piper crash in atlanta

[rbridges]

Those blades are curled back which indicated windmilling but not power production. Blade tips bend forward when the prop is under power

 

no kidding.  I didn't know that.

[bonal]

This was before my time (fewer and fewer things are) when they had the pumps with the glass container at the top of the pump you could confirm the product quality before it goes in. I always thought that was a good idea. 

Whatever happened here my prayers to those left behind 

[jetdriven]

I'm used to seeing two blade props with one bent forward and one bent back when planes go in making power. What would be the result on a 3-blade? Or is the large amount of bend on these two remaining blades indicative of windmilling?

If it's a high speed or high angle arrival with power on, then one blade tip will curl forward and then the next blade folds back, then the other one will fold back too. Low speed high power, blades curl and even peel forward.

[N601RX]

At the risk of pirating the thread, it occurred to me to wonder how often CFIs kill themselves in crashes. We often hear (rightfully) that we should train with a CFI, but do CFIs practice what they preach to the extent their likelihood of crashing is substantially less than us ordinary mortals. Would getting our CFI certificate automatically increase our chances a tremendous amount. It would be interesting to see some statistics.

Here is an accident that happened close to me last year. Not only was the pilot a CFI, but the 4 passengers were also CFI's. The local talk was that to begain with none would tell who was in the left seat. They had just delivered 4 new beeches and the accident plane was to transport them back home.

http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/GeneratePDF.aspx?id=ERA14CA397&rpt=fa

[ryoder]

If a cfi can't survive an engine out that makes a good case for a parachute.

[AndyFromCB]

If a cfi can't survive an engine out that makes a good case for a parachute.

 

Not all engine outs are survivable. In the end, it does come down to luck. We can help it, but only so much. In any case, a parachute still has a flaw in the first 30 or so seconds after take off. After that, I cannot think of a situation where I would attempt an engine out landing instead of a pull.

[PMcClure]

Here is an accident that happened close to me last year. Not only was the pilot a CFI, but the 4 passengers were also CFI's. The local talk was that to begain with none would tell who was in the left seat. They had just delivered 4 new beeches and the accident plane was to transport them back home.

http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/GeneratePDF.aspx?id=ERA14CA397&rpt=fa

 

Reading this report, I see it was not an engine out but a W&B issue. Overloaded, aft CG, early rotation. Proving even CFI's are human. The parachute is another tool to have and a good one, but even it won't overcome stupid pilot tricks and engine failures on take off. It certainly would help with fuel exhaustion at cruise. 

[Seth]

Not all engine outs are survivable. In the end, it does come down to luck. We can help it, but only so much. In any case, a parachute still has a flaw in the first 30 or so seconds after take off. After that, I cannot think of a situation where I would attempt an engine out landing instead of a pull.

You know, there was a Cirrus chute pull at KGAI maybe less than 30 seconds after takeoff a few years ago.  Entered the cloud base with low ceilings, his door popped open, and he pulled the chute as he got disoriented and was worried that close to the ground.

 

I am a Mooney man, and I'd have to debate the useful load and sitting on a live rocket, but in a single engine aircraft, a chute is a good option to have if you do need it.  It should not allow you to make flights you normally wouldn't make, just an added safety feature if needed.

 

Kind of like airbag belts that really need to be allowed in all Mooney's, frankly all light aircraft when the owners want to install them, not just the ones they've been STCed for, but that's another story all together.

 

-Seth

[cujet]

There is a local harley rider at the airport, who intentionally puts a small quantity of jet fuel into his harley. It smokes like crazy as he drives down the road. 

 

Exhaust smoke is one indicator of jet fuel in Avgas. However, like most airplanes, on this harley bike, it takes some time for the jet fuel to make it to the engine. So, he makes it all the way around the perimeter road and on to the main road before the thing starts fogging the street. 

[bonal]

Any one ever bother to ask why he would put jet kerosene in his hog. Seems like a stupid thing to do.

