Tom

I'd suggest that the Navion comes out ahead, even if it cheated a bit.

At many airports it'd be illegal (per the local municipality) for a mechanic to work on the field without first purchasing quite expensive insurance, plus getting approved by the municipality. I don't agree with 98% of these policies, but if I were a specialist IA willing to travel for work, I wouldn't want my name plastered about. Sorry about the soapbox speech, but people need to be cognizant about how problematic these municipality ordinances can be around the country for mechanics, particularly the good ones.

The writing has been on the wall for some time that some form of non-commercial conversion will be coming "any year now." If I remember correctly FAA charged itself with figuring out how to do this as early as 2007 or 8. The field approval system is fractured/inoperative and there's a multitude of embarrassing duplicitous safety standards in place between EAB and Standard Category aircraft that are completely illogical/unworkable (e.g. installation of autopilots, synthetic vision, um, parachutes) that render legacy aircraft to be, as mentioned on BT "in a state like automobiles in Cuba...stuck in 1959." Everyone knows that we're losing really low-end certificated planes to the scapyards because the overall market doesn't support keeping them flying. Moreover at least some manufacturers want little to nothing to do with legacy planes at least for liability reasons, if not also wanting to stop having to support them. When Cessna wants $13,000 for a new carb heat box for my 182, I assume that they don't want my business. If/when I have a certified plane that I've converted to experimental...and I go to sell it...I wouldn't worry about the buyer's jitters. I'd worry about my own jitters. If the guy who buys my converted Mooney goes out and creates a smoking hole, I have to assume that the next of kin will come after me, no matter how many "as is" phrases that are included in the sales documentation. Fact is there are fewer and fewer people holding wealth in the country, such that the attorneys (who get by on the wealth created by others) will be drawn to such accidents (apologies for the rant). Withstanding the fact that people have been selling second-hand EAB planes for decades with seemingly little liability exposure, some EAB sellers today nonetheless part out their planes without an airworthiness certificate (BTDT) to reduce the risk of liability after sale.

A quick-build 2-seat RV kit currently sells for $39k; to that a builder adds an engine, prop, panel, plus 1000+ hours of work. Not too long ago the 10,000th RV was completed. Hard to imagine a corrosion-free Mooney in annual/airworthy condition going for less than $40-50K when the PNC-type thing becomes reality.

NTSB did in 2012. Full PDF report here. Executive summary here. From the executive summary: " Experimental amateur-built (E-AB) aircraft represent nearly 10 percent of the U.S. general aviation fleet, but these aircraft accounted for approximately 15 percent of the total-and 21 percent of the fatal-U.S. general aviation (GA) accidents in 2011. Experimental amateur-built aircraft represent a growing segment of the United States' general aviation fleet-a segment that now numbers nearly 33,000 aircraft."

Agreed that this exercise of "emergency authority to maintain safety" is the only logical out such a pilot would have in writing an explanation. We've all been there, and go there on occasion (using emergency authority). But the guy who finds himself too-routinely in "unsafe conditions" that everyone else doesn't have a problem with is begging for a check-ride.

I'm reminded of all these sovereign citizen folks who question the authority of the police while getting pulled over, stating that XYZ isn't specifically forbidden under the constitution or something. Consider reminding the friend that FAA maintains the right to re-examine his ticket even without charging a specific infraction. 49 U.S. Code § 44709 grants FAA the right to re-examine a pilot if: "the Administrator decides after conducting a reinspection, reexamination, or other investigation that safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest require that action"

The above point made a lot of sense 10 years ago. Now, with Dynon, the G5, and the STC'd experimental autopilots coming on the scene, there's practically no difference between an experimental panel and a certified panel (sure STC fee, but overall small in the larger scheme of things). The big difference is who can/can't do the install. If certified, you have to cough of $10-15k minimum for labor and wait months, no matter how much elbow grease you have. A few weeks ago I paid $475 for 3 bushings (for a non-Mooney). These parts would be <$10 from an auto parts store, will cost <$30 when PNC goes live. I for one don't need help with panel options...I need help with all the nitnoid parts that have no business being "certified" in the first place.

