Parallel parking the Mooney (don't try this at home)

[ArtVandelay]

I did too, and I won't try it again.  I was trying to run the tank empty so I could measure the actual amount of fuel it holds.  I figured I'd just switch over at the first sign of any hesitation.  I was running at low power, and I had difficulty telling when the engine actually quit until I started descending.  It must have been 10-15 seconds after the engine was actually out, but with the prop windmilling there was very little change in sound.  I switched over to the other tank and turned the boost pump on, and the engine coughed, stumbled and hesitated for what seemed like forever (but was probably only 5-10 seconds).  And yes, I needed a clean pair of shorts afterwards

I would assume a engine monitor, especially fuel flow would be the first indication, or the fuel pressure.

[Skates97]

1 minute ago, teejayevans said:

I would assume a engine monitor, especially fuel flow would be the first indication, or the fuel pressure.

When I have done it I keep an eye on the fuel pressure when I am getting to the time I expect it to run dry. When the pressure slowly starts dropping, I reach down and switch the tank. Engine doesn't even stumble, passengers have no idea the tank ran dry. 

[chrixxer]

1 hour ago, jaylw314 said:

I was running at low power, and I had difficulty telling when the engine actually quit until I started descending.

That was exactly my experience. I was running 19 squared descending towards Burbank (a technique that kept the plane completely out of any continuous operation in the placarded RPM range (2000-2350), and had the added advantage of slowing the plane down to near-Vle speeds quickly without dumping manifold pressure through the floor - long leisurely letdowns don't always work with terrain...), and honestly didn't know I'd lost the engine for a while.

[chrixxer]

10 minutes ago, Skates97 said:

Engine doesn't even stumble, passengers have no idea the tank ran dry. 

That's on a carbureted engine, though, right? The IO-360s I've heard won't restart for several seconds (e.g.), until air clears from the injection system (?).

[jaylw314]

25 minutes ago, teejayevans said:

I would assume a engine monitor, especially fuel flow would be the first indication, or the fuel pressure.

I have a FP-5L which is pretty slow, so it did not show any brief drops in fuel pressure.  It only showed a drop in fuel pressure about the same time I noticed the loss of altitude

[jetdriven]

In the J model at least, you can descend at cruise power at about 200 mph and make a very positive impact on your block trip time. In the M20E around 23 inches will do the same thing while keeping out of the red. Also what were your fuel tank levels when this happened?

[jaylw314]

30 minutes ago, jetdriven said:

In the J model at least, you can descend at cruise power at about 200 mph and make a very positive impact on your block trip time. In the M20E around 23 inches will do the same thing while keeping out of the red. Also what were your fuel tank levels when this happened?

Not sure who the question is for, but when I filled the tank I put 33 gallons in a tank that only should have had a 32 gallon load.  I should also clarify the engine did not quit because I started a descent--it was the loss of altitude that clued me in that the engine was out.

That got me thinking--Does anyone know if the fuel pickup is towards the front or the back of fuel tank?

Edited September 28, 2017 by jaylw314

[kortopates]

34 minutes ago, jaylw314 said:

Not sure who the question is for, but when I filled the tank I put 33 gallons in a tank that only should have had a 32 gallon load.  I should also clarify the engine did not quit because I started a descent--it was the loss of altitude that clued me in that the engine was out.

That got me thinking--Does anyone know if the fuel pickup is towards the front or the back of fuel tank?

Its in the back, very close to above the sump, and where the remaining fuel is in level flight. But also where you need it in climb and climb gets my vote over descending.

[takair]

I've run a tank dry twice in 20 years while at cruise power and at altitude.  In both cases I knew I was low on fuel in the tank, but the gauges at the time were not accurate, so it was still a surprise.  The event was noticeable because power started to vary and i could hear it....major pucker factor.  In both cases I switched tanks and the IO-360 recovered almost instantly.  I would think it would be harder to detect in a descent. Not sure how it would behave if I let it go longer.

[Skates97]

3 hours ago, chrixxer said:

That's on a carbureted engine, though, right? The IO-360s I've heard won't restart for several seconds (e.g.), until air clears from the injection system (?).

Yes carbureted, not sure about the behavior on the injected.

[jetdriven]

2 hours ago, jaylw314 said:

Not sure who the question is for, but when I filled the tank I put 33 gallons in a tank that only should have had a 32 gallon load.  I should also clarify the engine did not quit because I started a descent--it was the loss of altitude that clued me in that the engine was out.

That got me thinking--Does anyone know if the fuel pickup is towards the front or the back of fuel tank?

The question was for Chrixxer.  What were the fuel tank levels when this happened. 

[jaylw314]

36 minutes ago, Skates97 said:

Yes carbureted, not sure about the behavior on the injected.

I have an IO-360, so yes, it seemed to take between 5-10 seconds to catch and smooth out, even with the boost pump on.