[aviatoreb]

Regular non aviation folk sometimes think that jet fuel is more powerful so that maybe he thinks that adding it to his mogas in his harley makes his bike faster.

[Shadrach]

In my experience, Harley riders are one of the most diverse group of motorcyclists.  In terms of intellect, they have solid representation across the whole bell curve. Putting Kerosene in a V-Twin proves that this guy resides in the lower left hand part of the graph.

[bonal]

And my original spelling of kerosene puts me on the wrong end of the curve

[aviatoreb]

In my experience, Harley riders are one of the most diverse group of motorcyclists.  In terms of intellect, they have solid representation across the whole bell curve. Putting Kerosene in a V-Twin proves that this guy resides in the lower left hand part of the graph.

 

There is a Harley shop near our small town - about 5 miles away.  In the summer massive groups of Harley ridin' Quobequoise lawyer/professional types come down across the border to ride the adirondack mtns beautiful roads and they stop in town for food and to shop at the Harley shop.  Mostly they are the other end of the curve than our jet fuel friend.

[Shadrach]

Like I said, diverse. I occasionally pilot an 88CI Police Edition Electra Glide. Sometimes our small group of 8 or so riders has folks from both ends. The Doctor/Lawyer "weekend warrior "is a relatively new phenomenon. A lot of the types of guys you're talking about would have been driving Porsches in the 80s.

[tony]

preliminary report

 

http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/brief.aspx?ev_id=20150508X11640&key=1&queryId=e42caef3-c155-4356-a43c-1049d72bea8f&pgno=4&pgsize=50

[jetdriven]

Could have taken off with the mixture leaned to taxi. It may run smoothly but not make nearly enough power. A couple minutes of that it overheats and melts Pistons.

[cujet]

Any one ever bother to ask why he would put jet kerosene in his hog. Seems like a stupid thing to do.

 

The Harley owner is doing this intentionally. He thinks it's funny to fog the street. He makes quite a show of it. 

 

I followed him on the highway one day. It was trailing white-ish smoke for miles. But the heavy traffic broke up the "cloud" fairly rapidly. I'll admit, I laughed...

[tony]

Interim report. 

The airplane was talking to the pilot and he ignored it.  Very sad.

 

NTSB Identification: ERA15FA208

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 8, 2015, about 0959 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-300, N5802V, collided with a highway barrier during a forced landing attempt near Chamblee, Georgia. The commercial pilot and three passengers were fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to and operated by TLT and GGBB LLC., as a personal flight. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from Peachtree DeKalb airport (PDK), Chamblee, Georgia, about 0956 and was destined for University-Oxford Airport (UOX), Oxford, Mississippi.

The accident flight was the second leg of a cross-country flight that originated earlier that morning from Asheville Regional Airport (AVL), Asheville, North Carolina.

Review of air traffic control (ATC) voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the pilot contacted clearance delivery for an IFR clearance. ATC provided the clearance, which included radar vectors, and "climb and maintain 3,000; expect 8,000 in 10 minutes." The pilot read back the clearance correctly and confirmed that he had the most recent automatic terminal information service, which was information "Whiskey." The pilot contacted ground control and indicated that he was ready to taxi. Ground control instructed the pilot to taxi to runway 3R, via taxiway Bravo, hold short of runway 3L and the pilot read back the instructions correctly. The pilot then contacted the tower controller, informing him that he was holding short of runway 3L and ready to depart. The tower controller instructed the pilot to "fly heading 360 and cleared for takeoff." The pilot then questioned the controller regarding which runway to take off from and the controller cleared the pilot for takeoff from runway 3L, which was 3,746 feet long. Approximately 3 minutes after departure, the tower controller called the pilot to verify his heading. The pilot responded "zero-two-victor, I'm having some problem climbing here." The pilot subsequently stated "zero-two-victor; were going down here at the intersection." This was the last transmission made by the pilot.