And more recently understood to be neuroprotective, reduces risk for dementia, suicidality, mood disturbance in general, integral for appropriate B-12 metabolism, etc, etc. Kidding aside, it's mainstream. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2649277 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4063497/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4063497/

Indeed this was previously designated as the Primary Non-Commercial (PNC) initiative that was to be part of the Part 23 re-write, though PNC wasn't incorporated (~2017). Googling the PNC subject can find previous discussions on what it entails. Incidentally I was on the phone with AOPA earlier today regarding the complete evaporation of independent A&P/IAs on my field caused by onerous insurance requirements from the city. This 'insurance requirement lack of maintenance providers' issue is a huge problem in several areas around the country yet I've seen nothing from AOPA whatsoever on the subject. And of course AOPA has long been in bed with the insurance people to make ends meet. It's known that PNC will come out sooner or later easing the burden a little bit in the maintenance provider department (with owners allowed to do certain maintenance and use whatever parts/mods), but the little-guy commercial operators who have to turn to the palatial FBOs for maintenance are getting screwed out of existence. Otherwise probably not a good time in history to invest heavily in STCs that PNC aircraft can do without the STC. FWIW.

I mean no disrespect to the tastes of others. I'm prone favor to ageless looks, simplicity, and a subtle edgy presence that draws the observer in to really considering the inherent uniqueness of what's under the paint instead of the paint itself. And we're talking about a Mooney here in the first place that can speak for itself. To me...I don't particularly appreciate all the ~swooshiness today, and I have to wonder how the style will be looked at in say 10-15 years. Insofar as there's a style pendulum that swings between trendy and conservative...I think all the swooshes are about as aggressive-trendy as you can get, and when things go back conservative...the swooshes will look clearly out of fashion. If you choose conservative then you're be fashionable half the time in history (off and on). The above said I favor the non-busy look with the large eagle on the tail. No large swooshes to clash with the elegant lines of the Mooney planform, while the large eagle (with short wings) speaks heritage and unique culture. You look at that and you know you're dealing with a plane that's all business with history, and not today's basketball shoe. And there's probably some correlation to the above assessment and the fact that it's cheaper to choose a conservative paint scheme.

Appears as though there's not enough lithium in the water supply in Iowa.

1. The statement "a save is a save" is like saying "gee, your newborn child is cute" when in fact it looks like an alien mutant (as they all do as newborns). We make such statements as a matter of expediency as stating to the contrary is just pointless. If you think that anyone goes to bed at night genuinely believing that 100% of chute pulls are indicated/necessary...I have a bridge to sell you. No one believes this, not even Cirrus people. 2. So Ross...if we ran an experiment where we took 100 different pilots in 100 same-type airframes....up to 11k feet over an airport at night and killed the engine...what percentage of the pilots do you fully believe will successfully touch down and stop on the runway? What percent will undershoot? Will run off the end? What percent will end up completely off the airfield? So run that experiment again, except do it during the daytime. What are your results? So run the two experiments again, except this time you get to train the pilots to your heart's content prior to the experiment. What are your results? I'm not asking you to publish your answers, but you ought to understand that the number is not 100% in any scenario and you ought to thus understand where the factory is coming from. 3. Not per se withstanding the above specific engine-out scenario.....the incessant harping on the "see...see...you don't need the chute in situation XYZ" really misses the end-result goal here...saving lives. Such harping completely neglects statistics like.....your risk of dying landing off-airport is 3 times higher than on-airport. Such harping neglects to respect that a fire erupting during your accident sequence makes you 20 times more likely to die. These two factors alone should encourage the thinking man to in an engine-out to pull the chute unless landing on a runway or other certainly clear flat landing area is assured (or course after running checklists, etc). On the subject of the thread....Cirrus is a plane with a big engine and a small wing that needs a chute in an engine-out scenario as the touchdown speed is so high so as to put it in the grim part of the speed vs survivability at touchdown/impact curve. Not as true with older/lighter/slower Mooneys.

Not selling anything, rather sharing observations. FWIW a good number of Ebay sellers of this type of equipment are simply reselling equipment that they purchased from government auctions...and for a significant mark-up (you can see this if you 'check all items by this seller' and note a bunch of clearly ex-military items). You can bid/buy this stuff yourself from govdeals.com. Here's a pulse-ox currently at $100...this unit doesn't have an audible alarm but can be used with disposable (~$1 per flight) tape-on sensors for continuous monitoring...lower profile than the ~bulky $20 Walmart units such that you can wear the monitor the entire flight with minimal inconvenience. I don't mean to promote the portable concentrator over a tank. The latter is less expensive and can be shared continuously by multiple people (while the concentrator serves only one at a time). Just that for solo flights <18k the device is incredibly convenient, making using routine supplemental O2 use, even at lower altitude, a no-brainer. Over 18k without pressurization is a life risk I'll never involve myself but tanks are clearly required in the flight levels. Regarding reliability...it's worth noting that the concentrators are used by tens if not hundreds of thousands of people outside of a medical/home environment...people who would crump/slump over if the thing failed. They're designed to be used 7 days a week for years and are accepted to be used in austere environments like the inside of a commercial airliner (withstanding the backup O2 tanks that airlines carry). Point being that they're incredibly reliable and are designed/tested/approved to standards arguably with higher tolerance than much/most airplane stuff (but not as simple obviously as a tank system). At least all modern units have an audible alarm if the unit isn't able to deliver what you've asked, or if there are other onboard faults needing attention. That said, I cannot hear the alarm on my G2 in the Mooney with my Halo buds in (I do have moderate hearing loss).

