Mooney down in Norfolk

[Marauder]

What a perv. I knew there'd be one around

 

I'm having trouble piecing this together because I haven't seen the times and what not so what would be the time of departure and arrival to put those figures into perspective?

 

I believe the accident happened around 4:30 am.

[midlifeflyer]

One reason never to jump to conclusions. The FAA Airmen Registry has a Michael Jay Bruxton from Virginia Beach listed who is instrument rated. There is also a Dr. Michael J. Bruxton practicing in Virginia Beach.

 

 

Always a good idea.

[Seth]

I was caught right at Texarcana where Texas, Arkansas, and Lousiana meet up around midnight in 2010 or 2011 in my former 1967 M20F flying back from Texas when I went through a layer around 4000 feet that also had extreme up and down drafts.  I had about an hour of fuel left and it was night IFR, so I wanted to get on the ground, refuel, and get away from the weather.   I was worried as I'd gain and lose 500 feet very quickly.  When I got out the bottom side of the clouds around 2000 feet, it was very smooth.  I landed, refuled, took off and headed South East until away from whatever the frontal boundary was.  Flew direct east after that, and then up to NC.  After another fuel stop, we finished the trip to MD.  We added maybe two hours of flying to stay away from the long front stretching a good 1/2 the country to stay clear of the bad weather.  We left late, all sorts of delays, and should have just stayed put and left the next morning.  I had another pilot on board, and almost decided to call it a night at that point.  That was one of my few  "get-there-itis" cases, and I've learned from them.  If need be, I just go the next day, or a few days later now, or cancel the trip.

 

Taking off at Midnight for a 4.5 hour flight is just hard.  Maybe one of the other passengers was also a pilot.

 

-Seth

[201er]

TAFs:

 

 

"KORF 040100Z 0401/0424 21008KT P6SM OVC015 TEMPO 0403/0405 -RA OVC008 FM040500 22012KT 4SM -RA BR OVC008 FM040800 22014KT 4SM -DZ BR OVC004 FM041500 24014G23KT P6SM OVC008 FM041900 22013G22KT 4SM BR O"

 

"KORF 040535Z 0406/0506 22014KT 4SM -DZ BR OVC004 FM041500 23014G22KT P6SM OVC008 FM041900 22013G22KT 4SM BR OVC020 FM050400 36012KT 4SM -RA OVC007"            

All other factors aside, with a good alternate, that is not a no-go TAF. It's a concerning one to be sure. But that alone isn't a reason not go go. The Metars show declining conditions which are concerning but again remaining within ILS IMC. What about the Airmets? Surely there were Airmets for icing and turbulence?

[flyboy0681]

TAFs:

 

 

"KORF 040100Z 0401/0424 21008KT P6SM OVC015 TEMPO 0403/0405 -RA OVC008 FM040500 22012KT 4SM -RA BR OVC008 FM040800 22014KT 4SM -DZ BR OVC004 FM041500 24014G23KT P6SM OVC008 FM041900 22013G22KT 4SM BR O"

 

"KORF 040535Z 0406/0506 22014KT 4SM -DZ BR OVC004 FM041500 23014G22KT P6SM OVC008 FM041900 22013G22KT 4SM BR OVC020 FM050400 36012KT 4SM -RA OVC007"            

 

 

Looks like the forecasters were right on the money.

[ryoder]

I would say that the technical step is bigger from PPL to IFR than it is from zero to PPL.

Besides all the new rules, the learning how to read and understand how weather unfolds, learning how to read charts and maps and lots more, I was really impressed with the basic geometric visualization skills that must be developed. Its called part of situational awareness the abilities to look at needles and guages and from that to build up a 3d model in your head of where you are in space and where you are supposed to be relative to the approach or what not, and to anticipate what's next - I'm a math professor and I should be a whiz at that right compared to "normal folk" but I will be the first to affirm that even this part was not easy for me. I can only imagine how that goes for folks that never were used to imagining three dimensional configurations in their heads previously - it must be like learning a new language from scratch.

Thanks for mentioning that. I find the visualization more comfortable than most because of my 3d game programmimg experience and engineering background. I have also been flying flight simulator since I was a kid so flying by needles was never scary. Of course that all goes out the window when in turbulent IMC I am sure.

