Shadrach

Im pretty sure that I have been verbally cleared into the SFRA many times; sometime direct to my destination within the SFRA and others via the filed entry gate. Clearance was usually accompanied by instructions to remain clear of Bravo. I have not had a need to file a SFRA flight plan for many years so perhaps things have changed.

Has anyone verified the timing by observing spark at the lead? The Lycoming IO360 was certified at 25° of advance. 20° of advance was added to the TCDS at a later date. Many of us are running 25° with cool CHTs. I can envision no scenario where 20° of advance would produce the symptoms you're experiencing. It seems unlikely that the increased spark energy of the Surefly would increase flame front propagation sufficiently to cause an increase CHT, ergo I would ensure it is properly timed. As for the Slick failure. Any magneto can fail. The question is what component failed. There are a number of component failures that would cause the scenario you describe. If you ever again find yourself operating in on a single mag in flight, it is perfectly fine to adjust the mixture to increase the speed of combustion (flame front propagation). This would entail leaning the mixture if ROP or enrichening the mixture if LOP. This will help to recapture lost power and reduce any roughness until the flight is completed. Note that losing a mag while running LOP is more likely to result in noticeable power loss and roughness. While it is getting harder to find A&Ps that will open a mag, there are still many that are willing. For future reference, a repair kit is available for the Slick 4370 through airpower for $175.00. Kit includes the following: Contact Point Kits Double Sealed Bearing Bearing Cap Assembly Condenser Rotor Gear Cotter Pin Coil Distributer Block and Gear Woodruff Key Oil Seal Washer Impulse Coupler

What type of Military fields? I have flown into both Martin State and Niagara Falls Int in the last 60 days and I was not asked nor did I hear it asked of any of the other inbound traffic. Both fields are active, joint Civil-Military airfields.

Fuel injection has been around for a long time. The Precision Airmotive/Bendix/Avstar RSA injection system utilized by your J model dates back to the 1950s. The previous RS system dates back to the 40s. By the end of WWII B29s were utilizing Bendix direct injection on the 18cyl Wright R3350. Generally speaking, there has been very little that has changed about FAA certified fuel injection systems since the mid 50s much less the mid 80s...

Nice looking strip! 1900’ isn’t a lot but it’s enough for a lightweight mid or short body. At 2120’msl, dog day summertime operations could get a bit dodgy with DAs in excess of 5000’.

It's not just about what you expect or don't expect, it's about solving the idle issue before adding a new variable. As good as Surefly products have been, they have not been trouble free. There have been software issues that specifically relate to start up and low RPM operations. If your idle situation is not completely resolved before adding a new component that has an issue and it manifests as a symptom that is similar to your previously unresolved issue, systematic trouble shooting becomes convoluted at best.

Indian head (2W5) and Leesburg (KJYO) are the closest to the National Cemetery. Leesburg is about 15 mins from nearest metro station. Leesburg is in the SFRA and requires training but does not require a SFRA flight plan. It does require that you squawk 1226 on ingress and egress. Leesburg is a rare Class E, remote towered airport. Operationally it’s pretty much the same as a Class D. Procedures for landing Leesburg are straight forward. I would recommend you get VFR advisories well ahead of arriving near DC. On a few occasions ATC has asked me to keep my discrete squawk code until landing rather than switch to 1226. I don’t know why. I’ve never had a problem either way.

@Matthew P I suggest you solve your idle issue before swapping in a Surefly. Generally speaking, it’s not a great idea to add new variables when troubleshooting. If you can isolate the issue to the mags then so be it, but I would work on getting the power plant running properly before I started modifying it.

I share your concern when it comes to just throwing parts at a problem. That being said, I think that answer to what constitutes a problem is a valve that ceases to rotate. As far as I know, no one other than Savvy is collecting data but I take Mike at his word. There have also been reports of valve to seat concentricity issues. I’ve heard lots of maintenance pros lament the quality of Continental factory cylinders. It’s not unheard of for an owner to send new cylinders off to be reworked by an Independent shop before install in order to give them the best shot at longevity. Your post implies that “proper operation” is the key to getting Continental cylinders to TBO, from which I infer that you believe premature failure is operationally induced. I’m curious what constitutes proper operation in your opinion. To be clear, I’m not suggesting that they never make it to TBO. We have some operators here that have had good success. We’ve also had a number of engines require new cylinders.

