ovation owners I will find the time to expand the analysis.

jamie

[Scottknoll]

Thanks for putting the effort into this. Wasn’t expecting much from the AI after seeing the disappointing 2025 Mooney M20 video

The analysis was actually pretty good. Would be interesting to know total fleet (ovation) hours for accident rate, but I’m not sure there’s an easy way to do it accurately.

[Schllc]

While there is always something to learn from these analysis, the critical element I am always left asking is why?

why would one take off in heavy snow, whiteout conditions at night?  I can’t in my wildest imagination see a scenario that I would make that decision. 

This makes me wonder the why, and what detail is missing from the story?

I am certainly guilty of some bad decisions over the last 10 years I have been flying. I have found myself in situations that I did not  predict, and fortunately everything turned out ok, but how close was I in those scenarios to being a statistic?

 That being said, none of them were so glaringly “wrong” at take off,  and while none were planned for, all but one, were merely more than I asked for, not near death.  
One example was I flew from Alaska to Louisiana without stopping, but for fuel, in a TBM.   I was not the PIC on the last few legs, and when we landed I had not accommodated for the time change and took off for home (FL) in my Mooney. 
I did not want to land at night, because I just don’t fly at night much, and not only did I find myself landing at night, but with less fuel than would have made me comfortable and malfunctioning landing lights at the airport. 
weather was nice, and it was a non event, but what could have gone wrong?

As informative as these stories are, and as instructional as they can be, I am always left wanting more information, because the story usually sounds too bizarre for reality…

[midlifeflyer]

23 minutes ago, Schllc said:

While there is always something to learn from these analysis, the critical element I am always left asking is why?

why would one take off in heavy snow, whiteout conditions at night?  I can’t in my wildest imagination see a scenario that I would make that decision. 

This makes me wonder the why, and what detail is missing from the story?

I sometimes wonder, if you presented the scenario to the pilot a month before the incident, would they:

1. say, "no, of course not."
2. talk in terms recognizable as one of the hazardous attitudes.
3. say, "legal is the only personal minimum I have."
4. have a history of similar acts in which they've been successful.
5. [fill in your own answer]

[DesertWrecks]

Great stuff. Thanks for sharing!

[DesertWrecks]

On 6/13/2025 at 9:21 AM, NickG said:

Vey interesting - I did a similar analysis a while back of all Ovation accidents, not just fatal (i'm looking for the results I know they're somewhere...) - A large percentage were landing accidents due to bouncing and botched go arounds. When I find it I'll post it. 

Would like to see this

[NickG]

Ok. here it is. brought it current and formatted it.

For those that don't want the detail, here's the conclusion:

Conclusion
The analysis of Mooney M20R Ovation accidents highlights that landing-related issues,
particularly those involving pilot technique errors, are the most common, accounting for
46.97% of all accidents and 87.10% of landing accidents. Loss of Control dominates fatal
accidents (66.67%), emphasizing the risks of spatial disorientation and IMC. These findings
suggest a need for targeted pilot training on landing techniques and IMC avoidance,
alongside robust maintenance practices to address mechanical failures.

Mooney Ovation Accident Analysis.pdf

[donkaye, MCFI]

A well written analysis.  I recommend sending it to Phil Corman who produces the monthly Mooney Flyer as an article worthy of publishing.  

I do a lot of transition trainings, and by far the thing that prevents me from signing a person off is the last 5-10 seconds of the landing.  It can't be done by Rote mechanical motions.  While proper approach speed and slope can make the flare easy for an experienced person, recognizing the rate of pull back on the yoke as it relates to reduction of sink rate, increase in ground effect, and remaining energy requires practice and feel.  After years of teaching I know when that "feel" has been achieved.  Sometimes it takes 20 landings on the low side and in rare instances it has taken 300.

In reading the landing accidents that were the result of pilot error---with proper training they shouldn't have happened.

