Terror

[Shadrach]

Quote: gsengle

 

Nothing is worse than that feeling "I could die shortly".  Funny I've had what I'd call 2 close calls in 18 or so years.  And only one of those gave me that feeling.

The first was a partial engine failure in a rented Arrow as I entered the pattern midfield left downwind runway 27 (I think) at KBED.  I was a fairly new private pilot and just had gotten my complex checkout.   As I leveled off at pattern altitude, and put in power to level off with gear down, and instead I got a backfire and a continued 300+ fpm descent at full power.  Glad that my instructor had done tons of engine out landings with me in that Arrow as part of my checkout - short wing arrow is not the best glider...  (Thank you Jessica Daisy!)  Lessons learned?  (fortunately I had learned these before this incident)  1.  Don't hesitate to declare an emergency.  If you aren't sure, declare.  Everyone just wants to help.  2.  Don't hesitate to turn TO THE RUNWAY.  I had almost 2 miles of runway to use, use whatever part you need to.  Last 3rd is fine if thats what works best.  Diagonally across it (it was 150 feet wide) is fine too.  3.  ALTITUDE is your friend.  I was going to descend early to get under the KBOS class B, but a helpful controller when I advised I was going to descend, cleared me into the Bravo.  (what did we call it then?  TCA?)  I suspect that if I had descended early and had my issue 30 miles short of the airport at 2500 feet, I would have ended up in the trees.

As a joint use AFB, the firetrucks were at the runway before I was.  A Citation on a straight in had to go around.  Backfired again as I taxied in.  Was all over in 90 seconds.  As my 2 passengers were dancing on the ramp, then it hit me...  But until then it was all calm no panic, training kicking in.  The MassPort truck rolled up and handed me a radio to talk to the tower.  At this point I was scared that I had done something wrong, caused a fuss.  All the tower wanted to do was see if I was ok and praise me for handling things well and for promptly declaring the emergency.

Years later, now in my personal Arrow (an aircraft that convinced me with its 137 knot cruise to upgrade to a Mooney, as much as I loved my Arrow) I was flying back on a very long VFR cross country from Florida back to MA.  Would have been an easy IFR flight (lowish ceilings in the Carolinas) and VFR to the north and south with broken to scattered.  Had just bought the plane, actually to get my instrument rating in, but hadn't started just yet.  Had never been in IMC even with an instructor.  Should have just flown over the overcast, but as a VFR pilot that made me nervous.  So I went lower.  And lower.  Most places were reporting above 1500 feet and I was along the coast so could go low if necessary I figured.  STUPID.  Near Myrtle Beach flying at maybe 1000 ft just offshore, I inadvertently entered IMC.  This is when I got the "I COULD DIE" feeling.  I had had the 178 seconds to live message drilled into me and felt very disoriented.  I had a basic autopilot so I did the right thing, I turned 180 degrees with the heading bug/autopilot and within a minute or two I was back VMC, but weather was deteriorating.  I confessed to ATC (you always get VFR advisories on a cross country, don't you?) and got help with vectors to a local VMC airport.  Got stuck there for a day or two - and ended up very motivated to get my instrument done.

I'm sure now I was in greater danger in the first incident, but the second one was the first time in my life that I got that "I could die now" feeling.  The best way to avoid that feeling is training.  In the first case, I was prepared.   In the second, I was not.  That was the difference.

And a Mooney with lots of excess HP, skywatch, weather, strikefinder, FIKI, dual alternators, dual vacuum pumps, lots of fuel (and soon backup AI) is also a great form of preparation  pinch me!

g

 

p.s. anyone know anyone who might want a nice IFR arrow?  I want it to get a good home!

http://www.aso.com/listings/spec/ViewAd.aspx?id=133943

 

[gsengle]

Quote: Shadrach

This is why I feel that the "178 secs to live" proverb is counter productive. It's scary enough for a VFR pilot when they inadvertently enter IMC.  Having a voice telling you that your going to die in the next 3 minutes does not help.

[MooneyMitch]

"What do people think about how productive or counterproductive the 178 seconds to live thing is?"

