midlifeflyer

It should not make any difference if your technique is sound.

It is pretty standard takeoff procedure (across makes and models) in a substantial crosswind to keep the airplane firmly on the ground until a decent flying speed is achieved and then pull it off briskly. I think unless one trains in a environment that has substantial crosswinds, there's a tendency to focus on the landings to the exclusion of the takeoffs.

Don't forget the T-shirt also. Yep. everyone focuses on the power but there is a loss of other things at high D-Alt including airfoil efficiency - both wing and prop.

If he did not have a GPS that was approach certified, you are quite correct. And that would certainly account for his declining a GPS approach. No need to take anything back since we're all speculating anyway. I was just pointing out approach certification is not a WAAS vs not WAAS issue. I think we can all agree there were probably links in this tragic chain that could have been broken at various points. Curious - does anyone know any good sites to be able to get a picture of what the weather was that night in a larger geographic area. It would be interesting to know what options there were assuming after the first missed, the pilot decided that heading toward substantially higher minimums would be the best choice. How far would he have had to travel?

I'm not sure we know whether he had a WAAS GPS or not or if he simply preferred the localizer. But just as a point of information, the selection from your post I bolded is incorrect. A WAAS GPS is not required for approach capability. WAAS allows for the use of LPV minimums on the approach and limits the pilot to LNAV minimums. If the pilot in this case did not have WAAS, yes it is relevant in this case since the weather was well below the LNAV minimums. Just clarifying the technicality.

I didn't have much trouble treating "fly 'IFR'" as meaning anything other than "fly under Instrument Flight Rules." And browsing quickly through the posts, I don't think anyone else did either. Except perhaps for this guy: in which I figured the person either misunderstood the phrase he was using, was intentionally departing from the proper use of the terminology just to produce an effect, or was telling us he flies unlawfully.

There are times insisting on precision in language is necessary and times when it becomes just silly. The folks who feel they are getting points for saying "there's no such thing as a BFR" (because the FAA removed "biennial" from the phrase) are ridiculous. OTOH, 90% of the confusion over Part 61 PIC logging issues can be resolved if people did not use "certificate," "rating," and "endorsement" interchangeably. It's kind of like the decision whether to wear a suit to a job interview if you know it's a casual shop. You are not going to be "wrong" with the suit. You might or might not be right with the khakis and open-neck shirt. PS - if this is US, are you sure he wasn't berating you for using "license" instead of "certificate"? (Not that it would make the berating any better)

Not that many people calculate true airspeed in flight. Even with the 2% increase in TAS for a given IAS with density altitude, that difference is usually going to be minimal compared with a significant discrepancy between uncorrected IAS and GS.

There's no way to know that. I flew a rental Cirrus for a while and joined the Cirrus type club for a year. One of the hot topics at the time was concerns with the lack of use of the BRS system. If you're interested, this is a link to the video COPA Safety Program presentation called "CAPS...Consider." The problem in this accident is that it at least appears (we're just speculating based on limited information) to be the typical chain of poor choices rather than a single catastrophic event. Late night departure, deteriorating conditions, not taking earlier opportunities to divert... coupled with what may be a lack of proficiency in flying an approach to minimums - again speculating, but the "windshield wiper" localizer needed could just be a pilot over-correcting as he got closer to minimums rather than a problem with the localizer; and if it was the localizer, GPS was an option- the GPS LPV minimums for are the same as the ILS at KORF. Add the stress of the situation and it's questionable whether pilot would have had the presence of mind at that point to even consider pulling the chute.

Just an observation based on my own experience in not flying much IFR. Before moving to North Carolina 2 years ago I lived for 20 years in Colorado and very rarely flew IFR. So I definitely needed to find a way to get back into it. And my comment definitely reflects my feelings about checklists and mnemonics. What I think you want to watch out for is that your checklist is not serving duty as a mini instruction manual. That's not a problem with your checklist items; inclusion of "how to fly" information that should be unnecessary is a problem IMO with many checklists. "Throttle - - - Advance" for takeoff is a good basic example. Just as I can't see the need for that in a checklist (unless there is some specific setting that's required other than full or an initial fuel flow target), I also literally can't imagine flying IFR to an airport without checking the ATIS/AWOS (even VFR) in order to select and load an approach and the transition to it and, of course, while doing so, briefing it and ensuring all the appropriate navaids are set. Since I just recently went through it myself and you are talking about not flying IFR enough, consider asking yourself is if your checklist is replacing either instruction or practice (including virtual practice on procedures). They say the cockpit is a bad classroom. I'd add a checklist is a horrible instructor.

I don't know if I did or not. If your point was that we collectively need to be accurate and consistent in our use of terms in order to have a discussion of any value, I guess I got your point but not until this post. Unless one uses an emoticon to assist (and many times even then) few of us are good enought prose writers to convey subtlety. If that wasn't your point I didn't get it at all.