[aviatoreb]

On 6/14/2025 at 7:47 AM, Scottknoll said:

Thanks for putting the effort into this. Wasn’t expecting much from the AI after seeing the disappointing 2025 Mooney M20 video

 

The analysis was actually pretty good. Would be interesting to know total fleet (ovation) hours for accident rate, but I’m not sure there’s an easy way to do it accurately.

 

This video is really bad - in such interesting ways.  If you are interested in the mathematics of AI like I am.  It remarkable that AI can put together something, anything at all.  This video has such interesting errors in the visuals - wrong airplane - details of the airplane keep changing - and even the prop is all off - with random number of blades sticking out at random angles.  And of course the information is all wrong.  Notably the idea that the airplane is still in production and development in 2025.  Or we get the G3000, and on and on.

[Fly Boomer]

6 hours ago, NickG said:

The analysis of Mooney M20R Ovation accidents highlights that landing-related issues,
particularly those involving pilot technique errors, are the most common, accounting for
46.97% of all accidents and 87.10% of landing accidents. Loss of Control dominates fatal
accidents (66.67%), emphasizing the risks of spatial disorientation and IMC. These findings
suggest a need for targeted pilot training on landing techniques and IMC avoidance,
alongside robust maintenance practices to address mechanical failures.

I wonder why the M20R is so much more dangerous and requires such a high degree of pilot skill to avoid crashing?  Why so much more dangerous than other Mooney models?

[Jeff Uphoff]

1 hour ago, Fly Boomer said:

I wonder why the M20R is so much more dangerous and requires such a high degree of pilot skill to avoid crashing?  Why so much more dangerous than other Mooney models?

But do we have a good comparison with other Mooney models--especially short- and mid-body models--and statistics to support the assertion the Ovation is more dangerous? (If the primary problem is landings, I'd expect the Bravo and Acclaim numbers to be pretty similar.)

--Up.

[exM20K]

2 hours ago, Jeff Uphoff said:

But do we have a good comparison with other Mooney models--especially short- and mid-body models--and statistics to support the assertion the Ovation is more dangerous? (If the primary problem is landings, I'd expect the Bravo and Acclaim numbers to be pretty similar.)

--Up.

It really is unknowable which model is “safer” for at least this set of reasons:

• small number of incidents. Each new incident can meaningfully change the conclusion.
• no certainty on the denominator, definition or size.  Is it hours flown? Landings? Miles?
• planes not uniformly equipped. If icing is a big contributor, can I eliminate or discount that from my analysis b/c I’m FIKI? Should the number of incidents in FIKI-eligible planes be inflated because *some* have FIKI and are presumably less subject to icing issues?

But where I believe this phase-of-flight analysis can be useful is to find patterns in the hazardous phases of flight. For example, if the M20R has a high concentration of landing LOC mishaps, that should be a training and transition focus.  It is a very different thing to say: “20% of Ovation mishaps are Landing LOC” vs “Ovation landing LOC mishaps happen twice as frequently as they do in M20E models.”

Another example of concentrated risk by phase of flight would be base-to-final and especially go-around upswing-to-crosswind stall/spin wrecks in the Cirrus line. They stick out bigly, and I’ve had the misfortune of witnessing one.  
 

-dan

[midlifeflyer]

10 hours ago, NickG said:

The analysis of Mooney M20R Ovation accidents highlights that landing-related issues,
particularly those involving pilot technique errors, are the most common, accounting for
46.97% of all accidents and 87.10% of landing accidents. Loss of Control dominates fatal
accidents (66.67%), emphasizing the risks of spatial disorientation and IMC. These findings
suggest a need for targeted pilot training on landing techniques and IMC avoidance,
alongside robust maintenance practices to address mechanical failures

Aren't those numbers fairly consistent with overall GA breakdowns?  None of those numbers are getting a "wow!" from me. Except maybe that only 87% of landing accidents involve issues with pilot technique  - that sounds low.  

