Mooney M20E N79338 destroyed in Saratoga, NY - one fatality, one injured

[EricJ]

I wish they hadn't tried to turn back to the airport so low and just looked ahead for a spot.   I wonder whether that would have mattered.   

 

[LANCECASPER]

I feel especially sorry for the CFI just learning about the maintenance issues after he arrived the night before the departure. That's a tough spot to be put in. His life has forever changed. 

[Slick Nick]

So was it the engine driven fuel pump, or is that one Magneto suspect?

[Shadrach]

16 hours ago, LANCECASPER said:

The daughter might be helpful also. https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=24757573850537454&id=100001345445744&rdid=yj9lkZwHO8pr9wWG

Her post was absolutely heartbreaking…

[LANCECASPER]

10 hours ago, Slick Nick said:

So was it the engine driven fuel pump, or is that one Magneto suspect?

On both of those items it mentions that they were subjected to "extreme heat" and "exposure to the postimpact fire". 

So, although they may never determine exact cause due to the fire, the engine stopped producing power due to lack of fuel, lack of air or lack of spark. And with its recent history that is not a surprise. 

[Shadrach]

15 hours ago, EricJ said:

I wish they hadn't tried to turn back to the airport so low and just looked ahead for a spot.   I wonder whether that would have mattered. 

Not a lot of friendly terrain in the area. I don’t always do it , but I try to familiarize myself with off airport landing spots around unfamiliar airports so that I don’t have to think about where I am going to put down while troubleshooting a low level emergency. Sometimes there just aren’t any good options. 
 

 

[neilpilot]

I obviously don't know what caused this accident, but it does sound like fuel starvation.  I had similar engine issues that started about 20 years after I purchased N1310W.  I experienced 3 incidents where I suddenly lost engine power, only to return a few minutes later.  Those incidents were spaced several months apart over about 3 years.  During that period, I tried to troubleshoot the issue, including injector cleaning and an overhaul of the fuel injector system.  I never did find the cause of the power loss, but hoped that the steps taken had eliminated the issue.  Difficult to tell, especially since the problem occurred once every 6-12 months.

The 4th occurrence in July 2012 resulted in an off-field landing, with damage that totaled N1310W.

https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=da0b1baa577a20b3619c1bbb6d80cdcd90f5c06aa938d080087b90bd8ddc3410JmltdHM9MTc2MjU2MDAwMA&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=4&fclid=10042cb7-72d6-62cd-192b-3a8373dd6330&psq=n1310w&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9kYXRhLm50c2IuZ292L2Nhcm9sLXJlcGdlbi9hcGkvQXZpYXRpb24vUmVwb3J0TWFpbi9HZW5lcmF0ZU5ld2VzdFJlcG9ydC84NDQwMC9wZGY

The NTSB found "loss of engine power during cruise flight due to a malfunction of the fuel injection servo due to a damaged O-ring".  The O-ring fragment found in the mixture control lever assembly was only found after I asked the NTSB to send the system to a shop for teardown. Otherwise, the investigation would not have discovered the cause of the fuel starvation.  I reviewed all maintenance logs since manufacture, and suspect that the O-ring was original to the aircraft.  It was likely pinched when initially installed.  After decades a fragment that had broken loose floated around and blocked fuel flow intermittently.   

[Max Clark]

On 11/2/2025 at 5:06 PM, DXB said:

I got finished reading all of Mr Baber's posts in his recent thread on here regarding the prior engine issue.  He sounds like a thoughtful and humble guy who handled the event carefully and intelligently.  The sediment in the left tank sounded like the culprit, the approach to addressing it seemed fairly meticulous.  It's very sad his efforts and those of his A&P weren't enough to keep him safe. What an awful tragedy. RIP

Also f*ck the folks who immediately want to point the finger at him without knowing sh*t.

I've been struggling with this as well. I've encountered reckless people before, and nothing about his posts or actions come off as anything other than someone trying to do it the right way.

The report in this thread:

The flight instructor stated that he met the pilot for the first time the night before the accident, and they discussed the airplane’s maintenance issues and planned flight route. The flight instructor added that the pilot had test flown the airplane about 1 month prior to the accident flight. He also stated that the airplane’s engine lost power during the pilot’s test flight and that he had landed safely back at the airport at he end of that flight. The flight instructor described that the airplane’s fuel had been contaminated with algae and debris. A local mechanic subsequently repaired the fuel tank and cleaned out the fuel system.