A witness stated that he was about 2,300 feet off the departure end of the runway. He stopped to look at the airplane because it was moving extremely slow and only 75 to 100 feet above ground level when it went over his head. He added that the engine sounded normal and despite the slow speed. He continued to watch the airplane as it flew out of his view.

Another witness that observed the airplane prior to the accident said he heard a "clacking sound," but the engine rpm did not change. The engine sounded like it was at "wide open throttle" as it descended onto the highway and exploded.

According to the pilot's mechanic, about 4 days prior to the accident flight, the mechanic observed a departure conducted by the pilot. He said that during climbout he watched as the airplane cleared trees at the departure end of the runway by approximately 50 feet. He added that shortly after that flight, the pilot called him and expressed his concern that the airplane was not climbing well. The mechanic mentioned to him that it was a warm day, and he was only a few hundred pounds under gross weight, with a slight tailwind. The mechanic further stated that the pilot said that he would do a run-up and if everything checked out, he would conduct a test flight the next day. The following day the pilot sent a text message to the mechanic and said that the run-up was good, but he wasn't getting full rpm at full power while static. About 30 minutes later, the pilot called the mechanic and told him he flew the airplane and everything was normal.

According to pilot's flight instructor, he said that the pilot called him 4 days prior to the accident flight and told him that he went flying and had some difficulty getting the airplane to gain altitude. He said that he had used up more than half of the runway when he was able to finally get the airplane in the air. The pilot told the instructor that he almost hit the trees near the end of the runway. The pilot also stated to the flight instructor that he did conduct "pre and post flight engine checks and noted no problems."

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. He reported a total flight experience of 667 hours, including 40 hours during the last 6 months, on his FAA second-class medical certificate application, dated November 18, 2014. The medical certificate indicated no restrictions. Review of the pilot's logbook revealed he had accumulated 687 total hours; of which, 672 hours were in the same make and model as the accident airplane.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1977. It was powered by a Lycoming O-540-K1G5D engine rated at 300 horsepower at 2,700 rpm, and was equipped with a Hartzell three-bladed constant speed propeller.

The last annual inspection of the airframe and engine occurred on July 22, 2014, at an airframe total time of 5616.03 hours. The last recorded maintenance included the installation of a battery on May 5, 2015.

The airplane's maintenance logbooks were not located and were presumed to have burned in the aircraft wreckage. Copies of airframe and engine logbook entries dated July 22, 2014 were provided by the mechanic who completed an annual inspection of the airplane on that date. The airframe logbook entry noted the tachometer hour meter reading and airframe total time as 5616.03 hours. The engine logbook entry indicated that the engine had accumulated 774.86 hours since major overhaul, as of that date.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The recorded weather at PDK, at 0953, included winds from 080 degrees at 4 knots; 6 statute miles visibility, few clouds at 6,000 feet, temperature 24 degrees Celsius (C), dew point temperature 16 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury. The calculated density altitude was about 2,259 feet.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The wreckage was located in the eastbound lane of interstate 285, approximately 2 miles from PDK. The airplane came to rest in the left service lane against a 5 foot barrier wall on a heading of 021 degrees magnetic. There was a postcrash fire that consumed the majority of the airplane. There were ground scars across four traffic lanes up to the concrete highway divider.
The cockpit and fuselage were fragmented and destroyed by postcrash fire. Flight control cables were attached to fragments of the flight controls. The right and left wings were fragmented and was destroyed by postcrash fire. The flight control surfaces were molten metal on both wings. The aileron bellcranks on the left and right wings were located within the fragments of the wings and connected to the flight control cables and turnbuckles. Flight control cable separations exhibited signs of overstress failures. The empennage was fragmented and fire damaged. The flight control cables to the rudder control sector and stabilator bell crank remained attached to the fragmented fuselage and were traced to the forward section of the cockpit.
The left and right main landing gear were found in the extended position and the flap handle was impact damaged and observed in the 10-degree flap extension position. The throttle was found forward in the "full power" position, the propeller lever was forward at the "full increase" position, and the mixture lever was full forward at the "full rich" position. The fuel boost pump switch and selector was destroyed. Engine control linkage continuity was established from the cockpit controls to their respective engine connections.