[NickG]

Just to be clear, this analysis is ONLY M20R models and does not state that Ovations are any more or less susceptible to accidents than any other Mooney model. Any yes, I fed the data into AI and then edited/clarified as necessary.

[NickG]

Here's the answer to the "go-around" question

Total Botched/Improper Go-Around Accidents: 5

• 19 Mar 1999 (HB-DID): Pilot lost control during go-around.
• 7 Jul 2000 (ZS-OEG): Go-around with insufficient runway, ending on wrong side of drag curve.
• 5 Apr 2006 (N4654M): Failure to maintain airspeed during go-around, resulting in stall/mush.
• 1 Jul 2007 (N321MD): Failure to attain proper touchdown point, failure to initiate go-around.
• 29 Jan 2011 (N64FM): Delayed go-around decision, wing striking trees, excessive speed.

Note: The 12 May 2007 (OE-KMO) accident (stalled after multiple landing attempts) is included, as multiple landing attempts likely involved botched go-arounds leading to a stall, though not explicitly stated.

Step 2: Calculate Percentages

• Total Accidents: 66
• Total Landing Issues Accidents: 31
• Botched/Improper Go-Around Accidents: 5

Percentage of Total Accidents:

• (5 / 66) × 100 = 7.58%

Percentage of Landing Issues Accidents:

• (5 / 31) × 100 = 16.13%

Step 3: Summarize Results

Table: Botched/Improper Go-Around Accidents

Category	Number of Accidents	Percentage of Landing Issues	Percentage of All Accidents
Botched/Improper Go-Arounds	5	16.13%	7.58%
Other Landing Issues	26	83.87%	39.39%
Total Landing Issues	31	100.00%	46.97%

Summary

• Number of Botched/Improper Go-Around Accidents: 5 out of 31 Landing Issues accidents.
• Percentage of Landing Issues Accidents: 16.13% (5 out of 31).
• Percentage of Total Accidents: 7.58% (5 out of 66).
• Key Observations: Improper go-arounds are a notable but not dominant subset of landing accidents, often involving delayed decisions, airspeed mismanagement, or loss of control during the go-around maneuver. The majority of Landing Issues accidents (83.87%) involve other causes, such as improper flares, bounced landings, or mechanical failures.

[NickG]

Heres a comparison based on public data:

Other Mooney Models: Available Data

Other Mooney models include the M20 series (M20A through M20V, with the M20R Ovation being a later model) and earlier variants like the M20E and M20F. Key sources provide the following insights:

• AOPA Safety Review (1995): Analyzed M20-series accidents (1982–1991, covering models like M20J, M20K, older M20C/E/F) with 392 accidents across ~6,500 registered Mooneys (~6% per 100 registered aircraft). Fatal accidents were not broken down by model, but the M20 series had a lower accident rate than comparable retractable-gear aircraft (7.7% per 100 registered aircraft).
• Aviation Safety (2005): Provided specific rates for newer Mooney models:
  • M20R Ovation: 5.7 overall, 1.9 fatal per 100,000 hours (33% of accidents fatal).
  • M20M Bravo: 6.7 overall, 1.8 fatal per 100,000 hours (27% fatal).
  • M20J 201: 6.4 overall, 1.6 fatal per 100,000 hours (25% fatal).
  • Older models (e.g., M20C/E/F) had higher rates, around 7–8 per 100,000 hours overall, with fatal rates of 2–2.5 per 100,000 hours.
• Air Facts Journal (2014): Noted that newer Mooneys (e.g., M20R, M20M) have better safety records than older models (e.g., M20C, M20E) due to improved avionics and pilot training. Engine failures are more common in Mooneys than in some competitors, often due to maintenance issues. Landing accidents remain a significant issue across all M20 models due to the low-drag airframe requiring precise airspeed control.
• NTSB Data (General Mooney Trends): For the broader M20 series, landing accidents typically account for 40–50% of incidents, loss of control for 15–25%, and engine failures for 10–15%, with patterns similar to the M20R but varying by model age and equipment.