On the day of the accident flight, the flight instructor and pilot performed a preflight inspection of the airplane and sampled fuel from the fuel tanks several times before departing. The flight instructor stated that after takeoff and during the initial climb, about 200 ft above ground level, the engine decreased in power from 2,500 rpm to about 1,500 rpm. A few seconds later the engine decreased to about 500 rpm and then lost all power. The flight instructor took over control of the airplane and tried to make a turn back to the airport. When he made a right turn, he realized that the airplane was too low. He then made a slight left turn to avoid a house before the airplane impacted a tree.

Maybe it's because we have the history before the crash, but something about this has really stuck with me. With the limited information we have:

• What went wrong here?
• Was this the first flight post repair?
• What was missed?

If they spent the time to "sample fuel several times" I would expect that they didn't skip a run up. My POH has a switch tanks before taxi, switch tanks to fullest for run up and leave on that tank for take off.

Could there have been something in the line between the sump and the engine that wouldn't have worked through during the run up? If that's possible would a longer run up have caught it?

Could this have been something that wouldn't show up on run up power, but would at take off power? How would you even check/test for that?

[Shadrach]

We can guess, but it’s not known for sure that fuel contamination or even the fuel system in general, was responsible for this engine’s recurring power loss issue.  Unfortunately, the previous statement was also true prior to the fateful flight.

I think it’s important to recognize that the diagnosis of a malfunction associated with critical system must be holistic.  If part of the fuel system is found to be contaminated, then the whole system needs to be inspected and decontaminated. AvStar will overhaul an RSA5A1D fuel servo for under $2K.

One can never be absolutely, 100%, sure that everything is functioning exactly as it should but…and I say this reverence for the loss associated with this crash…there could have and should have been a much deeper dive into troubleshooting the malfunctioning powerplant 

 

[Max Clark]

1 minute ago, Shadrach said:

We can guess, but it’s not known for sure that fuel contamination or even the fuel system in general was responsible for this engine’s recurring power loss issues.  Unfortunately, the previous statement was also true prior to the fateful flight.

I think it’s important to recognize that the diagnosis of a malfunction associated with critical system must be holistic.  If the fuel system is found to be contaminated, then the whole system needs to be inspected and decontaminated. AvStar will overhaul an RSA5A1D fuel servo for under $2K.

One can never be absolutely, 100%, sure that everything is functioning exactly as it should but…and I say this reverence for the loss associated with this crash…there could have and should have been a much deeper dive into trouble shooting the malfunctioning powerplant 

Thanks Ross. I get your point and will absolutely apply that to the future.

[LANCECASPER]

I've been struggling with this as well. I've encountered reckless people before, and nothing about his posts or actions come off as anything other than someone trying to do it the right way.
The report in this thread:
The flight instructor stated that he met the pilot for the first time the night before the accident, and they discussed the airplane’s maintenance issues and planned flight route. The flight instructor added that the pilot had test flown the airplane about 1 month prior to the accident flight. He also stated that the airplane’s engine lost power during the pilot’s test flight and that he had landed safely back at the airport at he end of that flight. The flight instructor described that the airplane’s fuel had been contaminated with algae and debris. A local mechanic subsequently repaired the fuel tank and cleaned out the fuel system.
On the day of the accident flight, the flight instructor and pilot performed a preflight inspection of the airplane and sampled fuel from the fuel tanks several times before departing. The flight instructor stated that after takeoff and during the initial climb, about 200 ft above ground level, the engine decreased in power from 2,500 rpm to about 1,500 rpm. A few seconds later the engine decreased to about 500 rpm and then lost all power. The flight instructor took over control of the airplane and tried to make a turn back to the airport. When he made a right turn, he realized that the airplane was too low. He then made a slight left turn to avoid a house before the airplane impacted a tree.
Maybe it's because we have the history before the crash, but something about this has really stuck with me. With the limited information we have:

• What went wrong here?
• Was this the first flight post repair?
• What was missed?