As a VFR only pilot, it always came immediately into my mind when I would accidentally enter into a cloud.  More so at night.

So, the thought definetly hit home with me.  It was effective!  The fact that I am writing this post gives the whole thing some validity.

With my IFR training, the mindset has disappeared.  I know now I can keep the aircraft under control should I accidentally again venture into an IMC situation.  I have a ways to go on the training still but that part I feel quite confident in.

[Hank]

I think the proper use of the "178 seconds to live" proverb and video is in prevention. Anything that keeps VFR pilots out of IMC conditions has to be a good thing. Teaching what to do AFTER reaching IMC is a whole 'nother ball of wax . . .

Reducing fear is always a good thing, but reducing fear of accidental VFR into IMC may well lead to a higher occurence rate, which will lead to more accidents. I suggest reading about Risk Homeostasis Theory, try this:

          http://psyc.queensu.ca/target/#contents

As the perceived risk of a particular activity is reduced, people change their operating method so that Risk * Exposure is held constant. Total risk over time does not change. Widen a road for safety, people drive faster; deaths per mile may go down, but deaths per driving hour along the road will not change.

[Shadrach]

Quote: gsengle

This is why I feel that the "178 secs to live" proverb is counter productive. It's scary enough for a VFR pilot when they inadvertently enter IMC.  Having a voice telling you that your going to die in the next 3 minutes does not help.

[paulthomas]

The saying is not bad but like you said it is a bit to dramatic and I agree.

[danb35]

Quote: gsengle

It is a really great point.  My guess is that for a typical vfr pilot, hard imc, no autopilot, it is probably true though.  I think a functioning autopilot significantly improves the situation though...  What do people think about how productive or counterproductive the 178 seconds to live thing is?

[John Pleisse]

Quote: danb35

IIRC, that statistic was developed before the private pilot curriculum required any hood/instrument time, by testing pilots (who had no complex experience) in a Bonanza.  Here's some discussion of it: http://www.cfidarren.com/r-178dissected.htm.

I don't know what's normal here.  I know that I did fine on my first lesson under the hood--my CFI remarked that I did better on instruments than visually.  And this study indicated that a few hours of training on the guages had a large effect in terms of safety (which is why it's now required).

I think it's important for VFR pilots to realize that clouds and instrument conditions are a serious matter, but the "you have less than three minutes to live" simply isn't true, and may well make matters worse.

[Hank]

I think the PPL training for accidental IFR encounter is sufficient:  maintain control and get out of it!

Training may help control the plane, which is good; but too much training will give overconfidence, which is bad. It is a two-edged sword, and must be handled carefully.

Consider the experience regarding Driver's Education that I found in the Risk study referenced above. We were all taught that Driver's Education is a good thing, and my insurance company gave me a discount for taking it. Here is an evaluation based on a school system in Atlanta, GA, and actual results:

Therefore, we turn to a real-life experiment which was conducted in Georgia, the Georgia with Atlanta as the capital, not Tbilisi. In DeKalb County in this state, trainee drivers were not allowed to choose, but were arbitrarily assigned to one of three training conditions. The first was called the Safe Performance Curriculum [sic]. This had been developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and was considered the most advanced and thorough driver training programme available in the USA. It involved about 32 hours of classroom instruction, 16 hours of training on a simulator, 16 hours of instruction on a driving range, 3 hours of practising emergency manoeuvres, and over 3 hours of driving on public roads, including 20 minutes of night-time driving.

The second was a minimal training programme for providing the skills that are necessary to pass the driver's test. Since this included no more than a total of about 20 hours instruction in the classroom, on the driving range and on the simulator combined, and only one hour of actual driving by the student, this course contained considerably fewer hours of instruction than the typical high school training course.

A third group of students received no formal training and were expected to be taught by their parents (although some may have taken training in private driver training schools).The three groups were matched in terms of gender, age, grade point average and parents' socio-economic status.

Each of the groups in this four-year study consisted of about 5500 students. Learner-drivers who had graduated from the special training programme obtained their driver's licences sooner and had significantly more crashes than those who had received minimal training or no high school driver training at all. There was no significant difference in the crash involvement of the latter two groups.

