Mooney down in Ocala FL

[Tony Armour]

Anyone ever depart and turn 45 from the runway after a reasonable altitude ? Then if you have the need to go back , and want to turn back, it lessons the turn needed. Sometimes I will do this at the home base. Rarely away from home unless I'm pretty familiar with the airport.

[aviatoreb]

7 hours ago, Tony Armour said:

Anyone ever depart and turn 45 from the runway after a reasonable altitude ? Then if you have the need to go back , and want to turn back, it lessons the turn needed. Sometimes I will do this at the home base. Rarely away from home unless I'm pretty familiar with the airport.

I have thought about that and done so occasionally in fact.  Somes as often as not, I am at a towered airport on travel, so I do as commanded in that regard.

One thing we can do, and I am going to try and do, is to pick airports at destinations with this factor in mind.  Are there open fields around outside the airport.  Is it a multiple runway airport where only a 90 degree turn might be sufficient to at least keep you on airport grounds if not a runway.

For most of us, more than half your departures will be at your home airport.  Know your home terrain well and all options associated with it.

[XXX]

As a new Mooney pilot and having recently been through the transition training including departure stalls, I thought I had a pretty good grasp on how to handle an engine out on departure situation. I'm currently working on my instrument rating and yesterday my instructor had me practice engine outs on departure at 100-200 feet AGL and at 900 feet (not under the hood of course). It is hard to believe how quickly the airspeed bleeds off in a climb and how dramatically the nose down pitch needs to be applied in order to maintain airspeed. The sight picture through the windscreen is not very comfortable and diving for the runway very much counter intuitive. At 100 or 200 feet on a good sized runway, your gear would be down and you should be able to make the runway.  At 900 feet turning back was no problem. The altitudes in between would necessitate a straight ahead or slightly left/right off-field landing with not much time to decide.

In the earlier post by bradp he mentioned using Google Earth to locate potential landing spots. I will certainly be doing that from now on as part of my pre-flight.

[FloridaMan]

I would not be so sure about being able to set back down on the runway ahead of you from 100-200ft. If you're above your best-glide speed you will float a long way. 

[mike_elliott]

11 hours ago, Cyril Gibb said:

I climb at well beyond Vx/Vy based on this article by Deakin:

http://www.advancedpilot.com/articles.php?action=article&articleid=1842

It makes sense to me.  As usual, YMMV.

Great article, but as John even states, VY (108) gives you 600 feet in 30 seconds vs 280' at his Bonanna climb at 120. His speed keeps you in the area  he labels as the red zone for a longer time, where he says an engine failure will put you in a pile of flaming wreckage (30-200). His method reaches an altitude somewhat safe to execute a turn back (say 1000 feet for our purposes) is 15 seconds later. His advantages (there are always tradeoff's) are less of a climb angle, better view, better cooling, more time to pitch to Vbg, better view of where your going to end up.

Its the "get to a safe altitude in the shortest possible time" parameter that has me climbing the first 1000 feet, or on his graph, 50 seconds at Vy before transitioning to cruise climb (his and my 120 kts).  The cooling penalty for 50 seconds isn't that great, the shorter time in John's red zone is worth it to me. YMMV.

 

 

[Cyril Gibb]

2 hours ago, mike_elliott said:

Great article, but as John even states, VY (108) gives you 600 feet in 30 seconds vs 280' at his Bonanna climb at 120. His speed keeps you in the area  he labels as the red zone for a longer time, where he says an engine failure will put you in a pile of flaming wreckage (30-200).

I got a different read on this.  Later in the article, describing his method he says, " Due to the early increase in speed, the aircraft never operates in that red circle. (my italics) There is no “frantic fumble” with the engine failure--just put the airplane back down--with small turns as necessary for the “softest spot” which has been in view the entire time."

[Andy95W]

Since the discussion is really all about energy, the difference is probably not as significant as people would think.  Potential energy (altitude) and kinetic energy (airspeed) are somewhat interchangeable, as we all know.

The better discussion is what we DO with that energy to get to the safest crash site, and then how do we minimize it before impact.

