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Rick Junkin

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Everything posted by Rick Junkin

  1. You have two questions there. The idle mixture has been addressed, let's address hot starts. I just finished re-reading John Deakin's series of articles on operating turbocharged engines. For a hot engine that won't start (he's specifically talking about TCM engines, but this also works for the TIO-540 in the TLS/Bravo), he recommends pulling the mixture to idle-cutoff and running the fuel pump for a full minute, then use normal start procedures. The purpose is to cool the fuel pump and clear any vaporized fuel in the lines. I happened on a similar procedure through troubleshooting a hot engine that would fire for a few blades and then quit, during a fuel stop in Pueblo (100+ degree day and high DA). Only run the pump with the mixture in idle-cutoff, otherwise you'll be dumping a lot of raw fuel into your hot engine, which could turn out very poorly. Here's a link to the article where he talks through this: https://www.avweb.com/news/pelican/182105-1.html The article covers more than just hot starts, and talks about another favorite topic here on Mooneyspace that I am NOT trying to restart here... Did you do anything other than letting the engine cool when you had the shut down issue? How long after you turned the boost pump off after landing did the engine shut down? What were the ambient temperatures and DA? It may more likely be a vapor lock issue than plugs if all you did was let it cool, however I agree that checking the idle mixture and for fouled plugs is a good place to start. Something else you can check is the fuel pressure as you taxi to the ramp, and also as you attempt a hot start. If you notice the fuel pressure wavering during taxi, or no fuel pressure while you're cranking the engine on start, its likely that things are hot enough to cause vapor problems in the fuel system, or even that your engine driven fuel pump is getting worn out. Cheers, Rick
  2. What's the part number for the 4th bearing, and where can I find one? I have the same issues with my nose gear doors. Cheers, Rick
  3. My bad, it's on the throttle cable on lower right side of the engine. It's a fairly large switch housing (mine is white) attached to the cable shield, with the usual thin metal switch arm with the roller riding on the cable. Not TOO hard to find, but unfortunately does require removal of the lower cowl. I'll look to see if I have a picture that shows it, and update this later. Cheers, Rick I couldn't find a good picture, but here's the drawing from the parts catalog. #13 and #14 are both identified as micro switches, with #14 being called out as the boost pump switch. You'll know it when you see it. Let me know if this doesn't get it for you.
  4. I had the same problem with the throttle boost pump micro switch. The switch arm has a small roller on it that rides on the throttle cable, and mine had developed a flat spot, presumably due to lack of lubrication/rotation. We rotated the roller to allow it to provide adequate travel on the switch, and I'm monitoring it for wear. I'll be replacing it at some point. Backup is to manually turn the boost pump on for takeoff, a practice the previous owner had employed as a matter of course (didn't trust the "automation"). Cheers, Rick
  5. Identifying a takeoff alternate is something that the guys in the Fly Like The Pros video series advocate. Their video on GNS430/530 operations is available the PilotWorkshops.com, which is where I was introduced to them. Jeff Van West is one of the regular "round table discussion" CFIIs on PilotWorkshops.com, so its no surprise that he has included that idea in an article. As you're probably aware, declaring a takeoff alternate is something that the "big boys" do. The points made thus far are all valid, both for and against. There are a lot of other reasons you may not be able or want to return to your home drome, even though most of them are unlikely. It certainly doesn't hurt to know what your options are and to have a pre-planned course of action for abnormal events on or after takeoff. In my personal case there are quite a few options that allow me to continue straight ahead, or nearly so, to recover at another nearby airport rather than try to work the problem single pilot IFR while making a turn back to my home airport. I certainly don't advocate a takeoff alternate as a requirement, but it is certainly another tool that can be be used in the planning and risk mitigation process. Cheers, Rick
  6. Thanks for the point out Paul. The gent I spoke with is the first one on the list, with a job title of "N/A". No help there... BUT, I do recall him saying he needed to talk to someone in ops to answer a question I had about carrying a laminated wallet size copy of my medical certificate (don't do it, you need to carry the original), so most likely he's in the airworthiness group. So I would say your assumptions are correct. Cheers, Rick