Now apply this to flight training, and specifically to VFR-into-IMC. Doesn't look like the path we want to take anymore, does it? Training by itself won't reduce accident rates, what happens inside our collective heads has to change, and that is not so easy to do. More thinking need . . .

[jetdriven]

I'm not sure that applies to piloting.  For example, i would love to see a study of Part 141 pilot school graduates' accident rates against local FBO taught students.

[Jerry 5TJ]

Quote: Hank

I think the proper use of the "178 seconds to live" proverb and video is in prevention. Anything that keeps VFR pilots out of IMC conditions has to be a good thing. Teaching what to do AFTER reaching IMC is a whole 'nother ball of wax . . .

[Shadrach]

Quote: jetdriven

I'm not sure that applies to piloting.  For example, i would love to see a study of Part 141 pilot school graduates' accident rates against local FBO taught students.

[DaV8or]

Quote: Hank

I think the PPL training for accidental IFR encounter is sufficient:  maintain control and get out of it!

[cujet]

An old thread, but I thought I'd add my "terror" experiences to the list.  Happened twice on the same trip. 

 

Aircraft: Eurocopter EC-135

Location 1: Grand Canyon

Location 1: LAX

 

I was in the back of our brand new heli, looking forward, as we were flying about 1000 feet below the rim of the Grand Canyon, at midnight. We turned down a box canyon (one that abruptly ends) and were heading straight for the canyon wall at 140Kts, illuminated only by moonlight! Once our pathetic landing light was showing a spot on the canyon wall, I "knew" we were dead, as the pilot took no action. I started screaming to the pilot to "pull up", which he did,,, hard! Narrowly missing the rocks on the slope. I'd guess we were within a few feet of the rocky slope, at 135-140Kts. Pulled about 4Gs on that one. 

 

Later the next day, we were cleared to cross perpendicular to the runways at LAX at 1500 feet. From the terminal on one side (dropping off the canyon pilot, thank God) and over to the FBO.  So, straight up we went, and across we go, normal procedure for a helicopter at LAX. As we crossed, an Embraer Brasilia did a "Space Shuttle" departure (pulled up sharply and climbed rapidly) right into our flight path. Once again, I was in the back, screaming like a little girl. The pilot saw the Embraer at the last second and took evasive action. About 4Gs, which seems to be the practical limit of the EC-135. We ended up inverted and pulled out near ground level in a "half loop" maneuver. That was a horrible and somewhat violent event. I ended up mildly injured as I was leaning out of my seatbelt watching the oncoming traffic.  

 

I'm 50, flying since 17, (both private and corporate) and these two incidents were the absolute worst I've ever experienced. Nothing else comes close. 

[aviatoreb]

An old thread, but I thought I'd add my "terror" experiences to the list.  Happened twice on the same trip. 

 

Aircraft: Eurocopter EC-135

Location 1: Grand Canyon

Location 1: LAX

 

I was in the back of our brand new heli, looking forward, as we were flying about 1000 feet below the rim of the Grand Canyon, at midnight. We turned down a box canyon (one that abruptly ends) and were heading straight for the canyon wall at 140Kts, illuminated only by moonlight! Once our pathetic landing light was showing a spot on the canyon wall, I "knew" we were dead, as the pilot took no action. I started screaming to the pilot to "pull up", which he did,,, hard! Narrowly missing the rocks on the slope. I'd guess we were within a few feet of the rocky slope, at 135-140Kts. Pulled about 4Gs on that one. 

 

Later the next day, we were cleared to cross perpendicular to the runways at LAX at 1500 feet. From the terminal on one side (dropping off the canyon pilot, thank God) and over to the FBO.  So, straight up we went, and across we go, normal procedure for a helicopter at LAX. As we crossed, an Embraer Brasilia did a "Space Shuttle" departure (pulled up sharply and climbed rapidly) right into our flight path. Once again, I was in the back, screaming like a little girl. The pilot saw the Embraer at the last second and took evasive action. About 4Gs, which seems to be the practical limit of the EC-135. We ended up inverted and pulled out near ground level in a "half loop" maneuver. That was a horrible and somewhat violent event. I ended up mildly injured as I was leaning out of my seatbelt watching the oncoming traffic.  

