Close Call At JFK

[GeeBee]

https://viewfromthewing.com/near-disaster-as-american-airlines-plane-passes-in-front-of-departing-delta-jet-in-new-york/

[RoundTwo]

Just saw that pop up YouTube. Somebody has some explaining to do.

[PeteMc]

@GeeBee  So what is this site you posted the link for????? 

The tape I heard did not say anything at all like "Shit! Delta 1943 cancel takeoff clearance! Delta 1943 cancel takeoff clearance." as in the link you posted.

[DCarlton]

News said ATC was panicked.  They amped the report with lots of drama. I heard urgency.  Just read the link above.  Seems like a different story than the ABC news led me to believe.  The link makes sense.

[RoundTwo]

7 hours ago, PeteMc said:

@GeeBee  So what is this site you posted the link for????? 

The tape I heard did not say anything at all like "Shit! Delta 1943 cancel takeoff clearance! Delta 1943 cancel takeoff clearance." as in the link you posted.

Here it is. Cancel Takeoff Clearance!

[GeeBee]

There is some operational issues involved which may have made an impact. AA apparently made some operational changes chasing that holy grail of airline operations, "fleet standardization". That doctrine attempts to make procedures and policies the same across the entire fleet regardless of aircraft type. I've fought a few of those battles myself with the doctrine which has a noble purpose but an almost impossible implementation. AA apparently just pushed it out by bulletin rather than having crews actually practice it in the sim and that is the bone of contention right now.

https://www.alliedpilots.org/News/ID/10941/Unwise-and-Unsafe

[rbp]

AA was instructed to taxi 4L via bravo, hold short 31L, then told the cross 31L to Kilo.

instead AA went straight on Hotel and crossed 4L, just as DL was departing 4L

"READ BACK ALL RUNWAY ASSIGNMENTS AND HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS" -- American forgot to read back taxi RW4

 

[GeeBee]

But if you are assigned, "4L, cross 31L" and you read back "4L cross 31L" and you think you are going to 4L, there is no hold short instruction to read back. My guess is he thought he was going to 4L and was crossing 31L. In their minds, "cross the runway and I will be at the departure end." the big red numbers "4L-22R" not withstanding.

[rbp]

5 minutes ago, GeeBee said:

But if you are assigned, "4L, cross 31L" and you read back "4L cross 31L" and you think you are going to 4L, there is no hold short instruction to read back. My guess is he thought he was going to 4L and was crossing 31L. In their minds, "cross the runway and I will be at the departure end." the big red numbers "4L-22R" not withstanding.

You didn’t listen to the tape

[DXB]

1 hour ago, rbp said:

AA was instructed to taxi 4L via bravo, hold short 31L, then told the cross 31L to Kilo.

instead AA went straight on Hotel and crossed 4L, just as DL was departing 4L

"READ BACK ALL RUNWAY ASSIGNMENTS AND HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS" -- American forgot to read back taxi RW4

 

Yikes that's horrifying. Kudos to the controller for the firm split second reaction.

[Hank]

5 hours ago, GeeBee said:

There is some operational issues involved which may have made an impact. AA apparently made some operational changes chasing that holy grail of airline operations, "fleet standardization". That doctrine attempts to make procedures and policies the same across the entire fleet regardless of aircraft type. I've fought a few of those battles myself with the doctrine which has a noble purpose but an almost impossible implementation. AA apparently just pushed it out by bulletin rather than having crews actually practice it in the sim and that is the bone of contention right now.

https://www.alliedpilots.org/News/ID/10941/Unwise-and-Unsafe

This linked article provides no information other than "management changed something and didn't train the pilots except by issuing a bulletin." It is impossible to tell if these unspecified changes were related to this incident or not.

[DCarlton]

There were two AAs.  185 and 106.  Wasn't 185 told to line up and wait at 31L.  Then 106 went to 31L.  Still confused.  Why was 31L in play with either aircraft?  Did the tower contribute to this? 

Also for the pros, the tower said "cancel takeoff clearance".  Curious about the language.  Seems like Delta - Abort Takeoff would have been much more succinct and clear.  

[aviatoreb]

How close did they get with Delta on take off roll to AA?

[DCarlton]

2 minutes ago, aviatoreb said:

How close did they get with Delta on take off roll to AA?

ABC news said 1000 feet.  Don't know if that's accurate.