  7. Like I said in an early post, I had written another two paragraphs about how I will do things differently "next time", then deleted them for this exact reason, Don (not wanting to dissuade anyone from asking for help in an emergency). I have a considerable amount of exposure to declaring emergencies in military aircraft, and was never hesitant to do so. I've changed my perspective on that after this experience. I can't and won't tell anyone else when it is and isn't appropriate to declare, but I have changed my personal criteria. I'm disappointed that I've been made to feel that I have to do that. Cheers, Rick
  8. I'm not sure, Paul. The title of the gentleman from the FSDO is "Aviation Safety Inspector - General Aviation Unit". He didn't ask for a statement from my mechanic until after I had submitted my statement, along with all of the aircraft and engine log book entries and my personal qualification documentation. If he was focused on the mechanical side, I would think he would have asked for the mechanic's statement up front? I read that the FAA has totally reorganized and taken away the FSDO's authority to provide interpretation of the CFRs at the local level, trying to drive consistency in the interpretation and application of the regulations. Maybe what I experienced is the new normal. I need to add that he was very personable and easy to work with. There were no formal deadlines for submission, and he said that he needed the info to close out his "paperwork" for the incident. The AOPA attorney I talked to had told me to expect this, and to cooperate until anything appeared to escalate, at which point I was to give the attorney a call back. Its been several weeks since my last exchange with the FAA, so I think its been put to bed. I'm not gong to to call and ask... Cheers, Rick
  9. Closing this out - final cost of a failed cotter pin in this particular instance is roughly $800 in parts and labor (completed in the course of doing the annual so I'm estimating) and, a surprise to me, providing the local FSDO all of the typical ramp check documentation, including statements from both me and my mechanic, that is requested when you declare an IFE as a GA pilot. I never had to do that in my previous life or day job, which admittedly is quite a different kind of flying. I learned quite a bit from the experience, both about my airplane and about the FAA IFE after-action process for GA pilots. I had written another two paragraphs about some rethinking I've done for how I would handle a situation like this in the future, but suffice it to say that I'm happy that it all worked out well. I'll also add an endorsement for subscribing to the AOPA Pilot Protection Service. I called them as soon as I got the voicemail from the local FSDO, and was connected to an aviation lawyer who gave me some good advice about the call I was about to make to the FSDO. He also reviewed and edited my written statement before I submitted it. It was reassuring to have the help of someone intimately familiar with the ins and outs of the process. Cheers, Rick
  10. Closing this out - final cost of a failed cotter pin in this particular instance is roughly $800 in parts and labor (completed in the course of doing the annual so I'm estimating) and, a surprise to me, providing the local FSDO all of the typical ramp check documentation, including statements from both me and my mechanic, that is requested when you declare an IFE as a GA pilot. I never had to do that in my previous life or day job, which admittedly is a quite different kind of flying. I learned quite a bit from the experience, both about my airplane and about the FAA IFE after-action process for GA pilots. I had written another two paragraphs about some rethinking I've done for how I would handle a situation like this in the future, but suffice it to say that I'm happy that it all worked out well. I'll also add an endorsement for subscribing to the AOPA Pilot Protection Service. I called them as soon as I got the voicemail from the local FSDO, and was connected to an aviation lawyer who gave me some good advice about the call I was about to make to the FSDO. He also reviewed and edited my written statement before I submitted it. It was reassuring to have the help of someone intimately familiar with the ins and outs of the process. Cheers, Rick