[mike_elliott]

2 minutes ago, Cyril Gibb said:

I got a different read on this.  Later in the article, describing his method he says, " Due to the early increase in speed, the aircraft never operates in that red circle. (my italics) There is no “frantic fumble” with the engine failure--just put the airplane back down--with small turns as necessary for the “softest spot” which has been in view the entire time."

being 30-300 feet up and having an engine expire is a bad place to be no matter if at Vy or Vdeakin, IMO. You are still in a red zone, looking for your best options. I personally like to spend as little time in this dangerous area as possible.

[Tom]

21 minutes ago, Cyril Gibb said:

I got a different read on this.  Later in the article, describing his method he says, " Due to the early increase in speed, the aircraft never operates in that red circle. (my italics) There is no “frantic fumble” with the engine failure--just put the airplane back down--with small turns as necessary for the “softest spot” which has been in view the entire time."

Correct.  The article is confusing as the pictorial depiction of the red zone is AGL height over distance over the ground whereas the text John correctly identifies the red zone as, essentially, time spent low and slow (i.e. not enough momentum to get done what needs to be done with such little altitude).

John's argument is quite analogous to the H-V curve known to helicopter pilots (area under the curve being the red zone).

FWIW I was taught the method advocated by John and it's what I use most always.  YMMV.

[Hedge]

On 4/13/2016 at 11:15 AM, mike_elliott said:

I personally set an altitude bug for 1200' agl prior to launching to remind me of this and to perform the after takeoff check list.

Just learned something new today and I am going to do this exact thing.  I have a large tree lined hill right in front of my airport at takeoff, I would definitely have go 45 deg to the right to find a field.

[sbarbier]

The pilot's name was Ross Grand and was from Prairieville, LA.  He was one of the best pilots I knew with thousands of hours of flight time and over 1000 in Mooney's.  He was my cousin and best friend.  He and I owned an M20k (N5787C) together and sold a few years ago before he bought this one. 

The survivor was his fiance,  actually girlfriend he was proposing to tomorrow.

I'm writing this because he and I always said this would never happen to us, never turn around on take off when too low.  It can happen to anyone in the heat of the moment.  We both lost another cousin 8 years ago in a similar situation, but he stalled when landing in low visibility.  Never think this could not happen to you!  Apparently there was a stiff head wind from 360 on the field that morning, which quickly became a cross wind / tail wind when he turned.  He was trying to make it back to runway 26 when he turned.  All seemed to be OK at first until he was reminded his gear was up.  Airspeed was low and probably on the threshold of stalling.  We all know what happens to airspeed when the gear drops.   His fiance is finally out of the hospital and I'm meeting with her today.  I'll let you guys know if there's anything else we can learn from this.

RIP Ross Grand.

 

Edited April 15, 2016 by sbarbier

[carusoam]

Sbarbier,

Thank you for sharing your thoughts and sorry for your family's loss.

Prayers and best regards,

-a-

[mike_elliott]

35 minutes ago, sbarbier said:

The pilot's name was Ross Grand and was from Prairieville, LA.  He was one of the best pilots I knew with thousands of hours of flight time and over 1000 in Mooney's.  He was my cousin and best friend.  He and I owned an M20k (N5787C) together and sold a few years ago before he bought this one. 

The survivor was his fiance,  actually girlfriend he was proposing to tomorrow.

I'm writing this because he and I always said this would never happen to us, never turn around on take off when too low.  It can happen to anyone in the heat of the moment.  We both lost another cousin 8 years ago in a similar situation, but he stalled when landing in low visibility.  Never think this could not happen to you!  Apparently there was a stiff head wind from 360 on the field that morning, which quickly became a cross wind / tail wind when he turned.  He was trying to make it back to runway 26 when he turned.  All seemed to be OK at first until he was reminded his gear was up.  Airspeed was low and probably on the threshold of stalling.  We all know what happens to airspeed when the gear drops.   His fiance is finally out of the hospital and I'm meeting with her today.  I'll let you guys know if there's anything else we can learn from this.

RIP Ross Grand.