An examination of the fuel system revealed that the all of the fuel lines before the firewall were destroyed. The fuel lines from the firewall to the fuel manifold were partially fire damaged. The fuel manifold and injector lines did not show signs of fire damage. The fuel manifold was removed during the examination of the engine and placed on a test bench and did not flow when tested up to 7 psi (normal test pressure is 4.5 psi). The unit was removed from the test bench and the bottom cover was removed. Following removal of the bottom cover, the gasket did not exhibit heat damage. The bottom portion of the movable portion of the body assembly was measured and found to be positioned 0.032 inch below the spool of the body assembly (normal closed position). The bottom of the movable portion of the body assembly was pushed by hand and some resistance was noted at first, but it then moved. The bottom cover was reinstalled and the four screws were torqued to the proper setting. The fuel manifold was placed on the test bench and debris was noted coming from the ports during initial flow. The unit was flowed at 4.5 psi (normal) and it was found to flow equally from all ports at 132 pounds-per-hour (pph); the minimum specification was 135 pph. The fuel manifold was removed from the test bench and the top cover, which was safety wired, was removed. Test bench fluid was noted on the top side of the diaphragm (air side) and some slivers of material were also noted. The movable portion of the body assembly was removed and contamination/debris was noted. Re-insertion of the movable portion of the body assembly into the body revealed slight binding.

The debris recovered from the fuel manifold was forwarded to the NTSB Materials Laboratory and examined using Fourier-transform infrared spectroscopy. The spectrum for the debris contained peaks that corresponded to signatures indicative that the material contained a carboxylic acid. A spectral library search was done on the debris spectrum. There were no strong matches found in the search; however, the debris spectrum had many similarities to several dicarboxylic acids, such as terephthalic acid and isophthalic acid. Carboxylic acids are pervasive in nature and are often found as precursors in polymer production, in adhesives and coatings, and are often naturally present in fuel as well as used as fuel additives (corrosion inhibitors and lubricity improving additives).

During examination of the fuel servo, it was noted that it was fire damaged. Due to the heat damage of the diaphragms, the unit could not be flow tested.

Examination of the propeller revealed that one blade was fractured off the hub. The spinner dome separated from the spinner bulkhead. All three blades exhibited rotational scoring and curling of the blade tips. There were impression marks on the preload plates indicating that the propeller was in the low blade angle position prior to impact. The propeller showed signs of power ON prior to impact. There were no discrepancies noted that would preclude normal operation. All damage was consistent with impact damage.

The propeller governor was mounted in a governor test stand and run through the standard factory acceptance test procedure for new or overhauled governors. The governor functioned normally and met all factory specifications, except for the maximum rpm. The governor maximum rpm setting was 2,660 rpm verses a factory specification of 2,555 +/- 10. Although the high rpm setting was higher than factory specifications, it did not affect the governor performance. A higher than specified rpm setting indicated an adjustment was made to the governor high rpm stop while installed on the airplane. The governor was then disassembled for visual examination of the governor components. There were no unserviceable conditions noted during the visual examination.