  11. There are useful things that a guy with a pair of binoculars can tell you, such as one of your mains is partially extended. He can't positively tell you that everything's good, but he can definitely tell you that something doesn't look right. He can also tell you that your gear appear to be down, which is another piece of information you can use in your decision process as to what you're going to do next, and how you're going to do it. More importantly, the original assertion that a tower fly-by is dangerous is incorrect. Its a tool that an appropriately prepared and skilled pilot can use to get more data about his airplane's configuration or condition. Calling it dangerous is misleading to someone who could otherwise add that tool to their troubleshooting kit by getting some training, experience, and proficiency. Back on topic - Can anyone recommend a source for reasonably priced new parts? I have a request in to LASAR for a quote, and have located some "as removed" parts, but I'd like to compare pricing for new parts. I'm planning to call Duncan tomorrow. I'm specifically looking for 560202-502 BELLCRANK ASSEMBLY, RH and 560244-501 PUSH TUBE ASSEMBLY. Thanks for any point-outs. Cheers, Rick
  12. A pilot without the training, experience, and proficiency should not participate solo in formation flying. With the proper training, experience, and proficiency, there is nothing dangerous about executing tower fly-bys or formation flying as the risks are mitigated by the training/experience/proficiency. Much can be gained from observation by a pair of eyes outside your cockpit, as was the case in this instance. Cheers, Rick
  13. Lesson learned about the landing gear - If you ever have an asymmetric gear configuration caused by interference with one of the gear, something is now probably bent in the belly of the airplane. In my case its the right hand bell crank and the right hand gear extension push tube. Tom, my mechanic, repaired the gear door linkage and we did a gear swing - the right main still would not fully retract, but the left main and the nose were fine. He dropped the belly panels and discovered that the right main push tube and bell crank were both bent. It all makes sense to me now. The single gear actuator moves all three gear symmetrically, so if that symmetry is disturbed, something has to give. When my right main bound up on retraction, the actuator continued to drive the retraction mechanism, so the push rod and the bellcrank deformed to absorb the travel that the wheel couldn't accomplish. Straight-forward fix, now waiting on parts. I'm keeping a tally, will let y'all know what a failed cotter pin costs me... And oh-by-the-way, yes, we replaced all of the clevis pins and cotter pins in the gear actuation system with new. And used stainless cotter pins. The new clevis pin fit tightly into the holes on the bell crank and link, so we believe that the cotter pin had probably been gone for some time before the pin worked itself out. There was evidence of some minor corrosion, so that could be what got the cotter pin. We recovered both the original clevis pin and washer from the disconnected joint. The remains of the cotter pin were not found. I expect my new inspection routine will give me a better chance of catching something like this in the future before it can cause a bigger problem. Cheers, Rick
  14. Lesson learned about the landing gear - If you ever have an asymmetric gear configuration caused by interference with one of the gear, something is now probably bent in the belly of the airplane. In my case its the right hand bell crank and the right hand gear extension push tube. Tom, my mechanic, repaired the gear door linkage and we did a gear swing - the right main still would not fully retract, but the left main and the nose were fine. He dropped the belly panels and discovered that the right main push tube and bell crank were both bent. It all makes sense to me now. The single gear actuator moves all three gear symmetrically, so if that symmetry is disturbed, something has to give. When my right main bound up on retraction, the actuator continued to drive the retraction mechanism, so the push rod and the bellcrank deformed to absorb the travel that the wheel couldn't accomplish. Straight-forward fix, now waiting on parts. I'm keeping a tally, will let y'all know what a failed cotter pin costs me... And oh-by-the-way, yes, we replaced all of the other clevis pins and cotter pins in the gear actuation system with new. And used stainless cotter pins. Cheers, Rick
  15. I don't have fuel flow on my EDM 700, but I've developed a method of establishing a stable fuel flow for about a minute, record the time and FF, and then move to the next 0.2gph FF increment. I match those time tagged fuel flows to the nicely stair-stepped temperature data that I download from the 700. Takes me about 20-25 minutes to go from 15gph to 11.4gph where the engine gets rough. That was at 65% with the stock injectors, gave me a 0.8gph spread. Looking forward to narrowing that significantly. Cheers, Rick Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