 

We are so sorry for your loss. It is so tragic when we learn of anyone going down in their plane, and when it is this close to home for you, even more gut wrenching. The Mooney Summit has the Bill Gilliland foundation to help with crisis intervention and financial assistance, please get in touch with me or my wife Alice when you can.

mike.elliott AT mooneysummit.com

alice.elliott AT mooneysummit.com

three one seven 371-4164

RIP Ross, blue skies in your new life.

[bradp]

On April 14, 2016 at 11:13 PM, aviatoreb said:

Hi Brad,

I am sure you know the reputation of flying doctors - too distracted, too get there itis, too much money so too much plane too soon, and for whatever reason they have the reputation is sometimes more prone to accidents.

You seem to have the opposite attitude of the stereotype and in part because you refer to the practice of you profession when thinking about flying.  Where do you think the other doctors reputation comes from?

I remember about a year ago seeing a local neurosurgeon dictating int a dictaphone notes about an upcoming surgery while walking around his plane preflighting. Yikes, talk bout multi-tasking  I am note sure which I would prefer less - to fly with him while he was distracted half thinking about surgery, or to have been that surgery he was planning while distracted half thinking about flying.

Thanks For the comment Erik.  

This is just my take on the flying doctor bit.  Physicians self segregate into distinc personality types based on specialty.  Many of the stereotypes about nerdy psychiatrists, jock orthopedic surgeons, and cowboy ED adrenaline junkies are very true.  (One ortho dude came up to reduce a fracture one day while I did sedation and afterward literally said "me ortho... Ortho strong!" while making a muscle like the Arnold).   Not always but there is a thread of truth to these things.  Unfortunately many of the specialties in which high performance aircraft can be afforded are populated by physicians (many times surgeons) who are rewarded by taking on and successfully managing calculated risks on a day-to-day basis.   They are like the Wall Street traders of the medical world.   They are also probably the last specialties where there exists the "rugged individualism" model of healthcare delivery rather than interdisciplinary everyone's input matters team based systems.    The risk reward mindset I think translates to flying behavior where professional skills and success in medicine are falsely transposed to personal flying confidence. (I.e. If I can push through adversity or challenging situations at work I can certainly do the same in aviation).   It's a false self assessment. That's the combination of behaviors that gets physicians into trouble when they take on flying.  

On the other hand, anesthesiologists seem to attract wanna be airline captains.  My wife is an anesthesiologist and she tells me on a weekly basis of some half baked flying metaphors that anesthesiologists come up with.  Interesting, though, that there are true parallels between the practice of anesthesia and flying. Checklists and flows are present.  Anesthesiologists were the first to incorporate simulation in healthcare.  There is even "CRM" that has been pulled from aviation, slightly bastardized, and rebranded as "crisis resource management".   Anesthesiologists are very risk averse.  

If you're really bored I have a whole lecture on historical parallels between the organizational behavior of airline CRM and healthcare CRM - and where they stop.    It's really dry.  ;-)

My specialty (critical care) is mostly like anesthesia.  We adopt checklists and flows.  We say we do CRM but most of us have no idea what that means. We are also risk calculators but are generally risk averse.

Most of my time is spent figuring out when to act and when not to act.  It's also spent trying to juggle multiple data threads that can very easily lead to helmet fire.   We are like the quants of medicine - love our equations.  There are fast emergency times just as much as  slow, plodding, strategizing times and they can flip very easily.  I think that the one thing that I might take away is that we deal with other people emergencies and our own adrenaline so often that you train through panic so that you can think (quickly) through helmet fire.  That skill set might be the one thing that saves my butt one day when flying.  Keep thinking, weigh options and choose prudently.  

The thing that is most risky for me is fatigue. I have to be very careful about setting non-negotiable rules about when I am  fit to fly.  They have us stay up for 30 hrs straight making decisions about and performing procedures for critically ill children despite exhaustion and that is the expectation (write your congressman- it's really not safe at all).   It would be lethal for me to attempt to act as PIC in a similar state- did it once with a safety pilot to see what it felt like and it was not cool.  Trying to identify my own weaknesses, face them, and accept them is probably a departure from the I'm invincible attitude of a lot of docs.   