Examination of the engine revealed it was discolored consistent with exposure to the postimpact fire. The propeller and crankshaft flange were separated from the engine. The crankshaft flange was impact damaged. The left side of the exhaust system was crushed. The engine accessories were fire damaged. Both crankcase halves were fractured in the area of the No. 1 and No. 2 cylinders. The No. 2 cylinder head on the left side was impact damaged. The engine mount was bent and the engine was displaced toward the firewall. Three of the four engine mounts were impact fractured. The engine could not be rotated by turning the crankshaft flange due to impact damage and was further disassembled to examine the engine internal components. The cylinders were removed and no damage noted to the cylinders, pistons or valves other than fire and impact damage. The oil sump was removed and contained an unmeasured quantity of oil. The accessory case was removed and no damage to the rear gears was noted. The oil pump was disassembled and no damage to the pump bore or gears was noted. The crankcase halves were disassembled and the crankshaft and rod assembly was lifted out. The rods were free to rotate on the crankshaft rod journals and were not disassembled. The crankshaft main journals and crankshaft bearing surfaces did not show any anomalies. The camshaft was removed and no damage noted to the crankcase camshaft bearing surfaces. No damage was noted to the camshaft except that the cam lobe, which serviced the No. 3 intake and the No. 4 exhaust cam followers were worn. The cam lobe was measured at 1.364 inches using an uncalibrated dial caliper. The No. 4 exhaust lobe was measured at 1.464 inches. The No. 3 intake and No. 4 exhaust cam followers were pitted and worn.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the DeKalb County Medical Examiner, Decatur Georgia.

The Federal Aviation Administration's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute performed forensic toxicology on specimens from the pilot with negative results for drugs and alcohol.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The weight and balance record dated August 24, 1999, noted the airplane's empty weight to be 2,154 lbs. According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) the maximum takeoff and landing weight for this aircraft was 3,600 lbs. With full fuel (94 gallons useable), an estimated cargo weight of 216 lbs, and reported pilot and passengers weights of 690 lbs, the total weight computed was 3,624 lbs. According to fueling records the airplane was topped off with 20 gallons of fuel prior to departure. The estimated cargo weight was based on the fire damaged items that were collected during the airplane recovery.

The airplane's calculated takeoff distance assuming that it was loaded to its maximum gross weight, the flaps were set to 25 degrees, and given the weather conditions reported about the time of the accident, was about 1,050 feet. The distance required to clear a 50-foot barrier was about 2,000 feet.

 

Edited August 18, 2016 by tony

[Jeff_S]

Tony, your link didn't work but I read the factual report online. Are you referring to the several prior incidents where the pilot reported poor climb performance? The report spent a lot of time discussing contamination in the fuel manifold but didn't say directly what that meant.

[Bob_Belville]

Just now, Jeff_S said:

Tony, your link didn't work but I read the factual report online. Are you referring to the several prior incidents where the pilot reported poor climb performance? The report spent a lot of time discussing contamination in the fuel manifold but didn't say directly what that meant.

The hyperlink did not work but I was able to get there by cut/paste the url. 

[tony]

5 hours ago, Jeff_S said:

Tony, your link didn't work but I read the factual report online. Are you referring to the several prior incidents where the pilot reported poor climb performance? The report spent a lot of time discussing contamination in the fuel manifold but didn't say directly what that meant.

yes.  He knew he was having issues with climb performance but I decided to load his family and go anyway.  Bothers me.  

Edited August 18, 2016 by tony

[ryoder]

http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20150508X11640&ntsbno=ERA15FA208&akey=1

[Jeff_S]

There was an article recently in one of my flying mags about a topic called "normalization of deviance," and this seems to be a prime example. This phenomenon was made infamous by the Challenger and Columbia shuttle disasters. The general premise is that as human beings, we tend to overlook deviances in expected behavior/performance if over time they seem to have not caused dramatic effect. In the case of Challenger, they knew that O-rings got brittle and less pliant while cold, but they had taken off before in cold temps so they decided to ignore it. Similar with Columbia, they knew foam from the external fuel tank had broken off before, but up until that time it had never caused enough damage to be a problem.

Seems like this is what happened here, based on what we know so far. There had been deviant climb performance leading up to the accident, but according to reports the pilot did have it investigated and was told that it was normal. Rather than further explore the deviance he just accepted it, with unfortunate consequences. We are all guilty of it to some degree, but it is something to monitor in our own behavior.

[Smiles201]

Report mentions cam lobe was worn. Reason for lack of full power?