[Hank]

2 hours ago, takair said:

I've run a tank dry twice in 20 years while at cruise power and at altitude.  In both cases I knew I was low on fuel in the tank, but the gauges at the time were not accurate, so it was still a surprise.  The event was noticeable because power started to vary and i could hear it....major pucker factor.  In both cases I switched tanks and the IO-360 recovered almost instantly.  I would think it would be harder to detect in a descent. Not sure how it would behave if I let it go longer.

I've done it twice, once expected and once because I got distracted and didn't switch tanks . . . The first one, my O-360 had the decency to cough, then run normally, cough again (getting my full attention, but everything looked normal), then cough twice, prompting me to see the clock then reach to the floor. The second time I was pushing range because my fuel stop had pump problems (me, the mechanic and the FBO guy couldn't make it turn on), and it died 2 minutes before my descent from 9500 was set to begin; I had been watching closely, adding 2-3 more minutes at a time, and there was no warning--humming smoothly one second, all quiet the next. Both times she started up by the time I sat up straight from the fuel selector between my feet.

Then there was the time I was checking my magnetos due to weird EGT readings, and when I selected Left, it got very quiet, and strongly pitched down. I don't remember a down pitch from the two above, but I had neglected to say anything to my wife this time about what I was doing, and she was not happy with me! She was along and aware for the second incident above, and we landed that time with 11 gallons in the other tank.

Ya'll be careful out there! 

[jetdriven]

On 9/28/2017 at 7:35 PM, jetdriven said:

The question was for Chrixxer.  What were the fuel tank levels when this happened. 

Still waiting. I'm beginning to think this engine failure may have been fuel mismanagement rather than mechanical failure. But I'm really in this for the facts whatever they may be 

Edited October 17, 2017 by jetdriven

[N6758N]

On 9/25/2017 at 12:07 PM, chrixxer said:

 Immediately switched tanks and hit the boost pump. Nothing. 

So you're saying he ran both tanks dry Byron?

[Hank]

Is the NTSB Factual out yet???

[N6758N]

16 minutes ago, Hank said:

Is the NTSB Factual out yet???

Only the prelim...

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20170923X20448&AKey=1&RType=Prelim&IType=LA

[201er]

8 hours ago, N6758N said:

Only the prelim...

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20170923X20448&AKey=1&RType=Prelim&IType=LA

"Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed."

Probable cause: the pilot's failure to file a flight plan.

[Guest]

On October 16, 2017 at 10:29 PM, jetdriven said:

Still waiting. I'm beginning to think this engine failure may have been fuel mismanagement rather than mechanical failure. But I'm really in this for the facts whatever they may be 

Fuel mismanagement. Based on what? What insider knowledge do you have that the rest of us don't?

Clarence

Edited October 18, 2017 by M20Doc

[MB65E]

10 hours ago, 201er said:

"Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed."

Probable cause: the pilot's failure to file a flight plan.

I know a helicopter instructor that files a VFR flight plan every leg!! 

He said when the NTSB does their investigation it won't say that if he's flying!!

-Matt

[chrixxer]

FWIW, when the timing is right and everything that can be known is known, I look forward to discussing everything with y'all candidly. Right now there's a lot I still don't know about what happened that night, and I can only guess at what's being looked at in depth based on FAA/NTSB requests for further logbook pages (airplane and engine), etc. There may also be litigation (my passenger hired a lawyer, claiming neck/back pain (though he confessed to me in a text message that he had a neck/back lacrosse injury he'd never been 100% from), bruising, and insomnia. So even when I do know more, I may not even then be in a position where I can discuss everything openly. :/ 

I can say I met with the FAA at length several weeks ago and went over all the logs  - my pilot's log, the plane, the engine, a log I kept of all the flying and maintenance I'd done since I got the plane (down to every gallon of gas pumped into it). They have not required me to take remedial training or set me for a 709 ride, and in fact lauded my getting right back in the cockpit (I've logged a number of hours in an SR22, starting two days after the accident, and in a rental Mooney and a Mooney I'm looking at purchasing), my record keeping, my trip planning, my election to transition train before hopping in 4BE, etc. The operations guy even exclaimed "I don't have logs this detailed!" and said, "you're not what we expected from a 300 hour pilot - this is more like what we expect from a 3,000 hour pilot."

(FWIW, the SR22 belongs to my boss, who picked me up from the accident scene and has been by my side throughout this process.)

I expect the ultimate cause will end up being compound.

If, and I'm saying this arguendo, but if there was "fuel mismanagement," it was not predictable / foreseeable, and the numbers don't line up. I've gone up with a CFII in a Mooney M20B and planned and flown trips exactly the way I planned every flight with 4BE and was always conservative on my fuel consumption estimates (and had more than minimum reserves on top of those estimates). I've also gone over that night with ATP/CFII/MEI/etc. holders at length - I'm heavily involved in the SMO airport community and am blessed with a lot of folks I can grab coffee with and burden with my "what-ifs." I plan every Cirrus flight the same as I did every flight with 4BE, though with the SR22 I have fuel flow information in the cockpit, a totalizer, and a really comprehensive set of owner/flight manuals, so my pre-flight calculations are more exact - but still conservative.