 

[Shadrach]

29 minutes ago, sbarbier said:

The pilot's name was Ross Grand and was from Prairieville, LA.  He was one of the best pilots I knew with thousands of hours of flight time and over 1000 in Mooney's.  He was my cousin and best friend.  He and I owned an M20k (N5787C) together and sold a few years ago before he bought this one. 

The survivor was his fiance,  actually girlfriend he was proposing to tomorrow.

I'm writing this because he and I always said this would never happen to us, never turn around on take off when too low.  It can happen to anyone in the heat of the moment.  We both lost another cousin 8 years ago in a similar situation, but he stalled when landing in low visibility.  Never think this could not happen to you!  Apparently there was a stiff head wind from 360 on the field that morning, which quickly became a cross wind / tail wind when he turned.  He was trying to make it back to runway 26 when he turned.  All seemed to be OK at first until he was reminded his gear was up.  Airspeed was low and probably on the threshold of stalling.  We all know what happens to airspeed when the gear drops.   His fiance is finally out of the hospital and I'm meeting with her today.  I'll let you guys know if there's anything else we can learn from this.

RIP Ross Grand.

 

Sbarbier,

Thank you for posting.  I am very sorry for your family's loss.  In situations like this everyone wonders how the event came to pass and what can be learned from it.  I am truly appreciative of your willingness to help us understand more given how close this is to you personally. 

[1524J]

8 hours ago, sbarbier said:

The pilot's name was Ross Grand and was from Prairieville, LA.  He was one of the best pilots I knew with thousands of hours of flight time and over 1000 in Mooney's.  He was my cousin and best friend.  He and I owned an M20k (N5787C) together and sold a few years ago before he bought this one. 

The survivor was his fiance,  actually girlfriend he was proposing to tomorrow.

I'm writing this because he and I always said this would never happen to us, never turn around on take off when too low.  It can happen to anyone in the heat of the moment.  We both lost another cousin 8 years ago in a similar situation, but he stalled when landing in low visibility.  Never think this could not happen to you!  Apparently there was a stiff head wind from 360 on the field that morning, which quickly became a cross wind / tail wind when he turned.  He was trying to make it back to runway 26 when he turned.  All seemed to be OK at first until he was reminded his gear was up.  Airspeed was low and probably on the threshold of stalling.  We all know what happens to airspeed when the gear drops.   His fiance is finally out of the hospital and I'm meeting with her today.  I'll let you guys know if there's anything else we can learn from this.

RIP Ross Grand.

 

sbarbier, please accept our condolences, I'm so sorry for your loss of family members, now and in the past. It most be especially difficult considering your close relationship and the pending marriage of Ross. Please let us know if there is anything we as a Mooney family can do for you or Ross's fiance! I'm grateful your willing to think of us by sharing details that might help a future pilot! God Speed

[bradp]

1 hour ago, sbarbier said:

The pilot's name was Ross Grand and was from Prairieville, LA.  He was one of the best pilots I knew with thousands of hours of flight time and over 1000 in Mooney's.  He was my cousin and best friend.  He and I owned an M20k (N5787C) together and sold a few years ago before he bought this one. 

The survivor was his fiance,  actually girlfriend he was proposing to tomorrow.

I'm writing this because he and I always said this would never happen to us, never turn around on take off when too low.  It can happen to anyone in the heat of the moment.  We both lost another cousin 8 years ago in a similar situation, but he stalled when landing in low visibility.  Never think this could not happen to you!  Apparently there was a stiff head wind from 360 on the field that morning, which quickly became a cross wind / tail wind when he turned.  He was trying to make it back to runway 26 when he turned.  All seemed to be OK at first until he was reminded his gear was up.  Airspeed was low and probably on the threshold of stalling.  We all know what happens to airspeed when the gear drops.   His fiance is finally out of the hospital and I'm meeting with her today.  I'll let you guys know if there's anything else we can learn from this.

RIP Ross Grand.

 

Our deepest condolences to your family.  Thank you for being willing to discuss and learn from this tragedy.  I'm sure any pilot who passes when flying would want his or her peers to be able to learn something valuable from their loss.  Thank you for teaching us Ross.  Regards,

[Shadrach]

3 hours ago, bradp said:

Thanks For the flattering comment Erik.  