Mine is a G2. I keeps sats over 95 regardless of altitude. Yes to the fingertip pulseox. The G2 has flow settings of 1 (low) to 5 (high); it’s a smart sensing pulse-demand system and I’m not sure what the technical flow (LPM) rate is. I’ve only been to 16k and have only gone up to the 4 setting. Most of the time I’m between 8 and 12k using setting 2 or 3. Once you get used to feeling not fatigued after a flight it’s hard to not use it all the time, particularly when it’s no muss no fuss. Can’t hurt human factors performance either. I’d ignore the Inogen aviator people unless you want to spend more for exactly the same unit. If you parse the verbiage on their website the FAA approval pertains to RF, while the “meets FAA supp 02 requirement” isn’t a performance designation that they earned. Rather CAMI accepts the devices as legit. I only use medical cannulas...disposable type that wraps around the ears. Call me Mr bad hygiene but I’m only on my second one in three years. If seriously interested in one of these devices but are unsure if it’ll work for you, consider stopping in a local medical supply store. Many places will rent these, +/- needing a script from a doc. If you tell them it’s just for a weekend trial for flying you might not need a script. Offer to take them up and the trial might be free (avoiding a deposit and such).

FWIW I use a portable concentrator which has been completely reliable (have not taken it above 16k but supposedly should be good up to 18k). Was a Craigslist find for $800 or 900 with three batteries (in my purchase anyway) plus ac charger plus cigarette lighter adapter. Uses regular disposable medical nasal cannulas. Only good for one person but the convenience can’t be beat. I’m healthy but I can tell a difference in post flight fatigue after a couple few hours over 7k; I use it on practically every cross country.

I think you threw the baby out and drank the bathwater. I'm 99% certain that you'd agree with Eric if you sat down in real life and talked about this. The risk homeostasis concept is fairly useless for dynamic systems. To my knowledge the COMT worrier vs warrior gene thing is one of the underlying biological concepts that defines this personality trait. The thing is you can't parlay risk behavior in one venue alone (e.g. in aviation behavior). The warrior-type risk taker indeed may not take more risks in his chute equipped plane....instead he might take up chainsaw juggling (to get his dopamine hit) and end up off the NTSB list. To the contrary, the worrier pilot may be emboldened and take further risks....taking off with a crosswind or something (former hangarmate of mine). In any event...if someone takes further risks and comes out alive...well...they've flown and are not in the NTSB database as a negative statistic. Mission accomplished. Right? So you do need a metric of accident rate in terms of distance traveled. You also need one for time aloft during travel. And one that accounts for many...seemingly countless variables both for the pilots who ended up in accidents...and...more difficult...all the aforemented countless variables for pilots (inverse thinking) who never get in accidents. Then, on an individual level....for example the buyer trying to choose plane A vs plane B with respect to accident statistics....match the buyer profile with the buyer's specific mission profile...as well as the specific risk taking behavior....etc ad nauseum. I don't think it'd take a day to run this. More like a team in industry many, many months to compile models....or never by the FAA, withstanding it being their mandate and all. I think the point that you're trying to make is that a save is a f'ing save. To this, I agree wholeheartedly. I too would make flights with a chute that I don't make without one. Just like I make more trips far away with my plane than I do by walking. It's all relative. But I have no qualms about pulling the chute and being called a puss by the cognitively impaired in society (they too need their dopamine hit...however they get it).