[GeeBee]

2 hours ago, rbp said:

You didn’t listen to the tape

Well I listened to the tape, he was instructed that 4L was his departure runway, he was instructed to cross 31L. My theory is his mind was turned 90 degrees because he saw AA 185 depart 31L which added to his confirmation bias what he saw was a 4L departure when in actuality it was not 4L but 31L. When he came to the bars he was already cleared across 31L and he believed he was crossing 31L when in fact he was crossing 4L. Again, in his mind, nothing to read back because he believed he was crossing 31L for which he had clearance and indeed read back the clearance.

[GeeBee]

48 minutes ago, Hank said:

This linked article provides no information other than "management changed something and didn't train the pilots except by issuing a bulletin." It is impossible to tell if these unspecified changes were related to this incident or not.

The operational changes that management is attempting to implement without fulsome training alters how pilots communicate, coordinate, and execute flight safety duties at some of the most high-threat times of flight. These high-threat times include, but are not limited to, rejected takeoffs, low visibility approaches, and go-arounds. Aligned and standardized crew communication and coordination is the bedrock of maintaining the safety margin during all phases of flight, but particularly during high task-loaded maneuvers. Management’s attempt to train by bulletin reeks of training on the cheap and placing profits before people.

I've seen these "fleet harmonization" goat ropes before. Lots of changes in callouts during taxi and before take off checks that result in confusion and timing leading to operational errors.

[GeeBee]

It is a lot easier when you sit up high. It is a challenge in a Mooney.

[T. Peterson]

23 minutes ago, bluehighwayflyer said:

I’m amazed that this kind of stuff doesn’t happen more often.  You pro pilots who regularly and safely operate in these types of environments really impress me.  Like probably all amateur pilots, rightly or wrongly, I’m confident with training and practice I could fly the planes you do, but I don’t think I would ever get used to these complex and congested airport operations.  A tip of the hat to you all. 

I’m glad everyone is ok.  

You are very gracious. Thank you.

[Will.iam]

2 hours ago, GeeBee said:

Well I listened to the tape, he was instructed that 4L was his departure runway, he was instructed to cross 31L. My theory is his mind was turned 90 degrees because he saw AA 185 depart 31L which added to his confirmation bias what he saw was a 4L departure when in actuality it was not 4L but 31L. When he came to the bars he was already cleared across 31L and he believed he was crossing 31L when in fact he was crossing 4L. Again, in his mind, nothing to read back because he believed he was crossing 31L for which he had clearance and indeed read back the clearance.

I think you nailed it. Confirmation bias is a very serious issue to keep in check. Since the capt is tasked with taxiing the aircraft the pilot monitoring which is the FO has more attention they can use to verify and backup the capt’s turns and route. But throw in new call outs like the FO now makes the before takeoff announcement to the FA’s to prepare for takeoff and that attention is now diverted away from helping the capt not turn on the wrong taxiway or cross the wrong runway. AA claimed the FO catches 60% of all taxi errors. That’s a huge loss of safety when the FO is tasked saturated or is trying to do new procedures and callouts on the line without having been able to practice in the sim first. 

Edited January 16, 2023 by Will.iam

[Will.iam]

 

[rbp]

58 minutes ago, Will.iam said:

Since the capt is tasked with taxiing the aircraft

I checked and the 777-200 has tillers on both sides, so we don’t know which seat is taxiing. 

[201er]

The controllers were clear in their instructions. In this case, it was a complete screw up from the American Airlines pilots. If they got confused about American 185 taking off 31L, it doesn't give them any reason to cross 4L. After American 106 stopped, they said "The last clearance we were given, we were cleared to cross, is that correct?" They still didn't know what runway they had just crossed.

American 106 reads back: "Cross 31L at Kilo, American 106 Heavy"

They cross 4L at Juliet

American 106: "The last clearance we were given, we were cleared to cross, is that correct?"

This video has the ground control recordings:

 

[Will.iam]

22 minutes ago, rbp said:

I checked and the 777-200 has tillers on both sides, so we don’t know which seat is taxiing. 

Ours do to but company policy is capt drives. 

[GeeBee]

Very few airlines allow the F/O to taxi even with two tillers.

 

[201er]

2 minutes ago, GeeBee said:

Very few airlines allow the F/O to taxi even with two tillers.

They'll let them land but not taxi?