Estimating Flight Hours for Other Mooney Models

The Mooney M20 series has produced ~11,000 aircraft since 1955, with newer models (M20J, M20K, M20M, M20R, etc.) comprising ~4,000–5,000 units. Excluding the M20R (~1,200 units), let’s estimate for other models:

• Fleet Size: ~9,800 total M20 aircraft, with ~3,000–4,000 for newer models (M20J, M20K, M20M) and ~5,000–6,000 for older models (M20C, M20E, M20F).
• Flight Hours: Assuming 150–200 hours/year per aircraft (similar to M20R), over 40 years for newer models (1985–2025) and 60 years for older models (1965–2025):
  • Newer models: ~3,500 aircraft × 175 hours/year × 40 years ≈ 24,500,000 hours.
  • Older models: ~5,500 aircraft × 175 hours/year × 60 years ≈ 57,750,000 hours.
• These are rough estimates, as older aircraft may fly less, and exact hours are unavailable.

Comparison

1. Overall Accident Rate:
   • M20R Ovation: 1.01 per 100,000 hours (estimated here), 5.7 per 100,000 hours (2005 estimate).
   • Other M20 Models:
     • M20M Bravo: 6.7 per 100,000 hours (2005).
     • M20J 201: 6.4 per 100,000 hours (2005).
     • Older models (M20C/E/F): 7–8 per 100,000 hours (2005).
     • AOPA (1982–1991): ~6% per 100 registered aircraft (~392 accidents for ~6,500 aircraft).
   • Comparison: The M20R’s accident rate is lower than or comparable to other newer Mooney models (M20J, M20M) and significantly lower than older models (M20C/E/F). The AOPA data suggests the M20 series as a whole has a slightly lower accident rate per registered aircraft than comparable GA aircraft, and the M20R, being a newer model, likely benefits from improved design and avionics.
2. Fatal Accident Rate:
   • M20R Ovation: 0.23 per 100,000 hours (estimated here), 1.9 per 100,000 hours (2005 estimate), 22.73% of accidents fatal.
   • Other M20 Models:
     • M20M Bravo: 1.8 per 100,000 hours, 27% fatal (2005).
     • M20J 201: 1.6 per 100,000 hours, 25% fatal (2005).
     • Older models: 2–2.5 per 100,000 hours, ~30–35% fatal (2005 estimates).
   • Comparison: The M20R’s fatal accident rate (per 2005 data) is similar to the M20M and M20J but lower than older models. The percentage of fatal accidents (22.73%) is slightly lower than the M20M (27%) and M20J (25%) and significantly lower than older models (30–35%), reflecting improved safety in newer Mooneys.
3. Landing Accidents:
   • M20R Ovation: 31 out of 66 (46.97%), with 5 botched/improper go-arounds (16.13% of landing accidents, 7.58% of total accidents).
   • Other M20 Models: AOPA and Air Facts Journal indicate landing accidents account for 40–50% of M20-series accidents, consistent across models due to the Mooney’s low-drag airframe and laminar flow wing, which demand precise airspeed control. The M20J and M20M likely have similar landing accident proportions to the M20R, while older models (M20C/E/F) may have slightly higher rates due to less advanced avionics and pilot training.
   • Go-Arounds: No specific data isolates go-around accidents for other M20 models, but the Air Facts Journal notes that Mooneys, including the M20R, are prone to landing issues like floating or stalling during go-arounds if airspeed is mismanaged. The M20R’s 16.13% go-around-related landing accidents is likely representative of newer models (M20J, M20M), while older models may have higher rates due to less forgiving handling characteristics.
   • Comparison: The M20R’s landing accident rate (46.97%) is within the 40–50% range for the M20 series. The go-around issue (16.13% of landing accidents) is likely similar across newer models, as the M20R, M20J, and M20M share similar aerodynamic traits. Older models may have a higher incidence of landing mishaps due to less sophisticated systems.
4. Loss of Control:
   • M20R Ovation: 16.67% of accidents (11 out of 66), 66.67% of fatal accidents (10 out of 15).
   • Other M20 Models: Loss of control accounts for 15–25% of M20-series accidents, with a high proportion of fatal accidents (50–70%), per NTSB and AOPA data. VFR-into-IMC and spatial disorientation are common causes across all M20 models, exacerbated by the Mooney’s high-performance characteristics.
   • Comparison: The M20R’s loss-of-control rate (16.67%) and its dominance in fatal accidents (66.67%) are consistent with other M20 models. Newer models (M20J, M20M) may have slightly lower rates due to better avionics (e.g., glass cockpits), but the pattern remains similar.
5. Engine Failure:
   • M20R Ovation: 9.09% of accidents (6 out of 66), 13.33% of fatal accidents (2 out of 15).
   • Other M20 Models: Engine failures account for 10–15% of M20-series accidents, with maintenance issues (e.g., fuel flow, oil starvation) frequently cited, per Air Facts Journal. Older models (M20C/E/F) have higher engine failure rates due to aging engines and less rigorous maintenance.
   • Comparison: The M20R’s engine failure rate (9.09%) is slightly lower than the M20-series average (10–15%), likely due to its newer engine design (Continental IO-550). Fatal engine failure outcomes are comparable across models.