A big congratulations. I sincerely hope that you've put in for your Wright Brothers award. Below cut/paste from https://www.faasafety.gov/content/masterpilot/ __________________________________________________________________________________________ The Wright Brothers Master Pilot Award is the most prestigious award the FAA issues to pilots certified under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 61. This award is named after the Wright Brothers, the first US pilots, to recognize individuals who have exhibited professionalism, skill, and aviation expertise for at least 50 years while piloting aircraft as "Master Pilots". A distinctive certificate and lapel pin is issued after application review and eligibility requirements have been met. Upon request, a stickpin similar in design to the lapel pin is also provided to the award recipient's spouse in recognition of his or her support to the recipient's aviation career. Once the award has been issued, the recipient's name, city and state will be added to a published "Roll of Honor" located at https://www.faasafety.gov/content/MasterPilot/RecipientList.aspx. Eligibility To be eligible for the Wright Brothers MPA, nominees must meet the following criteria: Hold a U.S. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pilot certificate. Have 50 or more years of civil and military flying experience. Up to 20 years of the required 50 years may be U.S. military experience. The effective start date for the 50 years is the date of the nominee's first solo flight or military equivalent. The 50 years may be computed consecutively or non-consecutively. Be a U.S. citizen. Note: Revocation of any airman certificate will disqualify a nominee for this award. To Apply Follow application procedures located in the current Wright Brothers Master Pilot Award Information Guide. (PDF) Contact your local FSDO for more information.

I've already stipulated that a chute would have been of no benefit in many accidents. I specifically wrote: "The above is a very quick/dirty analysis that took about 5 minutes; it is admittedly completely crude without case-by-case read to distinguish mechanism of the fatality # listed on the search result page. Within the context of a chute discussion...obviously not all the fatal accidents occurred in an operational phase where the chute could have been a benefit (e.g. in failure to launch accidents). But in those accidents the other intrinsic safety features (e.g. roll-cage, shoulder belt or not) were relied upon, with associated results. And obviously many accidents are Darwin feats by any measure (a phenomenon not unique to any manufacturer's statistics). Also, odd-ball stuff like maybe a Mooney being landed upon (or something) likely are in the 710 number, but still." So where is the dishonesty? I'd go so far as to agree that maybe a chute would have been of no benefit in 85% of the accidents. But here's the deal. Somewhere...at some number... we find that the cost of installing a chute in every plane, maintaining it, etc...reaches parity with whatever dollar figure someone wants to pin onto a human life, plus all the expenditures (family, societal/medical/legal/insurance) associated with accidents. To me, that's the golden number, whatever % of all accidents (fatal and non-fatal but serious) that occurs. Insofar as there are multiple serious trauma cases for ever fatal case, I'd suppose/assume/submit/lie/whatever that if chutes prevented only 15% of fatal accidents, they'd also prevent more than 15% of serious accidents, and that that an aggregate cost savings to all parties would occur. But there's no explaining this to some people. For sure lots of Cirrus early adopters ended up in fatals. Same with Mooney. Same with other high-performance planes, at least to some large degree. But in analyzing the big picture...in comparing A vs B vs C...for the sake of analysis I'd hold factors like pilot training and currency equal over the expected lifespan of the machine. I'd submit that this more in line with the thinking style of someone who has 900k to spend on a private plane. To NOT hold these latter variables equal is, to me...is cherry picking (at best).

FWIW my point in referencing the above numbers is in attempt to recalibrate perspective. Sure lies, damned lies, and statistics. While it’s most difficult to compare the milieu of the 1950s vs today, it’s reasonable to analyse the 1950s and 1960s statistics and ask “what likely result would XX (modern) countermeasure/technology have on the previous accident rates?” After all, such questions are what forms our progress in the first place. It’s how we develop countermeasures. (Otherwise a chute could have helped a lot of early mishaps, including weather-related...while I would not discount much the intellect or skills of the pilots of yesteryear who could actually afford to fly more often and by most accounts were less lizard-brained than modern folks) I too deal with statistics on a daily and nightly basis at work. The end-all statistic in my work is all-cause mortality; closely subordinate statistics are number needed to treat and number needed to harm. The first metric is what I posted above. The second two metrics are what people argue about, whether they know it or not. As a very basic idea, when the number needed to treat (to obtain the desired outcome) is lower than the number needed to harm, then the intervention is at least completely sound as a matter of logic. This is what some people here don’t get. Now, we can argue about useful load change and other subordinate factors, but when the intervention overall reduces all-cause mortality and is more cost-effective (if to society, maybe not the individual who can’t afford it) it’s a flat-earther position to not accept the overall cost-effectiveness of the intervention and the lives saved. I’d love to get a chute STCd for my Mooney. I’ve spoken to Boris Popov about it and write about it here previously, but there’s too little demand in the Mooney community (at least 4 years ago and it looks like little has changed). Regarding the overall new GA purchaser demographic, I’d submit that they are more concerned, too, about all-cause mortality than a bunch of nuanced suppositions that neglects to consider the most important metric.