[JaredDavis]

73kt headwind at 1600ft?  Anyone have the winds aloft forecast?

[201er]

73kt headwind at 1600ft?  Anyone have the winds aloft forecast?

Pitot icing anyone? Maybe the pilot thought he was going 100+ knots when he wasn't really going 100+ KIAS? 30 ground speed with 30 knot wind is possible.

[par]

All other factors aside, with a good alternate, that is not a no-go TAF. It's a concerning one to be sure. But that alone isn't a reason not go go. The Metars show declining conditions which are concerning but again remaining within ILS IMC. What about the Airmets? Surely there were Airmets for icing and turbulence?

 

I disagree with you and the accident here speaks volume as to why. Just because it can be done does not mean it should be done. Also, the whole issue here is that there was no good divert available. As a single seat Military aviator who spent plenty of time staying current, these are not the kind of conditions to take lightly when departing at 12am. I looked at the WX here last night and decided today would not a good day to go flying my Mooney. These guys had a serious case of get-home-itis and unfortunately it did not work out well.

[Ftlausa]

If everything iced over, that would make sense, but you would think he would have picked up on that and noticed no change in airspeeds.  I fly in Florida, so the whole icing thing is mostly theoretical to me.   

[Marauder]

All other factors aside, with a good alternate, that is not a no-go TAF. It's a concerning one to be sure. But that alone isn't a reason not go go. The Metars show declining conditions which are concerning but again remaining within ILS IMC. What about the Airmets? Surely there were Airmets for icing and turbulence?

Are you kidding Mike? Flying single engine, single pilot (even with help) with low IMC and high winds at night -- in a plane you borrowed?

The key to action was the worsening METARs. And even then, with the east coast socked in, it would have been a tough night to contend with these conditions.

[Piloto]

It is a sad accident. If there was icing conditions the windshield was ice up, thus impairing visibility. This was a 1975 M20F with probably no de-icing capability. Flying late at night is another risk factor. Wonder what was the pilot motivation for this risky flight.

 

On the M20J it is possible to de-ice a small area on the lower side of the windshield with the hot air coming out of the glareshield vent. To just peek and see the runway. Make sure the vent hose is properly attached. Have a flashlight on hand to check for windshield icing. 

 

José

[PTK]

All other factors aside, with a good alternate, that is not a no-go TAF. It's a concerning one to be sure. But that alone isn't a reason not go go. The Metars show declining conditions which are concerning but again remaining within ILS IMC. What about the Airmets? Surely there were Airmets for icing and turbulence?

This is nonsense!

You can't push aside "other factors." It is these "other factors" that spelled "NO GO" here.

This flight had "very high risk for a tragedy" written all over it. The perfect storm.

There was not a good alternate to be had. Especially with his fuel status. He crashed at his "alternate."

There's no substitute for sound judgement. None.

Edit:

Thinking about this tragedy this comes to mind: http://mooneysafety.com/tapestry

[Tommy]

It's incidents like these make me wonder if we should have two or even more alt minima depending on various factors - Single pilot vs multi crew. Recency. Aircraft equipment etc etc. A 777 with 25000 combined hours on the flight deck would probably get away with this but not a single pilot flying a rented aircraft that has no weather protection and no back up instruments...

[flyboy0681]

It's incidents like these make me wonder if we should have two or even more alt minima depending on various factors - Single pilot vs multi crew. Recency. Aircraft equipment etc etc. A 777 with 25000 combined hours on the flight deck would probably get away with this but not a single pilot flying a rented aircraft that has no weather protection and no back up instruments...

 

Sounds like a 3 page approach plate.

[140pilot]

Thanks for posting the ATC audio transcript. Many of us have been in similar situations and it reminded us to avoid being in them again. I thought ATC did a pretty good job till the very end. Unless he knew the airplane was already down, I wonder if ATC should maybe have immediately silenced the service vehicle given the seriousness of the situation for the Mooney. He had offered the Mooney radar guidance. The pilot seemed pretty capable and responsive throughout. Given all the factors to date, I think this approach should have come out different. It will be interesting to hear the final report. The pilots claim of one hour plus of fuel seems a little strange unless equipped with long range tanks.