Key Observations

• Overall Accident Rates: The M20R Ovation’s accident rate (1.01–5.7 per 100,000 hours) is lower than or comparable to newer M20 models (M20J: 6.4, M20M: 6.7) and significantly lower than older models (7–8 per 100,000 hours). This reflects improvements in design, avionics, and pilot training in newer Mooneys.
• Fatal Accident Rates: The M20R’s fatal rate (0.23–1.9 per 100,000 hours, 22.73% fatal) is similar to the M20J (1.6, 25%) and M20M (1.8, 27%) but lower than older models (2–2.5, 30–35%), indicating better safety in newer models.
• Landing Accidents: The M20R’s 46.97% landing accident rate aligns with the M20-series range (40–50%). Botched/improper go-arounds (16.13% of landing accidents, 7.58% of total) are likely similar in newer models (M20J, M20M) due to shared aerodynamic challenges (low-drag airframe). Older models may have higher landing accident rates due to less forgiving handling.
• Loss of Control: The M20R’s loss-of-control rate (16.67%, 66.67% of fatal accidents) is consistent with the M20-series pattern (15–25%, 50–70% fatal), driven by VFR-into-IMC and high-performance characteristics across all models.
• Engine Failure: The M20R’s engine failure rate (9.09%) is slightly lower than the M20-series average (10–15%), reflecting newer engine reliability, but maintenance remains a concern across all models.

Limitations

• Flight Hour Estimates: The M20R’s estimated hours and other M20 models’ hours are rough, as exact data is unavailable. The 2005 Aviation Safety estimates are more precise but dated.
• Data Age: AOPA (1982–1991) and Aviation Safety (2005) data may not fully reflect current trends, though newer Mooneys (like the M20R) benefit from modern safety features.

Conclusion

The Mooney M20R Ovation’s accident profile is similar to other newer Mooney models (M20J, M20M), with a slightly lower overall accident rate (1.01–5.7 vs. 6.4–6.7 per 100,000 hours) and comparable fatal accident rate (0.23–1.9 vs. 1.6–1.8 per 100,000 hours). Its landing accident rate (46.97%) and go-around issues (16.13% of landing accidents) align with the M20-series range (40–50%), driven by the Mooney’s demanding low-drag airframe. Older models (M20C/E/F) have higher accident and fatal rates due to aging systems and less advanced avionics. Loss of control remains a significant fatal risk across all M20 models, particularly in IMC. Enhanced training on go-arounds, airspeed control, and maintenance could further improve the M20R’s safety relative to other Mooney models.