If they spent the time to "sample fuel several times" I would expect that they didn't skip a run up. My POH has a switch tanks before taxi, switch tanks to fullest for run up and leave on that tank for take off.
Could there have been something in the line between the sump and the engine that wouldn't have worked through during the run up? If that's possible would a longer run up have caught it?
Could this have been something that wouldn't show up on run up power, but would at take off power? How would you even check/test for that?

Many of those questions are answered in the post that started back in early October in the vintage Mooney section.

As an example on October 21, 10 days before the accident, there was a 14 minute post-maintenance flight that looked successful. However, after these symptoms had showed up several times, I would’ve had a hard time trusting that airplane for a flight from New York to Florida.

[1980Mooney]

24 minutes ago, Shadrach said:

We can guess, but it’s not known for sure that fuel contamination or even the fuel system in general was responsible for this engine’s recurring power loss issues.  Unfortunately, the previous statement was also true prior to the fateful flight.

I think it’s important to recognize that the diagnosis of a malfunction associated with critical system must be holistic.  If the fuel system is found to be contaminated, then the whole system needs to be inspected and decontaminated. AvStar will overhaul an RSA5A1D fuel servo for under $2K.

One can never be absolutely, 100%, sure that everything is functioning exactly as it should but…and I say this reverence for the loss associated with this crash…there could have and should have been a much deeper dive into troubleshooting the malfunctioning powerplant 

 

One thing not discussed here is the fact that most pilots put almost complete trust in their mechanics/A&P/IA's.  This plane was in the hands of a mechanic from Oct 10-21 according the "Right out of the gate" topic.  The mechanic conducted the test flight after repair looping the airport at least 4 times and @LANCECASPER congratulated him on the outcome.

Most Mooney owners don't join or frequent MooneySpace.  The owners that post here are generally way, way up the scale on knowledge of their aircraft and their skill level for diagnosing and repair.  I wager that the average Mooney owner has basic knowledge of their planes but have to take the word of their mechanic for most things.

Some are quick to say that Baber should have walked away from the plane or that he should have sprung for $thousands on overhaul and repair of entire systems. I bet many have experienced engine power reduction or stoppages only to trust their mechanic it has been repaired and fly on.  @neilpilot above says that he had three (3) engine reduction/stoppages, yet they never figured out what caused it and he continued to fly based on his trust in his mechanics. He didn't park the plane. The fourth occurrence did cause an off-field landing that he survived.  Had it been on take off, the outcome might have not been survivable.

The point is that flying is inherently dangerous.  We are flying planes that are generally 20-60 years old.  These Mooney's have generally seen many owners and mechanics. Not every problem and repair has been documented over time.  A small thing like @neilpilot's fragment of an o'ring can bring your plane down.  Even brand-new Mooney's crash due to undetermined equipment failure like M20V Acclaim Ultra, N576CM, in 2019. 

This is a very sad outcome for an enthusiastic pilot/owner.  We can second guess the measures Baber took but I wager that most of us would have handled it the same way.   We take risks every time we fly - equipment, weather and personal performance.  We try to mitigate risks but we have to trust someone.

[LANCECASPER]

3 hours ago, 1980Mooney said:

One thing not discussed here is the fact that most pilots put almost complete trust in their mechanics/A&P/IA's.  This plane was in the hands of a mechanic from Oct 10-21 according the "Right out of the gate" topic.  The mechanic conducted the test flight after repair looping the airport at least 4 times and [mention=8122]LANCECASPER[/mention] congratulated him on the outcome.
.

 

To clarify, I congratulated him on the progress that was being made not the outcome. I said, “Congrats! That looks a lot better than last time”. It was obvious by this point in the thread that he was determined to get this airplane flying one way or another.

From the start, and more than once, I strongly encouraged him not to accept the airplane after what happened on the hand-off flight.

 

[DXB]

1 hour ago, Shadrach said:

 

I think it’s important to recognize that the diagnosis of a malfunction associated with critical system must be holistic.  If the fuel system is found to be contaminated, then the whole system needs to be inspected and decontaminated. AvStar will overhaul an RSA5A1D fuel servo for under $2K.

