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Found 4 results

  1. The final report on Dr. Moir's fatal crash in September 2015 has been released. AvWeb's Summary: A leaking oxygen hose fitting likely led to the fatal crash of a turbonormalized Mooney M20 Acclaim off the coast of Atlantic City on Sept. 10, 2015. Dr. Michael Moir, a dentist from Gaylord, Michigan, was the only one aboard the aircraft, which flew on autopilot without contact with ATC for more than two hours at 25,000 feet before descending to the ocean near Atlantic City, New Jersey. Moir was on his way to a Mooney owners safety conference and the NTSB speculated he did everything right to ensure a safe flight. He was still wearing his oxygen mask at the time of the crash but the technical fault made it worthless and he likely became hypoxic shortly after reaching altitude, the report says. Investigators found that a fitting connecting an oxygen line to the regulator on the tank was loose. It may have been missed at an earlier annual and when Moir activated the oxygen system as he climbed to altitude it likely quickly drained the tank. Moir read back a clearance to 25,000 about 16 minutes after he took off and was never heard from after that. Two F-16s were scrambled but the Mooney crashed before their pilots spotted it. The NTSB said the duration of the flight was consistent with the aircraft draining one of the aircraft's two fuel tanks on the flight. NTSB: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20150910X75635&AKey=1&RType=Final&IType=LA
  2. The news just broke that Fat Albert (The U.S Navy Blue Angels C130) will not be performing at EAA Air ventures Oshkosh this year due to a nation wide grounding of the aircraft. Does anyone have insight on this issue? I assume this has something to do with the accident a few weeks ago that left many dead.
  3. I don't know if this has been posted before. I just saw it.
  4. In the March 1 issue of Gene Benson's Vectors for Safety, Gene laments that he is: ...very tired of reruns. No, I am not talking about TV shows. I spend plenty of time reading accident reports and I have not seen any really new programming in a very long time. In one accident report after another, pilots follow the same old tired scripts with only slight variations in the details. I could understand this if the pilots involved were new and inexperienced, not having the benefit of what is well-known about accident prevention. But that is usually not the case. We very frequently see highly experienced, knowledgeable, respected pilots showing up in the wrong column of statistics. The easy explanation is to blame overconfidence and complacency or an attitude of invulnerability. But doing some hard examination of a significant number of accidents, including accidents in which I have had personal friends killed, I am convinced that there is more going on. I think a deeper look into our humanness might reveal some explanations. He goes on to explain that pilots should think about the psychology behind accidents and he gives an example of what is known as choice blindness, which I will bet any pilot with a couple of hundred hours has probably experienced--I know I have. Most of the time we get away with it and Gene notes how a tail wind can be a validator. Enough of a tail wind and we get a pass for a bad descision. The hard part is overcoming our own humanity, working past the psychology that is trying to undermine us. Frankly, the best solution is to train and train hard. Frankly, just never quit training. When you are in the left seat with a CFII on your right, you immediately enter into the trainee consciousness. The downside of it is that you might get the feeling that if anything goes wrong you are covered. After all, you have god as your co-pilot, right? We could discuss the merits and demerits of that sort of thinking, but I'd rather concentrate on the upside. The upside is that you are on your best behavior. You damn well better go item-by-item through that checklist. Why aren't you dead on that altitude? You know the FAA allows 200 feet, but you also know your CFII only allows 50. Yeah, things are different when he's there. So, why not fly like he is always there?