irishpilot

On my M20E, on the first annual we checked the screen and found minor debris. It is something that is a good idea to check.

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Thanks@carusoam. Most of the details have already been covered. As a recap, WAAS capable receivers are authorized to fly LPV, LNAV/VNAV approaches. RNP approaches are not authorized with the 530W or 650. Hint: if the approach you want is not loaded in your Garmin and you've updated it on its 28 day cycle, your unit can't that approach.

That being said, from the safety perspective, flying off of the iPad is a bad idea. iPads do not have FAA certified GPS units. iPads with Foreflight are great for SA but should never be considered a primary instrument reference for IFR flying.

There were valid reasons to be cautious with icing, turbulence, etc. However, if you are uncomfortable flying a circling approach at night, I recommend practicing them at night at your local field with a CFII.

Hindsight being 20/20, the decision matrix was either fly an approved approach for circling, or divert.

Lastly, thanks to the OP for asking this question because it takes guts knowing you will get Armchair quarterbacked by 100 of your closes MS friends. This is how we all learn. In fact, I had to brush up on RNP requirements/limitations before posting.

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[mention=14366]irishpilot[/mention] More appropriate in our safety section, but this was the original thread.  Not sure if it can be moved...

@chriscalandro &@mike_elliott, please take any open grievences offline. I recommend you chat versus text, but that's just a humble recommendation.

Any more posts about notifying the pilot's family (for or against) will lead to this thread being locked.

Fly safe.

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Everyone, as a reminder the safety section is setup to discuss safety,mishaps, prention, etc. in a logical and clinical manner. I understand this can be difficult when members know the mishap pilot.

For this mishap there are very little details, so there is not much to analyze or discuss as to why this mishap occured.

I recommend we hold off and cool off for a bit. Everyone has good intentions, and right now discussing who the pilot is, whether their family has been contacted, etc. is outside the intent of the safety thread and would be best suited in the General section of the forum.

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Very sad news it was a Mooney fatality. I think this one will be tough to do a full post-crash analysis with the lack of info. We will see what the NTSB comes up with.

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Every military plane I've flown has AOA and it is essential, especially when max performing the airfoil. A lot of GA accidents happen from stalls/spins in the final turn. Yes, if you fly the correct airspeeds, it shouldn't be an issue. However, it's another tool that is much more precise than a stall horn. Lastly, when ice builds up on an airfoil, you can see the impact on the AOA.

I also agree, the AOA must be calibrated in order to be useful. Do I want one for my Mooney, yes, but price is a driving factor.

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Fuel burn stays pretty much the same at any given alt since it is Turboed. To go non-stop with that headwind, I flew 4,500' at 27"/2200 which gave me around 160TAS at 15gph.

My normal cruise setting is 29"/2400 which gives me between 180-200TAS in the high teens to low FLs. I usually see 195-200 above FL200. Fuel flow at that alt is 18.5-19 gph 100 degrees ROP.

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This crash hit close to home as I used to live in N Las Vegas and flew out of Nellis and KVGT. The terrain is mountainous and not to be taken lightly. Here's some reading material and my take on how to stay safe, especially when flying night VFR. First disclaimer, if you don't have your IFR ticket, I highly recommend as it makes you a better, more precise flyer and gives you more tools when weather/environment deteriorate. 

When flying VFR, it's good to know the VFR sectional, found on Foreflight, Garmin Pilot, or in print. In this case, the MEF for N Las Vegas is 7,500 and is not based on Gass peak, but a 7,128' peak NE. When on vectors VFR and in VMC pilots are still responsible for see and avoid and obstacle clearance (AIM 5-5-8). This is regardless of whether under ATC control or not. Pre-study of terrain is essential if knowingly going to fly VFR at night, especially in low illumination conditions (new or waning moon).

Already highlighted in this thread is cockpit situational awareness tools that pilots need to know. The Garmin 430 has terrain awareness as well as most portable GPS units. Additionally, any EFB (Foreflight or Garmin Pilot) has terrain avoidance features as well. 

Now, let's dive in a little deeper when switching to IFR. First, the numbers only get more conservative. The MOCA for the KVGT area is 14,100 due to Mt Charleston. East of the Vegas basin it's 10,300.

If on vectors for the ILS to KVGT, the MSA (minimum sector altitude) North of the field is 11,000 and that is based off of Hayford peak 26.8NM North of KVGT. Realize that the MSA seen on the approach plate is for emergency use only and does not guarantee navigational reception. 

Finally, if flying at night and under IFR, I recommend an approach plate study. Looking at the ILS 12L approach, one can see there is steep and rising mountainous terrain North and West of the Las Vegas metropolitan area. As a personal technique, when flying at night and in mountainous terrain, I file IFR and plan to fly the published approach to my destination. When I lived in Las Vegas this is what I primarily flew at night because of the terrain.

How do we learn from this tragedy. Hopefully discussion like this focuses us on the basics and we brush up on basic aeronautical knowledge as well as take time to ensure we know how to maximize the various tools we have inside the cockpit. Lastly, please read the AOPA Safety PDF attached as it is great at explaining obstacle avoidance and calculations.

Min Alt AOPA Paper.pdf

I figure I'd post what the trip going West was like...slow! Left AL and 4.9 later I was back in TX. Set it for long range cruise 27/2200 and had an hour left in the tanks. With the strong headwinds, the fuel way too tight for my liking at 29/2400. The power difference added 45 min of reserve.

The Bravo can go a long ways non-stop!