  16. I had my annual scheduled for next week, so we're going to go ahead and complete all of the 100 hour inspection items on the gear now before returning to service. I just had GAMIs installed and was hoping to get the first iteration of tuning completed before the annual (that's what I was planning to do on the IFE sortie), but it sounds like I may have an issue that will keep the airplane grounded for a bit. Thanks for the info! Cheers, Rick
  17. Thanks, we'll take a close look at the holes for wear. Cheers, Rick
  18. Technically the clevis pin that holds that connecting rod to the rest of the gear door mechanism is what failed, but I believe your assessment could be correct. Judging from the deformation of the door, it appears that the connecting rod fell free when the clevis pin failed and the inner door partially closed against it. It could be that the wheel retracted against the closed door, as you said, but there aren't any witness marks on the door from the wheel or tire. However, since the nose and left main were fully retracted, and the gear all move symmetrically (I think?) as they're driven by a single actuator, it could be that the right main wheel was mostly in the well with the inner door partially closed over it but being held open by the dangling connecting rod. The outer door may have been binding against the open inner door just enough to keep the gear from reaching its up limit switch, which could have caused the actuator to continue running, jam the drive train and stall, and pop the breaker. I didn't get to talk to the tower controller afterwards to ask exactly what he saw (my call went to voice mail, unfortunately), so its possible he was just seeing the doors partially open, but I don't want to assume anything at this point. If I have the time I'll take a closer look at all of the pieces and parts and see if I can determine exactly what happened. Or, more likely, I'll have a glass of Woodford and just be happy that the gear finally came down. The details of anything before that, other than the failed clevis pin that caused it all, now seem somehow unimportant... Cheers, Rick
  19. Thanks! I was airborne for about 15 minutes. It was a 0.7 including ground time according to Foreflight. I burned a total of 5.1 gallons of the 32g on board, throttled back to 20/2200 to stay under gear retraction speed (a conservative decision). Cheers, Rick
  20. I originally posted this in the Mooney Bravo forum yesterday, but realized that the info may be useful to a broader audience and I may have a better chance of getting answers to my questions. Sharing this morning's experience "just in case it happens to you". This did NOT end with a gear-up landing. I have a couple of questions about some of the details of the event though. Bottom line up front - one of the links on the inside gear door for my right main became disconnected and the door didn't operate properly, preventing the right main from fully retracting. Here's what happened: I got a GEAR UNSAFE light, confirmed with an unsafe indication on the floor indicator, shortly after raising the gear switch on takeoff this morning. The GEAR ACTUATOR circuit breaker was also popped. I got into the checklist. I didn't know what position any of my gear were in at this point. Question #1: Is there a checklist for this scenario? It doesn't fit the GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT - GEAR HORN DOES NOT SOUND checklist because the ACTUATOR breaker popped, not the RELAY breaker. And continuing the flight certainly wouldn't have been a good idea with the failure that I had. After not finding what I needed in the checklist, I started troubleshooting with the goal of getting the gear indicating down and locked. I tried resetting the ACTUATOR circuit breaker with the gear handle up, and it popped immediately as expected. I put the gear handle down and reset the circuit breaker. It didn't pop, but nothing moved and the GEAR UNSAFE light remained illuminated and the floor indicator showed unsafe. So I pulled the circuit breaker. Next step was to attempt an emergency extension using the checklist. The emergency extension clutch didn't feel like it engaged. I pulled the T handle about 40 times with no success. I stowed the T handle and the secured the emergency gear lever. Question #2: Is it to be expected that the emergency extension clutch won't engage if the mains are out of sequence? I didn't know they were out of sequence at this time, but this could be an indication that they are, which is helpful information if you don't have a tower to fly by for a look. I called the tower for a fly-by to look at my gear, and they cleared me for pattern entry and a low approach. Tower was able to tell me on downwind that they could see that my right main was slightly extended. I declared the emergency at that point and ran through other ideas for getting the gear down, while also