This is just my take on the flying doctor bit.  Physicians self segregate into distinc personality types based on specialty.  Many of the stereotypes about nerdy psychiatrists, jock orthopedic surgeons, and cowboy ED adrenaline junkies are very true.  (One ortho dude came up to reduce a fracture one day while I did sedation and afterward literally said "me ortho... Ortho strong!" while making a muscle like the Arnold).   Not always but there is a thread of truth to these things.  Unfortunately many of the specialties in which high performance aircraft can be afforded are populated by physicians (many times surgeons) who are rewarded by taking on and successfully managing calculated risks on a day-to-day basis.   They are like the Wall Street traders of the medical world.   They are also probably the last specialties where there exists the "rugged individualism" model of healthcare delivery rather than interdisciplinary everyone's input matters team based systems.    The risk reward mindset I think translates to flying behavior where professional skills and success in medicine are falsely transposed to personal flying confidence. (I.e. If I can push through adversity or challenging situations at work I can certainly do the same in aviation).   It's a false self assessment. That's the combination of behaviors that gets physicians into trouble when they take on flying.  

On the other hand, anesthesiologists seem to attract wanna be airline captains.  My wife is an anesthesiologist and she tells me on a weekly basis of some half baked flying metaphors that anesthesiologists come up with.  Interesting, though, that there are true parallels between the practice of anesthesia and flying. Checklists and flows are present.  Anesthesiologists were the first to incorporate simulation in healthcare.  There is even "CRM" that has been pulled from aviation, slightly bastardized, and rebranded as "crisis resource management".   Anesthesiologists are very risk averse.  

If you're really bored I have a whole lecture on historical parallels between the organizational behavior of airline CRM and healthcare CRM - and where they stop.    It's really dry.  ;-)

My specialty (critical care) is mostly like anesthesia.  We adopt checklists and flows.  We say we do CRM but most of us have no idea what that means. We are also risk calculators but are generally risk averse.

Most of my time is spent figuring out when to act and when not to act.  It's also spent trying to juggle multiple data threads that can very easily lead to helmet fire.   We are like the quants of medicine - love our equations.  There are fast emergency times just as much as  slow, plodding, strategizing times and they can flip very easily.  I think that the one thing that I might take away is that we deal with other people emergencies and our own adrenaline so often that you train through panic so that you can think (quickly) through helmet fire.  That skill set might be the one thing that saves my butt one day when flying.  Keep thinking, weigh options and choose prudently.  

The thing that is most risky for me is fatigue. I have to be very careful about setting non-negotiable rules about when I am personally fit to fly.  They have us stay up for 30 hrs straight making decisions about and performing procedures for critically ill children despite exhaustion and that is the expectation (write your congressman- it's really not safe at all).   It would be lethal for me to attempt to act as PIC in a similar state- did it once with a safety pilot to see what it felt like and it was not cool.  Trying to identify my own weaknesses, face them, and accept them is probably a departure from the I'm invincible attitude of a lot of docs.   

 

Brad,

This was a great post! It's a truly articulate analysis of how high level professionals get into trouble through "transference"...

Your stereotypes are kinda spot on.  

I wish there had been a "Jock" in the ER that early morning in August when I dislocated my knee (completely effaced both cruciate ligaments). The Doc on duty took my lower leg in his hand and pulled it gently and after evaluating the situation said, "F#*%, I can't do anything with this" (I think he assumed I was unconscious form the pain).  In the end, I believe it was his concern over my very weak to non existent pedal pulse that forced him to finally find a second person and together reduce the dislocation. The risk of necrosis pushed him to action. As it stood, I still spent nearly 6 hours dislocated and suffered a fair amount of neuropathy, but that could have been due to other procedures.  

My Ortho on the other hand was a barrel chested man of over 6'.  He played varsity football for Tufts...an Ivy League "Jock".  He was aggressive in his treatment and I count him as the reason that I achieved 95% of my pre-injury mobility and strength.

