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GeeBee

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Everything posted by GeeBee

  1. GeeBee
    "Point being, if you have thoughts of going around, it's probably the right thought, go around" The way I think of it is a go around is an admission of good judgement, not of failure.
  2. GeeBee
    Never allow unattended fueling of your airplane.
  3. GeeBee
    I also just noticed you said “upset recovery in normal law”. The airplane should not be upsettable in normal law. It can only happen in alternate law or below. Slamming the throttles forward and stick full aft in normal law is terrain warning procedure. It will simple climb at minimum speed in normal law.
  4. GeeBee
    I don't know who told you that but it was wrong before 447 and it is wrong after. You slam the thrust levers full forward on a set of under slung engines and I will guarantee secondary and tertiary stalls and the stick full aft will aggravate that further. It is true that recovery training now is more aggressive, i.e. get light in the seat, but it has always been taught nose down, feed in partial power, control the pitch up, continue increasing power while maintaining pitch stability. After Boeing screwed up the elevators on the 737NG (yes, they messed up that 737 too) we had to fly a full stall profile on them after they got new tail feathers. Flaps up at FL410, Full flaps at 10K and 20K. We had the new AOA indicators on the PFD and I can report they are rock solid accurate. Airplane broke every time at the red tick. The problem with airspeed tapes is they quite often are GIGO because they are based upon ZFW or GW data entered in the FMC. More than once I have been at min maneuvering fir a given flap position or on final at Vref+5 only to notice the AoA saying something different. Subsequent load audit reveals the airplane heavier than the garbage fed into the box. AoA does not lie. It is how the Navy nails the 2 wire.
  5. GeeBee
    Upgraded mine. No reason why you cannot fly an approved LNAV/ VNAV procedure with SBAS. Not only is the guidance solid, my S-tec flies the GP really nicely.
  6. GeeBee
    G loading can be biased in the display, 99.99% of the time, AoA is highly reliable in a transport aicraft.
  7. GeeBee
    At the rate the airplane was descending at FL270 there was insufficient time for the stab trim to roll to a nose down position such that it and the elevator in combination could recover the airplane. There are a three things at play here. First the Airbus stab trim system. You don't "trim off pressure" in an Airbus. In fact you feel no pressure, there is no control pressure feedback. If you pull back or push forward on the stick, the elevator moves, then the stab trim follows and trims until the elevator is faired with the stab. You do not have a stab trim switch on stick. It is all automatic. When Jaque Jet Jock started yanking 15 degrees nose up at high altitude he got the stab trim full nose up, to the stops. Second, the Airbus trim wheel is small, by design. It is small so that should all that quadruple redundant fly by wire stuff quit, you can still fly the airplane with the stab trim, BUT your inputs need to be small and precise. I've practiced it a couple times in the sim. You are lucky to get it on pavement let alone the touchdown zone of 10,000' slab. The reality is such a failure is one quarter the chance of both engines quitting over water. The fastest way to roll the trim forward is automatic electric actuation. Third issue. For fuel economy, fuel is transferred in cruise, starting around 25,000 feet on climb out to the fuel tank in the stab, which holds about 11,000 pounds. At cruise I have seen a CG as far aft as 39.5% of MAC. So if you stall the airplane at high altitude, you are going to need a lot of pitch authority to get the nose down. If at the first indication of stall they had executed standard upset recover, push, roll, power, stabilize the loss off control would have been survivable. They did not believe the stall warning because their airspeed was invalid......except stall warning come from the AOA sensor, not airspeed. Which is why I am a big advocate for true AOA indicators in all airplanes.
  8. GeeBee
    " I am sure AF447 crew had good chance to catch it in low altitudes: they had a serviceable engine & aircraft allway to the ground..." Nope. Airplane was lost out of FL270. I don't know how many times I have to say it. The stab trim was too far up to allow for the nose to be pushed down even with full down elevator. The Airbus stab trims automatically to elevator position. The elevator was up so long the stab was trimmed full nose up. If at Fl280 the elevator had been reversed to full nose down, the airplane would have been recoverable with just a few thousand feet to spare. As to engine recovery at altitude, even if the fires stay lit, in general the average twin spool engine in the middle 30's requires 20 to 30 seconds to accelerate from idle to full power. In that time you only have pitch to recover the speed if your speed is inadequate.