 

I'm curious if there are any SOPs to guide exactly how far to go with such inspection and decontamination in Mr. Baber's fuel system contamination scenario. One adds some risk with all invasive maintenance, particularly that performed without a clear diagnosis up front, which may more than offset likelihood any safety dividend of an intervention not directed at a clearly identified problem in a component.  I admittedly know little about these fuel injection systems, which my plane lacks, and so my comment may be completely off the mark in this particular case. However, if there is a more rational, systematic process for dealing with Fred Baber's fuel system contamination issue than what he did, it's certainly worth highlighting here so that others can learn from this tragedy.  

[DCarlton]

3 hours ago, Shadrach said:

We can guess, but it’s not known for sure that fuel contamination or even the fuel system in general, was responsible for this engine’s recurring power loss issue.  Unfortunately, the previous statement was also true prior to the fateful flight.

I think it’s important to recognize that the diagnosis of a malfunction associated with critical system must be holistic.  If the fuel system is found to be contaminated, then the whole system needs to be inspected and decontaminated. AvStar will overhaul an RSA5A1D fuel servo for under $2K.

One can never be absolutely, 100%, sure that everything is functioning exactly as it should but…and I say this reverence for the loss associated with this crash…there could have and should have been a much deeper dive into troubleshooting the malfunctioning powerplant 

 

As I've mentioned, I had an experience back in 2015 leading to two emergency landings; the first with complete loss of power downwind.  The second occurred after extensive troubleshooting that didn't identify a cause and a test flight that lasted over an hour before the problem resurfaced.  We decided to overhaul the engine instead of pouring more money into a high time engine; plus I just didn't feel like I could fly a third test flight without identifying root cause which seemed unlikely.  I was fortunate to be at my home airport which eased some of the pressures of dealing with an aircraft issue miles from home.  After going through my logs thoroughly, and with consideration to all the troubleshooting, I always thought it might have been the fuel servo (speculation based on the process of elimination); it was the bigger bucks item that hadn't been touched.  I'm repeating my story because I hope there is something to be learned here; as much as I don't want to second guess, and it seems obvious now, I have to agree.   

[EricJ]

3 hours ago, Max Clark said:

...

Maybe it's because we have the history before the crash, but something about this has really stuck with me. With the limited information we have:

• What went wrong here?
• Was this the first flight post repair?
• What was missed?

If they spent the time to "sample fuel several times" I would expect that they didn't skip a run up. My POH has a switch tanks before taxi, switch tanks to fullest for run up and leave on that tank for take off.

Could there have been something in the line between the sump and the engine that wouldn't have worked through during the run up? If that's possible would a longer run up have caught it?

Could this have been something that wouldn't show up on run up power, but would at take off power? How would you even check/test for that?

I had some significant problems with my airplane when I first got it, which included three separate occassions of power loss, and I was extremely fortunate that in all three I was able to put it on an airport without damaging anything.   In my case the issues were confounded a bit because we had a known issue with water contamination which seemed to include trapped water coming out and getting ingested at inopportune times, as well as a fuel servo which had been subject to unknown contamination and was "full of grit" according to the shop that ultimately overhauled it.

So the first power failure, which was a complete loss of power on takeoff, we *think* was due to water, but because of the later issues that turned out to be the fuel servo, may have been because of the fuel servo.    When I rolled off the end of the runway onto the taxiway the engine was idling, so it had restarted somewhere between when I pulled the throttle back to make the runway and when I rolled off the end.   That seemed to support the water ingestion theory, but servo failures due to contamination can be intermittent as well, so who knows.

The second failure was a clogged injector, also on takeoff, which on a four cylinder takes about half the power away.   In that case I still had about 100 ft/min climb, so I felt my way around the pattern pretty low, did an actual short approach and got it back on the airport.   The finger filter in the servo was completely full of junk, and when we cleaned that and the failed injector things seemed to be back to normal.   It was an indicator that was, or at least had been, contamination in the fuel system.   By then we thought we had all the water out, and couldn't find any signs of contamination anywhere else, so I kept flying it.   

The third failure was another total power loss, but we were, very, very fortunately, already within glide range of our destination, so we landed there.   Again, it was idling when we landed, but wouldn't make any more power than a little above idle, basically barely enough to taxi.    The mechanic on that field had heard us taxi in and my attempts to get it to make power, and had already diagnosed it by the noises it was making as the fuel servo.   He's a really good mechanic, and he was right.   The servo got sent off for overhaul and I've put essentially a thousand hours on it since with no more similar trouble.