[mike_elliott]

30 minutes ago, Shadrach said:

Mu Ortho on the other hand was a barrel chested man of over 6'.  He played varsity football for Tufts...an Ivy League "Jock".  He was aggressive in his treatment and I count him as the reason that I achieved 95% of my pre injury mobility and strength.

Our own Mr. Ortho, Rocketman, is a scrawny 5'7 150# orthopedic surgeon (who will be running the Boston Marathon Monday) and does not suffer from delusions of invincibility. He just tries to imitate the most interesting man in the world.

 

[DXB]

5 hours ago, bradp said:

Unfortunately many of the specialties in which high performance aircraft can be afforded are populated by physicians (many times surgeons) who are rewarded by taking on and successfully managing calculated risks on a day-to-day basis.   They are like the Wall Street traders of the medical world.   They are also probably the last specialties where there exists the "rugged individualism" model of healthcare delivery rather than interdisciplinary everyone's input matters team based systems.    The risk reward mindset I think translates to flying behavior where professional skills and success in medicine are falsely transposed to personal flying confidence. (I.e. If I can push through adversity or challenging situations at work I can certainly do the same in aviation).   It's a false self assessment. That's the combination of behaviors that gets physicians into trouble when they take on flying.  

On the other hand, anesthesiologists seem to attract wanna be airline captains.  My wife is an anesthesiologist and she tells me on a weekly basis of some half baked flying metaphors that anesthesiologists come up with.  Interesting, though, that there are true parallels between the practice of anesthesia and flying. Checklists and flows are present.  Anesthesiologists were the first to incorporate simulation in healthcare.  There is even "CRM" that has been pulled from aviation, slightly bastardized, and rebranded as "crisis resource management".   Anesthesiologists are very risk averse.  

If you're really bored I have a whole lecture on historical parallels between the organizational behavior of airline CRM and healthcare CRM - and where they stop.    It's really dry.  ;-)

My specialty (critical care) is mostly like anesthesia.  We adopt checklists and flows.  We say we do CRM but most of us have no idea what that means. We are also risk calculators but are generally risk averse.

Most of my time is spent figuring out when to act and when not to act.  It's also spent trying to juggle multiple data threads that can very easily lead to helmet fire.   We are like the quants of medicine - love our equations.  There are fast emergency times just as much as  slow, plodding, strategizing times and they can flip very easily.  I think that the one thing that I might take away is that we deal with other people emergencies and our own adrenaline so often that you train through panic so that you can think (quickly) through helmet fire.  That skill set might be the one thing that saves my butt one day when flying.  

 

This characterization of surgeons and how it might reflect on their behavior as pilots is nonsense.  Just because people in other specialties tend not to be familiar with the intensely analytical aspects of surgical decision making and related risk mitigation behaviors does not mean that they don't exist. Same goes for the complex and evolving bodies of knowledge that support surgical decision making.  The integration of knowledge and practice experience that leads to increasing proficiency over time is fundamentally no different in surgery than many other specialties.  This progression is also actually quite similar in aviation.  

I would very much doubt that surgeons have a measurably higher mishap rate than any other group of physicians.

BTW Learning how to fly a plane is without a doubt the very closest learning experience I've ever had to my surgical training - I marveled at the parallels every day when working on my PPL- particularly the sensory-motor integration required for subtle tasks like landing.  Also the incremental growth in ability to manage workload, anticipate events, and increasingly multitask when learning to fly is remarkably similar to what happens when learning to perform a surgical procedure. 

[PaulB]

I wanna add my two cents on physicians and flying.  I too am a physician, a urologist.  I have friends and acquaintances in several different specialties that fly as well.  Ortho, ob/gyn, surgery, internal medicine, neonatology, rad onc, plastics, CT surgery, dentistry, and anesthesia.  With all due respect I don't think there's anything unique about anesthesia that makes anesthesiologists safer pilots. I think the biggest factor that contributes to pilot safety is the amount of time the individual dedicates to flying, regardless of the profession.  If you don't regularly spend time actually flying, training, reading, and thinking you put yourself at a higher risk.  You always have to remember that flying isn't just another hobby, it's a hobby that can kill you.  The dangerous flying physicians that I know are the ones that go months without flying and then plan a long trip with their family.  Interestingly, the surgical specialists that I know aren't the dangerous ones but that has to do with their dedication to flying rather than their day job. I don't want people feeling unsafe flying with me  