considering where to land if I couldn't. I had 2 hours worth of fuel to figure it out and let the airport get prepared to clear my airplane from the runway after the gear-up landing. Question #3: Is there any advantage to consider a belly landing in the grass vs the runway? I was going to use the runway with my gear configuration, figuring it likely that the right main would dig in on the grass and complicate things. Either way I think you get to replace the bottom of the airplane and anything else that catches. At this point I had the ACTUATOR circuit breaker pulled, gear switch down, and the emergency extension lever stowed and latched. I put some G on the airplane while resetting the ACTUATOR circuit breaker and immediately heard the gear motor running. GEAR SAFE light and floor indication followed shortly after. I don't believe our POH suggests putting G on the airplane to help extend the gear, but its a procedure in another airplane I fly so I gave it a shot. And it worked. I advised the tower and asked for clearance to land. It worked out ok, but in retrospect that wasn't the best decision. I should have executed the tower fly-by so that they could take a closer look and let me know if I had any damage or other weirdness. I had plenty of fuel. Epilogue: This incident was precipitated by a fastener on a gear door connecting rod failing/coming loose. This particular door is closed on the ground and the only way to preflight the fasteners on the connecting rods is to climb under the airplane and stick your head up into the wheel well with a flashlight, not something that I have routinely done in the past. I'm going to add it to my oil change ritual, easy to do while I'm under there checking tire pressures. Incidentally, the door felt secure on my "grab test" during preflight. There was some minor deformation done to the door that looks repairable, but my IA will tell me for sure tomorrow. Either way, sure beats a gear-up landing. Cheers, Rick
  21. Sharing this morning's experience "just in case it happens to you". This did NOT end with a gear-up landing. I have a couple of questions about some of the details of the event though. Bottom line up front - one of the links on the inside gear door for my right main became disconnected and the door didn't operate properly, preventing the right main from fully retracting. Here's what happened: I got a GEAR UNSAFE light, confirmed with an unsafe indication on the floor indicator, shortly after raising the gear switch on takeoff this morning. The GEAR ACTUATOR circuit breaker was also popped. I got into the checklist. I didn't know what position any of my gear were in at this point. Question #1: Is there a checklist for this scenario? It doesn't fit the GEAR FAILS TO RETRACT - GEAR HORN DOES NOT SOUND checklist because the ACTUATOR breaker popped, not the RELAY breaker. And continuing the flight certainly wouldn't have been a good idea with the failure that I had. After not finding what I needed in the checklist, I started troubleshooting with the goal of getting the gear indicating down and locked. I tried resetting the ACTUATOR circuit breaker with the gear handle up, and it popped immediately as expected. I put the gear handle down and reset the circuit breaker. It didn't pop, but nothing moved and the GEAR UNSAFE light remained illuminated and the floor indicator showed unsafe. So I pulled the circuit breaker. Next step was to attempt an emergency extension using the checklist. The emergency extension clutch didn't feel like it engaged. I pulled the T handle about 40 times with no success. I stowed the T handle and the secured the emergency gear lever. Question #2: Is it to be expected that the emergency extension clutch won't engage if the mains are out of sequence? I didn't know they were out of sequence at this time, but this could be an indication that they are, which is helpful information if you don't have a tower to fly by for a look. I called the tower for a fly-by to look at my gear, and they cleared me for pattern entry and a low approach. Tower was able to tell me on downwind that they could see that my right main was slightly extended. I declared the emergency at that point and ran through other ideas for getting the gear down, while also considering where to land if I couldn't. I had 2 hours worth of fuel to figure it out and let the airport get prepared to clear my airplane from the runway after the gear-up landing. Question #3: Is there any advantage to consider a belly landing in the grass vs the runway? I was going to use the runway with my gear configuration, figuring it likely that the right main would dig in on the grass and complicate things. Either way I think you get to replace the bottom of the airplane and anything else that catches. At this point I had the ACTUATOR circuit breaker pulled, gear switch down, and