I haven’t collected any data, but there have been a number of threads on BT about the problem. Seems to be a known problem. Mike Busch discussed it in detail in 2022. Seems to be a known problem. Continental seems to have other cylinder issues as well. https://resources.savvyaviation.com/wp-content/uploads/articles_aopa/AOPA_2022-05_failure-to-rotate.pdf

So you don’t think that the rash of rotocoil issues with Continental cylinders is significant? Certainly “proper or improper” engine operations are not related to garter spring issues?

Edited!

@1980Mooney was the original poster of the thread showcasing @natdm's prop strike incident. Nate responded to the thread with a detailed account of what happened. The whole thread was then deleted and his account of the situation was lost. Seemed kind of senseless.

You make a good point. I think it is often a combination of issue when a J-Bar fails. I also think it is exceedingly rare. Some of these "failures" may be the Electric gear equivalent of the putting the gear switch in the down position after a gear up landing. There may be some who have released the J-Bar from the up lock block after a gear up, and then claimed the down lock failed. I think most actual failures occur when the bar is not fully seated in the lock. Even a severely "egged out" lock will have substantial engagement from the thumb lock (see image). There is some resistance in the system as the J-bar goes over center into the down lock. It's not a lot but on undulating terrain or during a hard landing, it could dislodge if it's not seated. It only takes one gear leg being out of rig to pull the rest out of over center and cause everything to retract if the down lock is flakey.

I would submit that running at peak is OK at most cruise MP and RPM settings, provided you use the richest cylinder. The approximately 5% delta in power between peak and ROP just is not that large. Assuming the WOTRAO and 2500, 11.5 seems high at the 10.5K DA @AndreiC describes. According to book power charts. At 2500, 2600rpm is no setting 100ROP setting at ISA 10,000' that consumes 11gph much less 11.5gph. At 2700rpm and 100ROP, fuel flow would be around 11GPH...interpolated from the POH.

Down lock holds gear over center. Actuator does the same. I have heard that a little slop in the jack screw will sometimes allow just enough play in the the limit switch to activate the actuator a fraction of a turn when the master is turned on. I do not believe that gear loads transmit to the actuator or J-bar unless it's out of rig or not over center.

My rudimentary understanding of the Mooney gear system is limited to the J-Bar models. If I apply my understanding of the manual system to the electric gear system, I would say that the actuator and the up limit switch are what hold the gear in the up position in the same way they hold the gear in the over center down position. I’ve never seen a detailed explanation of precisely how the “no back spring” incorporates into the system. I was under the impression it was part of a clutch mechanism.

Manual has a down lock, electric does not. But it hardly matters because all three gear mechanisms lock over center. I don' take turns fast either but I have landed in crosswinds strong enough to cause the mains to skip/skid laterally. Terrible sound and feeling. Even though I was confident the upwind main would not fold, it still made me nervous.

I don't think side load could do something like that unless the gear hit something stationary. In my experience, properly rigged gear is extremely robust and resistant to loads from any direction.

Right. So likely forward CG. Forward CG require nose up elevator trim. Nose up elevator trim = additional induced drag.

It’s probably a function of frequenting this space, but it’s my perception that there was a lot more “winging it” back in the paper days. Information was not as available or easily acquired either. The only info spigots flowing were magazines, technical publications and other pilots/CFIs around the drome. Safety culture was inconsistent. People were a lot more cavalier…I’ve heard the stories. My airport was full of old and bold maniacs that thought there ADM was perfectly reasonable. Most of them lived to old age, a handful that didn’t, served as the subject matter of many stories in the pilots lounge. Overshooting a runway is child’s play compared to the shit that these guys did and got away with.

Some of it’s currency but it’s mostly understanding approach speed as a multiple of Vso, knowing vso for your op weight, and being disciplined enough to maintain it. In terms of airmanship, it’s pretty easy. In my opinion, it’s less rust and more laziness. I think if you ask a most pilots after they've had an RLOC/over run incident, they would be at a loss to give correct approximations of the aforementioned numbers.

Not having the side braces that run from firewall to the lower rail assemblies probably makes some tasks easier. Do you know which year they were discontinued?

That is a sobering image of the cabin door. If there had been a fire it would have been very difficult to open. Looks like the pilot was extracted via the baggage door. from the images, it does not appear that either wing tank was compromised. Will be interesting to get more info. Total distance from DVT to crash site is 61.74NM. Seems unlikely that anyone would depart with less than 30 minutes of fuel.

The plunger must be pushed out the cam side by applying force to the “needle” from the valve side.!I doubt the plunger is the problem. Recoining the valve seats does not take a lot of force. You’re not driving a nail. You”re just mating steel to aluminum in one case and steel to plastic in the other two.