So the number is now 710 airframes. People can run this themselves. Go to https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx and set the search for ~1950 to today, Mooney (as manufacturer), fatal as injury severity. A quick review of the most recent 200 airframe losses shows ~334 lives lost associated with those accidents. One can generalize the total fatality count up to 710 airframes to far exceed 1,000 souls lost. Very, very costly. The above is a very quick/dirty analysis that took about 5 minutes; it is admittedly completely crude without case-by-case read to distinguish mechanism of the fatality # listed on the search result page. Within the context of a chute discussion...obviously not all the fatal accidents occurred in an operational phase where the chute could have been a benefit (e.g. in failure to launch accidents). But in those accidents the other intrinsic safety features (e.g. roll-cage, shoulder belt or not) were relied upon, with associated results. And obviously many accidents are Darwin feats by any measure (a phenomenon not unique to any manufacturer's statistics). Also, odd-ball stuff like maybe a Mooney being landed upon (or something) likely are in the 710 number, but still. At any rate, arguments against chutes as being more expensive to either the flying community or to the larger society are completely devoid of greater understanding of the real world...at least from my perspective.

I last ran the numbers (directly from NTSB records) in 2015. At that time the number [numerator] was 682 fatal accidents having occurred in Mooney aircraft. For the denominator, a quick wikipedia reference finds 9,715 airframes produced (if you add production totals) prior to the Acclaim and Ultra series. So, rounding Mooney production to 10,000.....682/10,000 obviously is about 7%. 1/15 is 6.66% (apologies to those superstitious). Fatality data is fatality data; I don't know how it's cherry picked.

There's potential, and there's reality. A little more than 1 out of every 15 Mooney airframes that left Kerrville ended up in a fatal accident. The 1 in 15 doesn't include all the accidents that resulted in ~only permanent disability, serious but recovered injuries, and otherwise written-off airframes. So what does your contention say with respect to aggregate family and societal losses (emotional, financial, opportunity cost), the medical service expenditures, the lawsuits, et al, that have occurred associated with the 1 in 15 number? Do you genuinely believe that pulling the chute "too much" actually costs more? Really? With respect, people need to look at real numbers before they waste energy warning of threats that are relatively inconsequential. I'd rather see a goofy viral video than hear about a funeral, or worse.

Paging the safety mod (even if not in the safety forum). There's a transparent double standard here when it comes to safety discussions. I'm sorry if I lack the requisite tact or demeanor to be more effective in promoting at least this subject, but I submit that my logic is sound. Where an "our type" vs "their type" incident occurs, an overwhelming "it's their type" bias occurs where the sarcasm (against "their type") really distracts from lessons to learn. Sarcasm as they say should be a garnish, not the main course. Now even still when an "our type only" incident occurs...the "their type" jabs erupt. With lots of "likes." What kind of serious safety culture is this? Our type is literally a dying breed yet still the "their type suck" sentiment still comes out....as the other type expands in numbers. A real Freudian defense or something. Moreover...on the "those we know vs strangers we don't" double-standard: A fellow pilot can be laid up critical in a hospital and people will speculate away; a relative fender bender occurs and all hands are to keep quiet for fear of a certificate action. Really??? "Real" pilots who know how to act "properly" don't need a chute nonsense spews out while one of our kind is laid up critical ill in the precise circumstance where a chute invariably would have greatly increased the chances of walking away from the incident. Where is the chorus of the "chutes are for people who can't fly properly" when people are laid up in the hospital? Well, they're on this forum saying that pilots who operate properly don't need a chute, and they're getting multiple likes. What absolute nonsense. I'm sorry that my advocacy for chutes, tone, whatever is deemed unwelcome, redundant, over the top...but all the chutes-are-for-pussies posts continue to flow out with multiple likes. This double-standard stuff needs to stop. It does nothing to engender a safety culture.

So you're taking the same approach as Mooney Intl when it comes to the chute issue...maintaining a different perspective on safety and ignoring the demand for a chute. This plus the victim blaming above. And people have the gall to blame Mooney Intl for being out of touch. What a defunct groupthink circle jerk this conversation is. Not helping Mooney moving forward while denigrating all those "improper" pilots who have accidents. Nuts. Just nuts.