Good article on plan continuation primacy

[bradp]

https://airfactsjournal.com/2018/04/know-when-to-fold-em-how-to-avoid-tunnel-vision-in-the-cockpit/

[Mooney in Oz]

On 20/04/2018 at 11:11 AM, bradp said:

https://airfactsjournal.com/2018/04/know-when-to-fold-em-how-to-avoid-tunnel-vision-in-the-cockpit/

Thanks for the link Brad.  A worthwhile read.

In the MD-82 accident, the pilots ignored two of these automatic go around cues: they lost sight of the runway and the crosswind (which was 50 degrees off the runway at 30 knots, gusting to 45) 

Well illustrated in the above details.  After a long, busy and at the end tiring duty the crew were confronted with the above and probably just wanted to get down and finish for the day, a normal human trait.  I believe the max demo crosswind of the MD80 is 30 kts dry runway and 25 kts wet runway. 

[Hank]

1 hour ago, Mooney in Oz said:

 . . . the crosswind (which was 50 degrees off the runway at 30 knots, gusting to 45) 

I believe the max demo crosswind of the MD80 is 30 kts dry runway and 25 kts wet runway. 

Is this a hard limit in 121 ops? It is not for us in Part 91, it's just the most the plane saw in certification and must be a certain minimum fraction of stall speed (20%?).

[Mooney in Oz]

2 hours ago, Hank said:

Is this a hard limit in 121 ops? It is not for us in Part 91, it's just the most the plane saw in certification and must be a certain minimum fraction of stall speed (20%?).

At a guess, probably Hank.  However, company SOP comes into play.  I had a quick look at the NTSB link and the three causes it cites is - Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s (1) impaired performance resulting from fatigue and the situational stress associated with the intent to land under the circumstances, (2) continuation of the approach to a landing when the company’s maximum crosswind component was exceeded, and (3) use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio after landing.

Note No. 2.

Company SOP's with regard to crosswind (or other limitations) do not exceed the manufacturer's numbers, even if only demonstrated and I can't see any country's regulator permitting this.  Gust factor has to be taken into consideration too.  For example, the company I work for considers wind gusts to 45 kts (or any wind speed in excess of the SOP limit) as a solid figure, even though its a momentary occurrence.  The wet runway in this accident made it worse.