  9. GeeBee
    The problem for foreign carriers is they produce ab-initio trained "wunder kind" who have barely enough time to occupy the seat, let alone the savy to handle to handle challenging situations. Such was the case here. Not to worry, it is coming to a US airline near you. Around 2008 my carrier was hiring hot and heavy and we found some new hires being assigned a low seniority base on transoceanic equipment. Once they completed 75 hours they were off low time restrictions and could be paired together. I asked the boss if he was comfortable with the Captain going on break with two guys with less than 75 hours handling the flight deck He told me they were qualified and I had to take my mandated break. Well..... thank God it was not me but.....two wunder kind in charge of a 767 had a low oil pressure light come on. One ex-Navy, the other 5000 hour civilian started an immediate divert to BIKF. Trouble was, pressure gauge and oil temp was just fine. Captain non plussed. These two AF pilots were wunder kind, and while they had the time, they passed the minimal training, they were incapable of hand flying an airplane in the dark over an ocean.
  10. GeeBee
    The bottom line to AF 447 is the pilot could not attitude instrument fly for squat. I had the scenario sprung on me several times in the sim both before and after 447. You don’t go yanking back beyond 7.5 at those altitudes. Put the dang. Airplane at 2.5 up, set the power at 92% GE, 84 P&W and sit on it. If you don’t know what pitch attitude to use, drop down the FPV and put it on the horizon. We can sit here and discuss the qualities ir lack there of with regard to automation and different implementation of it but it is an absurd argument if you cannot attitude instrument fly the airplane. Af447 is a poor example to cite for automation, because the at the controls was unqualified to start with.
  11. GeeBee
    1.4 is based upon a bank overshoot. The avocation is to fly minimum 1.4 while maneuvering then slow to 1.3 for landing when pattern maneuvering is complete. 1.4 allows up to a 55 degree bank in the event the pilot overbanks the turn onto final. The concept is based upon "minimum maneuvering speed used in transports.
  12. GeeBee
    I've come to the conclusion you don't know what you are talking about with respect to Airbus. AF 447 did not turn on pitot heat on the way down. The Airbus high probe heat is continuous from engine start to shut down. You have to make an affirmative selection to OFF, which would trigger an ECAM warning of OFF and there was no such ECAM. They did turn on WING ANTI -ICE, which was appropriate. There is NO indication in the CVR or FDR that the pitot heat was switched off or on, only that the data was invalid from the pitot. In Paris it was indeed a demonstration that the airplane would not stall. The pilot flew the airplane with the stick full aft showing it would not stall, except it will sink with insufficient power (being on the backside of the curve) and when it sank below 100' RA Normal law removes stall protections because the airplane must land at some point. So as the demonstration went through 100' it stalled because the airplane reverted to direct control. Any Airbus pilot who has landed in a crosswind can tell you this fact because you cannot slip the airplane until direct control is established.
  13. GeeBee
    So tell me how the Paris Airshow accident happened.
  14. GeeBee
    Might want to take a look at this from an instructor I know. I would note he talks about a friend of his killed at KFFC in a stall spin after engine failure. Now he was not only well trained, he was a CFI-I
  15. GeeBee
    Why would you go to a stall regime when you just lost an engine? Should you instead go to “lost engine regime”?
  16. GeeBee
    Really? When you lose an engine in a multi engine airplane you are trained to pull up? When you loose an engine on a single you were trained to pull up? Really?
  17. GeeBee
    Put 100 pilots in a single engine airplane and fail the engine below 500'. What will 95 of them do? Pull up on the pitch control. Put 100 VFR only pilots in an airplane, and suddenly plunge it into IMC what will 90 of those pilots do? Pull up on the pitch control Put 100 multi engine pilots in a light twin and fail an engine below 500' what will 90 of them do? Pull up on the pitch control.
  18. GeeBee
    We don't want to prevent the airplane from stalling? The other night I watched a demonstration, where the presenter kept throwing a glass of water on a subject on stage. The subject had a towel and an umbrella. The first time he used the towel. The second time he put up the umbrella. You obviously prefer the towel? Why? Your characterization of AF447 is totally inaccurate and since you are referencing book, let me be specific. My good friend and colleague, Captain Bill Palmer wrote the definitive work, "Understanding Air France 447". In fact I played guinea pig for him in the sim for his research. More automation does not mean less training. That is flawed thinking. It means training in how to manage the automation modality including complete failure.