I really, really liked that plane and was rapidly fixing it up to be exactly what I wanted. I had just picked it up from the avionics shop a week prior. She was wearing all new tires. I would never have started a flight I had any inkling I wouldn't be able to complete. I would never knowingly aviate in a manner that constituted a risk for those in my cockpit or on the ground. (I've had one other almost-an-emergency in flight; in a rented Arrow. Went to land SMO and had no brakes... An o-ring inside the brake cylinder failed sometime between taking off at RAL and landing at SMO, something I couldn't have caught in a pre-flight - I verified that with the A&P who fixed it.)

Edited October 25, 2017 by chrixxer

[Marauder]

Hopefully it will all work out for you. We have lost a few Mooney members over the years. It doesn't take much to become a member of that club (an undiscovered mechanical issue, poor decision making or just lack of experience). And even the best prepared can succumb to it. Whatever the cause, learn from it and keep up the diligence on staying safe. 

[N6758N]

Any update on this @chrixxer ?

[chrixxer]

1 minute ago, N6758N said:

Any update on this @chrixxer ?

Negative.

Meanwhile, I'm looking at a nicely upgraded "F" and logging rental hours. Took an Arrow out for night currency on Friday - my first time up solo since the incident. First trip around the pattern I had some "student pilot on his first solo" jitters, for about a second, and then they passed. The next day, was supposed to take the Arrow on a dinner run, but weather was moving in, so rented a Warrior instead (the Arrow's GNS530W is out for service; the Warrior has a GNS430W). Got a lot of IFR time in. (Because the Warrior is painfully slow.) Had my first actual missed into Palomar (ATIS lied; ceiling was accurate, visibility was decidedly not - had the ALS and the runway threshold lighting, but never had the actual runway in sight), diverted to our filed alternate (Montgomery, which was CAVU). Flew up to VNY as SMO was below minimums even for the LPV. Ferried it back to SMO the next morning, when the weather finally broke (700-3, good enough for the LPV). My landings suffered for a minute, but seem to be back on track. So do I, after a whopping 18.4 hours PIC since 9/22.

[N601RX]

 

 

NTSB Identification: WPR17LA212

14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation

Accident occurred Friday, September 22, 2017 in Glendale, CA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/15/2018

Aircraft: MOONEY M20E, registration: N34BE

Injuries: 2 Minor.

NTSB investigators may have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The private pilot and passenger had planned a round trip personal flight in the pilot’s single-engine airplane. According to the pilot, he had wanted to service the airplane with fuel before the return leg, but he did not do so due to the passenger’s desire to arrive home before a certain time. During the initial descent of the return leg, the engine lost total power. The pilot conducted a series of troubleshooting steps to no avail and then conducted a forced landing onto a residential street and struck trees. Postaccident wreckage examination revealed that both fuel tanks were empty, and although the right fuel tank sustained a small breach during impact, there was no fuel odor at the accident site. A series of brown streaks were observed trailing from an area adjacent to the right-wing fuel sump drain. The sump valve sealant was badly degraded, and it is possible that a small fuel leak had developed at an undetermined time; however, blue streaking would have been more likely if a significant and recent fuel loss had occurred. Further examination revealed no leaks in the fuel supply system or engine. The engine tachometer was tested for accuracy, and no anomalies were noted. During an engine test run, the engine started normally and operated through its full speed range with no evidence of a mechanical anomaly.The pilot had purchased the airplane 5 months before the accident and had been tracking fuel consumption since his purchase. He determined a representative fuel burn rate based on fuel purchases and engine tachometer hour-meter readings. The pilot reported that he did this because the fuel gauges were unreliable, and he did not possess a calibrated dipstick to measure the actual fuel quantities. Using his calculated fuel burn and tachometer reading method, the pilot estimated that he had enough fuel remaining to complete the flight and land with the Federal Aviation Administration-required 45-minute fuel reserve. However, he had performed multiple flights since the last fill up, which included one go-around and a full runway-length taxi earlier in the day. The total time for those flights was near the airplane’s fuel endurance limit when measured by tachometer time, but the fuel consumption was likely higher due to the increased consumption demanded by the engine during the multiple takeoffs. It is likely that the pilot miscalculated the amount of fuel on board before the flight, which resulted in fuel exhaustion and a subsequent total loss of engine power.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

• The pilot’s inadequate preflight fuel planning and improper decision to not refuel before the flight, which resulted in fuel exhaustion and the subsequent total loss of engine power.

Edited November 19, 2018 by N601RX