the emergency extension lever stowed and latched. I put some G on the airplane while resetting the ACTUATOR circuit breaker and immediately heard the gear motor running. GEAR SAFE light and floor indication followed shortly after. I don't believe our POH suggests putting G on the airplane to help extend the gear, but its a procedure in another airplane I fly so I gave it a shot. And it worked. I advised the tower and asked for clearance to land. It worked out ok, but in retrospect that wasn't the best decision. I should have executed the tower fly-by so that they could take a closer look and let me know if I had any damage or other weirdness. I had plenty of fuel. Epilogue: This incident was precipitated by a fastener on a gear door connecting rod failing/coming loose. This particular door is closed on the ground and the only way to preflight the fasteners on the connecting rods is to climb under the airplane and stick your head up into the wheel well with a flashlight, not something that I have routinely done in the past. I'm going to add it to my oil change ritual, easy to do while I'm under there checking tire pressures. Incidentally, the door felt secure on my "grab test" during preflight. There was some minor deformation done to the door that looks repairable, but my IA will tell me for sure tomorrow. Either way, sure beats a gear-up landing. Cheers, Rick
  22. How about this from ACS? http://www.aircraftspruce.com/catalog/avpages/voicegearalert.php?clickkey=32662
  23. I think we can ALL agree that updated METAR/TAF/NOTAMS in the cockpit is a great benefit on extended flights, as are the other ADS-B weather products, if they're used correctly (as in not tactically). Can anyone point me to a good source of data regarding how ADS-B is working out for ATC? Are there any public blogs from the controllers that might give insight? As has been pointed out, ADS-B was designed to improve traffic handling, and I'm interested to see if there are any measures of effectiveness in use that we can look at. Cheers, Rick
  24. It's disappointing, Don, that that's what you chose to take away from my post. I have more than one car, too. My airplane budget pockets are of average depth. Technology is a great tool that can help build your SA or completely trash it, as reflected in some of the posts here (looking at the iPad for traffic that you already know is there). Looking out the window is what will save your life, if you make sure it's the biggest part of your VMC crosscheck AND it's what you use for primary traffic detection. If you FEEL safer having more data in the cockpit, that counts for something too. Right up until it bites you. Thanks for considering my opinion, we all have one. Cheers, Rick
  25. I'm weary of the "safety" speak. And I'm stepping up on my soap box. For people with deep pockets, the cost may be minor. For the rest of us, not so much. And if there is to be another government mandate every decade with dubious benefit (I'm sure I'll get flamed for THAT), it becomes essentially a tax to continue flying. What I'm trying to say is that it IS possible to be duped into a perception of a needed safety improvement through mandated available technology. If we wanted to eliminate all risk of running into another airborne object we would never leave the ground. Another way to look at it is, how can we possibly continue to drive cars that don't have automatic braking sensor systems? Just because the technology is available doesn't mean it should be mandatory, nor does it mean that its necessary. I'll admit to not being well informed about any increase of mid-airs in recent history, and concede that the addition of UAVs to the calculus is going to increase the number of objects in the air and hence the probability of running into something. But having info displayed in the cockpit does not mean that you are safer, nor does it mean that you're seeing everything that's out there. SoCal traffic can be a bear, I get it, but I need some data on what REAL safety benefit is being realized. I have ADS-B In/Out in one of my airplanes because I had to replace a failed transponder, and its a nice warm fuzzy to see on a display what's being called to me by ATC. If I were VFR and not talking to anyone I could see some benefit in not being surprised by a late visual pickup. But again, I'm not aware of an increase in mid-airs or near misses, and the cockpit display of traffic can be a real eye magnet when the threat to be avoided really needs eyes out to be detected. Voice warning is a help, but so is the radio. We'll see what happens as the 2020 deadline gets closer. Seeing as how the system can't even implement the ICAO flight plan requirement on schedule, I have my doubts about the ADS-B mandate implementation schedule holding firm. Cheers, Rick
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