  19. GeeBee
    What you are saying is you need transparency in control. I agree and you can not get that with mechanical controls with mechanical mixers, nudgers and shakers. We do not want the pilot to stall the airplane, so do we nudge or warn of a stall or do you prevent a stall in the first place? Now Blue on Top accuses me of being an Airbus fan. Let me tell you, I did not get there easily. After 33 years in Boeings, I fought the Airbus for 3 years. Then I had my "Road To Damascus" conversion which happened interestingly in Rome. Approaching in rain we had a sudden windshear warning. One aural, cancel, WINDSHEAR on the PFD. Only thing to do was pull back. Power already went to TOGA, no worrying about nibbling the stick shaker, the airplane will fly on the edge of critical AOA no matter how far aft the stick. All there was to do is call the IVSi and the tower. The mistake Boeing is making is trying to put lipstick on over designed mechanical control systems. Just like putting a config warning on a Mooney is one warning too many. By the way in an Airbus you will crab in a cross wind. You cannot slip the airplane until below 75 feet
  20. GeeBee
    No AF447 the aft elevator caused the stab trim to roll full nose up. Even if the pilots had pushed the stick forward to the stops, after FL270 the airplane could not recover because there was not enough down elevator in the whole wide world to save the airplane. A B757 out of Santo Domingo also crashed when it lost pitot static info, only they pitched forward, but the result was the same. The lesson is not to pull back OR pitch forward, but verify synchronous attitude, then fly attitude and power appropriate to condition of flight.
  21. GeeBee
    You might want to look at having the main bosses doweled and pegged. Keeps the case halves from shifting.
  22. GeeBee
    Nope it could not be easily solved by turning off the stab trim switches. and yes you get a lot of warning, most counter productive. When the MCAS starts to trim down the pilot instinctively pulls back on the yoke. That action in a Boeing airplane will engage the stab trim brake. At that point you have a stab trim down with an up elevator, which will activate a stab trim warning. The only way at that point to unlock the stab trim brake is regardless if the power trim switches are on or off is to push forward on the yoke. Except if you do, you got a EPGWS also screaming, "Don't Sink" , a Master Warning, and a Master Caution. Unfortunately, Boeing removed the stab trim brake "pull to release" after the 727. I had a "bound up Boeing" once over Ireland, when the autopilot failed to keep the stab in trim, it just kept adding up elevator. By the time "Stab out of trim" warning came on, the stab could no longer be trimmed, because the back pressure on the yoke engaged the brake. Fortunately, FL370 gives you some room. I had to sit every one down, suspend service, get a block altitude. I was then able to push the yoke forward then trim to elevator, then retrim back to normal flight. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/ntsb-faults-boeing-tests-of-max-system-for-not-assessing-pilot-response-to-multiple-alerts/ I would point out to you Boeing's hodge podge warning systems system on the 737 flies in the face of even 1980 Boeing EICAS technology with rudimentry prioritization, on the 757/767 series. It certainly is no where near the Airbus ECAM tech which correctly inhibits warning in critical flight regimes. The ECAM system proved its logic a design on QF42, the A380 that had uncontained failure of #2. The ECAM correctly prioritized the warnings, allowed the pilots to correctly ignore inconsequential failures and directed the crew to manage multiple failures in proper sequence. One of the great parts of the ECAM system is it ignores TO warning logic after 100 knots because it knows the pilot reaction to such a warning, even if say a single slat retraction occurred would be counter productive. That goes to the heart of A configuration warning on a light airplane. There is nothing that will kill a even modestly proficient pilots. Look you can immunize people with live virus', but you really don't do that unless the disease is lethal. So we immunize smallpox, but not the common cold.
  23. GeeBee
    If you look at the current Boeing MCAS debacle, you see Boeing arriving at the position of "warning overload" in critical flight situations. There is no need to create a configuration warning in an airplane that can be safely flown in bad configurations. You only add to confusion.
  24. GeeBee
    Takeoff with full flaps and landing trim. Hmmmmm, I think that is called an aborted landing. i.e you touchdown as wildlife wanders onto the runway. You should be able to perform that easily. No warning device required. Here is the thing guys. Every takeoff I make, even in a wide body jet the last words out of my mouth is "flaps set, trim set, spoilers down, airplane should fly.". I also never set the parking brake on the runway. These systems fail both ways. I have saved myself two high speed aborts by my final verification, knowing indeed the airplane was properly configured. Equally so, Delta 1141 DFW. System failed to warn and pilots crashed the airplane.My point is too many pilots rely upon these systems rather than secure knowledge.
  25. GeeBee
    What you are talking about is a Part 25 warning system. Speed brakes. Part 25 aircraft a killer if deployed. A Mooney will fly and land easily if deployed. Flaps. Part 25 aircraft essential to getting airborne. A Mooney will fly. Trim Part 25 aircraft pilot lacks strength to overcome a mistrim. In an Airbus it actually is very hard because the trim number is in the FMC, but if you did it, the airplane would be uncontollable. Mooney can be managed Not pleasant but manageable. Parking Brake. Part 25 jet can over come the parking brake with take off thrust before the pilot notices the degraded situation. Not so much in a Mooney. A set parking brake will be noted very early In short there is insufficient kill potential in these items in a Mooney to warrant such systems.
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