 

I'm 50, flying since 17, (both private and corporate) and these two incidents were the absolute worst I've ever experienced. Nothing else comes close. 

 

Holy Moly?!  Same pilot same day?

 

What did he have to say for himself (herself)?

 

Have you heard from that guy since?  Does he/she survive today?

[John Pleisse]

My biggest..... is severe continuous turbulence. I have encountered it twice. Nothing more terrifying than losing complete control of the plane. It happened once years ago and I almost quit flying. The other bad one is almost wiping out in IMC. Fear paralysis is real, you gotta snap yourself out of it, by literally talking out loud to yourself. Fly the plane.

[John Pleisse]

 

IIRC, that statistic was developed before the private pilot curriculum required any hood/instrument time, by testing pilots (who had no complex experience) in a Bonanza.  Here's some discussion of it: http://www.cfidarren.com/r-178dissected.htm.

I don't know what's normal here.  I know that I did fine on my first lesson under the hood--my CFI remarked that I did better on instruments than visually.  And this study indicated that a few hours of training on the guages had a large effect in terms of safety (which is why it's now required).

I think it's important for VFR pilots to realize that clouds and instrument conditions are a serious matter, but the "you have less than three minutes to live" simply isn't true, and may well make matters worse.

 There's a great read on called "IFR for VFR" pilots. It should be manditory for every newly minted PP.  ASA publication.

 

[phecksel]

Three times,

 

1st, brand new IR, literally the ink was still dry.  I trusted FSS and a temperature inversion.  All was well at my assigned altitude, but an airplane missed the runway due to icing directly below me and a corporate jet immediately above me was screaming for lower as he was in icing.

 

2nd, flew over a massive snow storm that was literally shutting down airports.  It had incredibly low tops, zero reports of icing, and the top reports were coming in low enough to fly over, and yet it was dumping snow several inches per hour.  I'm flying along fat dumb and happy and pulled carb heat... engine went instantly quiet.  12,000 feet lots of room to glide, right?  Except the airports below me were SHUT DOWN!  As it turns out, the carb heat cable had slipped and only applied 1/2 way.  I lost about 700' before the engine restarted, but damn.  While I carefully evaluated flying conditions, I did not have an out.

 

3rd was the scariest.  No reports of icing anywhere.  25°F at my altitude, which should be below potential icing.  I have a single puffy cloud in my path.  Not showing up on ATC's limited scope ability.  I can see the top, and it appears to be few hundred feet above me.  In the middle of this small cloud, I hit Super Cooled Drizzle Drops.  I lost 30 kts AS in 30 seconds, and even worse, the plane felt stallish.  Don't recall if I used the E word, but did file a NASA report.  Several years later, an Icing researcher called me and we talked for quite awhile.  What made this so incredibly scary, he told me I was one of the few to ever survive an encounter with SCDD.  Researching the phenomenon was difficult due to so few 1st hand accounts.

[cujet]

Holy Moly?!  Same pilot same day?

 

What did he have to say for himself (herself)?

 

Have you heard from that guy since?  Does he/she survive today?

Both pilots were in the front on the Canyon event. The Canyon PIC was dropped off at LAX, so the other guy was flyin at LAX.  Neither said anything much to me afterwards. The LAX event did involve some heated discussion with the tower (as if they had any control over the situation) . Both pilots are alive and well. 

 

Oh, I forgot to add, Pilot #2 did fly under a famous bridge on the last leg of the delivery flight. Ugh. I was not happy about that either. 

 

Thinking back, it's no wonder I operate aircraft the way I do. I absolutely refuse to fly low, do stunts, buzz people or other stupid stuff. I'm not good enough to do such things and live. Heck, I won't fly to the Keys or Bahamas due to water...

[flyboy0681]

More like "hours of total boredom and minutes of sheer terror".

 

In 1982 I lost power in an Archer after departing Caldwell, NJ. It happened about three minutes after takeoff so I was able to turn around and land down wind. I was also eyeing Interstate 80 at the time.