On every one of those flights there were no indications of trouble during startup, taxi, or runup, or even the takeoff roll or the climbout right up until the actual failure.  

In this case the fire probably erased any hope of finding out the actual problem.    Because of the symptoms and the similarity to the issues I had, I suspect there was a problem in the servo that was intermittent, maybe due to some particulate contamination that got into the diaphragms and needle valves.

FWIW, contamination can get inside the servo via the ram air tubes that protrude into the throttle body.   On most airplanes the air that goes in there is always filtered unless the mechanical bypass opens, but on Mooneys with the ram air door the filter can be bypassed by opening the ram air door.    If this happens with dust or other contamination in the air, that contamination get into the servo, and basically has no way to get back out.   This is one of the reasons that I recommend that people with J models with ram air doors that are so inclined should delete the ram air door and cover it over, and there's a kit from Mooney and an SB to do this.    On other models, just be very careful to not open the ram air door until you're in clean air (although you can't ever really be sure), and remember to close it before you descend or enter rain or the potential for dust/bugs/whatever.

So there's no way to know for sure what happened in this case, because it really could have been a few different things, and any evidence in my personal prime suspect, the fuel servo, was probably destroyed in the fire.   All we can do is be careful, pay attention to the filters during service and annual inspections, sump for contamination and water, do thorough runups, and pay attention to misbehaviors that may be indicating deeper problems.   

I raced cars regularly for twenty years and never lost a friend or even an acquaintance.   We had some injuries, myself included, but never lost anybody.   I've been back to aviation for about nine years and have already lost a number of acquaintances, and I include this as one of them.   Risk in GA is higher than we sometimes care to admit, so it's really important to stay diligent and pay attention.

[hazek]

18 hours ago, EricJ said:

I wish they hadn't tried to turn back to the airport so low and just looked ahead for a spot.   I wonder whether that would have mattered.   

 

4 hours ago, Shadrach said:

Not a lot of friendly terrain in the area. I don’t always do it , but I try to familiarize myself with off airport landing spots around unfamiliar airports so that I don’t have to think about where I am going to put down while troubleshooting a low level emergency. Sometimes there just aren’t any good options. 
 

 

Since the McSpadden death I sort of have made it my mission to look for this mistake and point it out every time it happens and harp on the fact that turning back is basically never the best option. Remember my posts in that thread about the power off 180s demonstrated by the youtube pilot with the Acclaim?: New “impossible turn” video - Acclaim S

 

It's not an impossible turn. It's just a "very likely to kill you if you try it" turn. And the irony of this example is that he needed to have a instructor with him. And maybe I shouldn't judge a person who has survived a crash and another person died as a result of their actions, and I will definitely look as an asshole for what I'm about to post, but this CFI likely killed the owner. How can you start a turn back without even noticing how low you are and only doing so once in a bank dodging houses? Why the automatic reflex to turn back at all? Another failure of our community, blind leading the blind, and no standards adopted that are objectively safest. I bet I will get responses to this very comment by someone more experienced than me (and therefore presumably a higher authority, right?) saying how wrong I am. It seems like every pilot, especially once with the rating of a CFI is just an artist, who just gets to impart knowledge on to others without any real authority, doing it their own way, teaching their "techniques". What a load of bullshit we have in this business. In this story they had no business turning back at all. I checked! Look, the view they had in front of them (crash where the red X is roughly):

Further along their flightpath:

Why not go straight? Why not be prepared to go straight? Foreflight has this feature, I don't know if people know this, but you get to look at the 3D view of the airport with one click, so easy to do even just when holding short (something I do every single time):

 

If anyone ever, this pilot, and especially this CFI, should have been briefed on what to do if the engine fails. Judging from where they ended up, it seem like going straight could have worked for both to survive. There was enough of a nice clearing right there just in front of them. A couple of S turns with full flaps should have made it possible to set it down there.