There *are* multiple minimums based on various factors. They are called "personal minimums."

The FAA makes the rules. There is an unfortunate tendency by us to interchange similar terms even if they have specific meanings and that definieitel doens;t help with understanding. "IFR" means instrument flight rules. [FAR 1.2] "IFR conditions" means "weather conditions below the minimum for flight under visual flight rules" [FAR 1.1] Essentially the same as the term "IMC" [FAR 170.3]. And very, very different from what they mean when the word "actual" is placed in front of them. Your comment is absolutely the very first time I have ever heard it even suggested IFR means "instrument flight rated."

Always a good idea.

The other FlightAware information indicating a route and altitude filing also suggests that an IFR flight plan was filed. So do the ATC communications; they are the communications one would hear between ATC and a pilot on an IFR flight plan, not one who was VFR receiving flight following.

LiveATC feed: http://archive-server.liveatc.net/korf/KORF-Mar-04-2015-0830Z.mp3

Yep. No instrument rating shown in the FAA Airman Database.

It's the "macho" school of aviation. Any personal minimums make you "not a real pilot." As you point out, it's nonsense. Unfortunately it's nonsense you find in many segments of aviation.

Yeah, I've taken off there full rich with high MP also (actually it was the trainee doing the takeoff). But I'm not so sure "leaned to full rich" isn't an oxymoron.

Probably better to use IFR and LIFR rather than "hard" since those terms have specific meanings.

There's a simpler shortcut which does not require standing on the brakes at full power while you go through the process (a problem when the airplane has more power). You can ballpark the proper mixture settings at run-up power by using a method similar to what you may have done at altitude during your primary training. At run-up power, lean until you see the rpm rise, peak and drop. Enrichen back to where it peaked. To allow for greater the greater fuel demands at takeoff power, enrichen about 3 turns of the vernier mixture control. There is some variation among individual aircraft, usually in how many turns of the mixture to enrichen, so, unless you have done it before, you will still want to go to full power briefly to confirm you are getting the power you should. But that only takes a moment and with an airplane that has a target fuel flow, is even easier. It's the method almost universally taught at Colorado flight schools.

Your biggest issue is going to be your experience in high density altitude and mountain operations. I flew a M20C for a while in Colorado and flew in and out of airports as high as 7,000 msl. I've also flown a 180 HP 172 in and out of Leadville (9934 msl). The biggest Mooney issue in general is that it's a great cruiser but not that great on the takeoff distance compared to even lower-powered aircraft.

The issues you are bringing up is exactly the reason for the move to scenario-based training within the past decade and the current steps being taken to change the PTS to bring more focus to human factor issues. Historically, we've been quite deficient in our training, even at the simplest level? How many of you (except fairly recently) have had to divert and set up a landing at an unplanned airport on your dual student pilot cross country? Or have heard volumes about the "go/no-go" decision but next to nothing about the "continue/divert" decision? Actually, I've been exactly the opposite. I tend to be sloppier knowing there is someone in the right seat watching over me than when I am the one truly responsible for my own fate (not to mention my passenger's).

Well, kinda. Yes, with flight following, you are communicating with ATC. But in Class E airspace, VFR you are still at your own discretion for altitude and heading at least 98% of the time and are not receiving mandatory separation services. Never mind that they can drop you if they get too busy. IFR, you are at a specific altitude and heading or course at least 98% of the time and changing course or altitude on your own can mean certificate suspension. Yep, in Class B and C airspace, you are in more positive control but even there, most of the instructions tend to be more limited - of the "remain at or below" type rather than the "descend and maintain" type. When I explain what is the most difficult part of instrument training, I say that IFR flight is only about 20% about the flying - maintaining control over the aircraft for sustained periods in the clouds. The other 80% is about how to operate in the system. While our approach-centric system of instrument training makes it easy to think that what it is all about (and it is indeed the part that can kill you if you do it wrong), there is so much more to operating in the IFR system than that. I mention this specifically in response to what appears to be a minimization of what it actually means to be flying under IFR (instrument flight rules). I saw this initially as a discussion about a pilot who is violates the rules. Yep. It happens just like it does on the ground. As to the accident... The NTSB report is about a CFIT event involving a VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flight in which the pilot flew into a mountainous area famous for eating light airplanes. The commentary about being known to file IFR despite the lack of the rating seems to me to be mostly relevant to a description of his personality style as a pilot happy to head into trouble without reflection. If anything, the 11,599' altitude last recorded on his GPS suggests to me a pilot who had gotten himself in a situation in which he had run out of choices — trying to maintain visual reference in mountainous terrain during at best marginal conditions — as opposed to intentionally flying under instrument flight rules in uncontrolled airspace.