[bradp]

47 minutes ago, PaulB said:

I

Paul has it right here- time and dedication have everything to do with it.  I wasn't trying to can one group or raise another group up.  Just trying to use professional stereotypes as an example and note that both "positive"or "negative" professional personality stereotypes can land a non-professional pilot in trouble.   I diverted on a long cross country when the sky turned to popcorn firecrackers ahead and met another pilot in a similar performance aircraft who I chatted with for an hour or so. He was a brilliant xxx_oligist who was flying from floridla to somewhere north to do a weekend locum tenens call and then head back home after.  When the sky was still very dark and active with a nexrad that looked 10-mile-gap iffy he said he was heading out.  I asked him if he didn't want to consider waiting for another hour or so as things looked like they were peaking and maybe starting to dissipate.  He said he needed to go.   That's get there itis in a nutshell.  I tracked his flight and sure enough he shot a gap and got to his destination but the setup is clear as day.  Did it matter what kind of doc he was?  Absolutely not- he had something important to get to (family, work, etc) and used his confidence in his ability to push through.   The sky didn't calm down until several hours later.   The number of successful trips he made in the past likely reinforced that this trip would be just as successful and it was.  Look at the ASF video about the doc that crashed at Dover.  IIRC the piece went into much analysis of the in-flight decision making but didn't get to the preflight decision making.  The deceased pilot in that circumstance clearly pushed to get to his destination because he had an important commitment. Did it matter that he or the gentleman was a doc even? Nope.  But there is a reputation and it does come stem from somewhere.  I was just tying to address Erik's question but of course my transferable answer doesn't have any data to back it up.   Sorry if I offended anyone.   

I also I left John Breda out of the stereotype game.  He must be a geriatrician restoring his 1968 F to an Ovation. :-).  

[N33GG]

8 hours ago, sbarbier said:

The pilot's name was Ross Grand and was from Prairieville, LA.  He was one of the best pilots I knew with thousands of hours of flight time and over 1000 in Mooney's.  He was my cousin and best friend.  He and I owned an M20k (N5787C) together and sold a few years ago before he bought this one. 

The survivor was his fiance,  actually girlfriend he was proposing to tomorrow.

I'm writing this because he and I always said this would never happen to us, never turn around on take off when too low.  It can happen to anyone in the heat of the moment.  We both lost another cousin 8 years ago in a similar situation, but he stalled when landing in low visibility.  Never think this could not happen to you!  Apparently there was a stiff head wind from 360 on the field that morning, which quickly became a cross wind / tail wind when he turned.  He was trying to make it back to runway 26 when he turned.  All seemed to be OK at first until he was reminded his gear was up.  Airspeed was low and probably on the threshold of stalling.  We all know what happens to airspeed when the gear drops.   His fiance is finally out of the hospital and I'm meeting with her today.  I'll let you guys know if there's anything else we can learn from this.

RIP Ross Grand.

 

"It can happen to anyone in the heat of the moment"  More true words could not be spoken.  Ratings, experience, and brainstorming on forums provide no guarantees either.  None of us can be too careful.

Very sobering.  Prayers for all concerned.

 

[bonal]

Thank you sir for posting and providing more about this tragic accident. Whenever I hear of these events its personal being in a Mooney makes it more so. Knowing something now and of how highly you speak of your cousin adds to the sense of loss to our small but dynamic flying community. Sounds like Ross was a good man and my prayers go out to you and your family. Having a debate on weather medical professionals make good or bad pilots is kind of silly especially when I remember reading something that was related to military aviation that states that Artists tended to make the best pilots since they think more in three dimensions and have better special awareness a complete opposite of the professional spectrum. I would also like to welcome you to this great forum and hope you stick around. From your comments I assume you are a pilot and fan of aviation 

God speed

[bradp]

By the way all this medicine nonsense aside my flying hero is Dick Karl - surgeon turned charter pilot.