 

But no, the CFI the insurance company demanded reflexively turned back only to see he's about to hit a house. And this damn idea to turn back just refuses to die. Thanks to all the youtubers making videos about the "impossible" turn, despite the many craters it creates, it just keeps on taking and it seems to me it has claimed another victim. This pisses me off to no end. /rant-off

[hazek]

46 minutes ago, DCarlton said:

I'm repeating my story because I hope there is something to be learned here

There likely is. I just did some pretty big work on my 18 year old engine that suffered from an intake leak a few months ago. It turns out the 12 year TBO is there for a reason and various rubber and other synthetic items, from hoses, to o rings, to gaskets just don't last that long. All my gaskets were near the end, if not already destroyed. We found a pretty badly worn fuel selector o ring that was replaced, some oil was leaking mildly in various places from stiff rubber hoses. And with this accident I'm thinking perhaps I didn't do enough and I should replace all the diaphragms in the fuel injector servo as well as in the flow divider. I'm a true believer in OC maintenance just like Busch preaches it. But I have now realized that some of this stuff has to be replaced in a certain interval and it's likely not advisable to wait for a problem to manifest itself. Luckily I noticed my intake leak only as a brief engine stumble on downwind to base turn on power reduction and it wasn't anything more than that.

[DCarlton]

2 hours ago, EricJ said:

- a fuel servo which had been subject to unknown contamination and was "full of grit" according to the shop that ultimately overhauled it.

- On every one of those flights there were no indications of trouble during startup, taxi, or runup, or even the takeoff roll or the climbout right up until the actual failure.  
 

Your experience tends to support that my issue in 2015 was also the fuel servo.  No power downwind even with full throttle but we were idling at the very end of the 5000 foot runway and were able to taxi back to the hangar (which made no sense at the time).  

Why focus on J's?  Why not seal the F ram air door too?  I check mine every flight.  Sometimes it'll look like it's cracked open a few degrees; may need to be adjusted.     

[EricJ]

1 hour ago, DCarlton said:

Why focus on J's?  Why not seal the F ram air door too?  I check mine every flight.  Sometimes it'll look like it's cracked open a few degrees; may need to be adjusted.     

On a J it's an easy mod that has almost no affect on performance, and there's a factory Service Bulletin and kit to do the mod, i.e., it's an approved alteration.   It has a bigger affect on performance on the earlier models and doesn't have any factory data for the alteration.

[AndreiC]

@EricJ My mechanic just discovered that my ram air door cable has been broken for the best part of a year (the time since my last annual), thus the door has stayed open during all this time, including during ground operations. (1970 E.) I operated only from paved runways in this time, and not particularly badly crumbling ones. Should I be concerned that I got crud in the servo? So far the engine has been running like a top, no complaints, so other than your comments above I have no reasons to suspect a bad servo. 

What should I do at this point? Sorry to be changing the topic of this thread. 

[Slick Nick]

31 minutes ago, bluehighwayflyer said:

If the oil hasn’t been changed yet maybe oil analysis?   Look for silicone readings.  Most likely no harm has been done.  

Silicon.

[AndreiC]

1 hour ago, bluehighwayflyer said:

If the oil hasn’t been changed yet maybe oil analysis?   Look for silicone readings.  Most likely no harm has been done.  

My understanding was that the issue would be if the crud got into the servo but not left it -- that it could clog things up there. Isn't it the case that silicon that would show up in oil would be from whatever crap the plane picked up that did make its way out of the servo? I am not that concerned about that stuff, more about the stuff that is stuck in the servo.

[Max Clark]

8 hours ago, LANCECASPER said:

Many of those questions are answered in the post that started back in early October in the vintage Mooney section.

As an example on October 21, 10 days before the accident, there was a 14 minute post-maintenance flight that looked successful. However, after these symptoms had showed up several times, I would’ve had a hard time trusting that airplane for a flight from New York to Florida.

I saw that flight and wondered about it and what it meant in context of figuring out the cause of the crash.

[Max Clark]

8 hours ago, 1980Mooney said:

This is a very sad outcome for an enthusiastic pilot/owner.  We can second guess the measures Baber took but I wager that most of us would have handled it the same way.   We take risks every time we fly - equipment, weather and personal performance.  We try to mitigate risks but we have to trust someone.

This is exactly what I've been thinking about - "would I have done something differently?" Followed with "what should I do differently?"