The ATC tapes are a combination of all ORF freq. Rescue 1 was probably on ground control freq not on approach or tower. He was already out doing a FOD check on 14-32 when this happened. So the controller called him over the air before they " hit the button " for the field alert. On the tapes it all sound like it is on one freq. I am fairly sure it wasn't though.

[M016576]

Someone from another thread wanted to know what I meant by "Hard IFR." This is it.

[ArtVandelay]

73kt headwind at 1600ft? Anyone have the winds aloft forecast?

The moderate turbulence would be a major problem for me, was there a sigmet or airmet?

[carl]

A static blockage would overread in a desent .

[Guest]

I was caught right at Texarcana where Texas, Arkansas, and Lousiana meet up around midnight in 2010 or 2011 in my former 1967 M20F flying back from Texas when I went through a layer around 4000 feet that also had extreme up and down drafts.  I had about an hour of fuel left and it was night IFR, so I wanted to get on the ground, refuel, and get away from the weather.   I was worried as I'd gain and lose 500 feet very quickly.  When I got out the bottom side of the clouds around 2000 feet, it was very smooth.  I landed, refuled, took off and headed South East until away from whatever the frontal boundary was.  Flew direct east after that, and then up to NC.  After another fuel stop, we finished the trip to MD.  We added maybe two hours of flying to stay away from the long front stretching a good 1/2 the country to stay clear of the bad weather.  We left late, all sorts of delays, and should have just stayed put and left the next morning.  I had another pilot on board, and almost decided to call it a night at that point.  That was one of my few  "get-there-itis" cases, and I've learned from them.  If need be, I just go the next day, or a few days later now, or cancel the trip.

 

Taking off at Midnight for a 4.5 hour flight is just hard.  Maybe one of the other passengers was also a pilot.

 

-Seth

Many accident investigation are said to take place 12 hours later in VFR conditions.

Clarence

[Raptor05121]

This is beyond horrible. Seeing the after pictures is just sickening.

As a student pilot to some of you instrument pilots, why would firewalling the plane and asking a controller for an airport with better weather not an option? Imagining that METAR, in a Mooney, while reading that transcript, I'd be neededing new pants.

RIP.

[Rwsavory]

This is beyond horrible. Seeing the after pictures is just sickening.

As a student pilot to some of you instrument pilots, why would firewalling the plane and asking a controller for an airport with better weather not an option? Imagining that METAR, in a Mooney, while reading that transcript, I'd be neededing new pants.

RIP.

Good point. The second attempt at an approach in low weather is when accidents seems to occur. The best time to avoid this kind of scenario is before takeoff. Spending an extra day (or two) or landing short and spending the night are good strategies for staying safe.

[Amelia]

It was his THIRD attempt that got him, after a missed at SFQ and a go-around at ORF. Exhausted pilot, no doubt, probably much lower than he admitted on fuel (no fire at the crash site?), unable to hold his localizer course..., dark, bumpy, Widespread LIFR to VLIFR, and maybe no good alternate within range.... Added to all the other links in the accident chain, this poor guy and his passengers didn't stand much of a chance.Scary!

[201er]

It was his THIRD attempt that got him, after a missed at SFQ and a go-around at ORF. Exhausted pilot, no doubt, probably much lower than he admitted on fuel (no fire at the crash site?), unable to hold his localizer course..., dark, bumpy, Widespread LIFR to VLIFR, and maybe no good alternate within range.... Added to all the other links in the accident chain, this poor guy and his passengers didn't stand much of a chance.Scary!

Wait so Norfolk was his alternate? Based on he TAFs we saw earlier, I don't believe it could have qualified as a legal alrernate. Not trying to justify or condemn, but following the rules is a good starting point when striving for safety.

[Hank]

Filing an alternate is one thing; actually diverting to an alternate is a whole mother thing. There's no requirement to actually go to the alternate that you filed. I'm just saying . . .

On the other hand, it's a good idea to arrive at your destination with enough fuel to shoot an approach, divert to alternate, shoot another approach, and still have reserves left. (Isn't that the rule?)

Flying into widespread LIFR isn't always a good idea, nor is flying over widespread LIFR.

I have to wonder what was in the clouds at 1200 msl that things were pretty smooth at 1600? Causing excessive gyroscopic precession and being shaken like a washing machine sounds distinctly unfriendly, especially to be so smooth just 400' higher.