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I think a T210 compares to a M20M. Both turbo sixes. T210 has great useful load if you are only using four seats or less. They are great planes that are jack-of-all trades. When doing long haul, Turboed Mooney's speed shines and offsets the Cessna's advantages. However, I think they are great planes.

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Hey ya'll, just wanted to share yesterday's flight. Left TX and 2.9 later I was in AL. GS around 250 and TAS between 198-200. Truly an awesome cross country plane!

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I also got a tour and was equally impressed. I've got a few friends who work there and it's a pretty high burnout rate because of the pace. As with anything ambitious, hard work and long hours are usually part of the deal.

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I checked the NTSB database and nothing is uploaded yet. I recommend we don't jump to conclusions until some data is posted and/or the NTSB posts the preliminary report. I don't have the tail #, so I can't pull the FlightAware trail. Once we get more data, we can analyze. 

Regarding Cirrus and CAPS, I feel some of the comments are against that aircraft. Statistically speaking, Cirrus has 92 confirmed CAPS saves (21 Oct 19). Here are my thoughts on parachutes and how it applies to general aviation. First, there are no 0/0 aircraft parachute systems. Ejection seats such as the ACES and Martin-Baker seats are certified for 0/0, but older ejections seats had either a min airspeed, or min alt and airspeed limitation, similar to Cirrus CAPS. Cirrus has done a fine job working hard to get new owners (both new planes vs and pre-owned) training. COPA does a fantastic job of hosting conferences, with a focus on CAPS and safety. Bottom line - the system works but only with the "pull early, pull often" mindset. Pulling less than a 1,000 increases the odds of injury or death. AOPA quotes the system works as low as 400' (960' in a spin).

The statistics do not support the notion that Cirrus is building a false sense of security for its pilot fleet. I've flown and have had training in Cirrus aircraft, and the CAPS system is an additional tool. On takeoff or base-to-final, the Cirrus is not in the CAPS envelope and pilots must train to ensure they do not stall the aircraft when trying to do an off-field landing, same as the rest of GA pilots. In 2017 there were 12 Cirrus fatalities with an approximate fleet size of 7500. For 2017, their accident rate was lower than GA's overall. Mooney had four (click here for more), but I don't think we have nearly the active flying fleet size Cirrus does. If anyone knows how to find how many Mooney's are actively flying in the US, that'd be helpful. I have not analyzed how many 2017 Cirrus fatalities were due to no-pull or out of the envelope. Here's a link to a good safety article on COPA. Bottom line, CAPS should be viewed as an additional tool to be used in an emergency and not as something that removes all risk.

Short hops probably dont warrant the extra expense of the Bravo. I use my Bravo for 500-800 mi trips and I go high almost always. I file IFR and I get GPS direct quite a bit because not a lot of civilian traffic in the teens.

I don't have a specific target altitude. I fly at the best alt for winds. However, it usually ends up being: Going East - 16k-FL210. West - 8-14k.

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As a reminder, posts in the Safety section need to stay focused on safety. Please keep the non-safety banter to a minimum or start a thread in the General or Misc sections. Thank you.

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Just my take from flying high performance planes with AOA and flying planes without. AOA is absolutely the best way to know what your wing is doing real-time. With that said, if you are upgrading your glass panel, you should spend the extra money to include AOA.

That being said, AOA does not supplant quality training. Power on and power off stalls both straight-ahead and a turn will help build that route memory. Additionally, I recommend you adopt a -0 rule for your final approach speeds. For my students, I hold them to -0/+5 rule. If they get slower than final turn or final airspeed, I expect an immediate correction. Precise flying is a must.

Bonus: of you are able, I highly recommend an advanced flying course. There are many out there, and they will help you explore the aerodynamic envolpe.


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Congrats on your new plane. Enjoy and fly safe!

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**Disclaimer, some of the NTSB reports are not final, I do not work for the NTSB or FAA, and my analysis is only as a concerned Mooney owner and not in an official capacity. I also realize that some of our MS members may be the subject to some of these crashes. The observations are objective and not personal. If there are factual errors in the reports, please let me know with documentation. 

Fellow MSers, this is a living thread that I'll edit as I add info. Click here for my previous post on 2017 Mooney fatal accidents. I'll jump right to it:

For 2017, there were 24 Mooney Accidents (20 non-fatal). Bottom line upfront - top Mooney accident causes mirror GA overall with the GA top three being Loss of control, CFIT, and engine loss, in that order. 2017 Mooney top causes mirrored the GA top 3 just a slightly different order. Overall, top Mooney causes, in order:

1. Loss of Control - 5 

1. Engine Loss - 5

2. CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) - 4

2. Fuel related - 4

3. Misc (hard landing, long landing, instrument fail)- 3

4. Gear up - 2

5. CO₂ Poisoning - 1

Overall, there were some variances in the data due to incomplete or non-existent post-accident analysis. Some reports were very thorough, while others very sparse. One item to highlight, only one engine failure was due to a confirmed catastrophic failure of a component. A few engine failures could have been fuel related, but since no evidence in the report could confirm, I kept them under the engine loss category.  I reserve the Top 3 accident fixes/best practices for a separate thread. 

Listed below is a breakdown and summary of each accident (long read):

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12/21/17 – gear up. Partial gear extension that was not verified visually by the pilot. NTSB probable cause: A failure of the normal landing gear extension system for reasons that could not be determined due to damage to the system and the pilot's failure to ensure that the landing gear was down and locked before touchdown. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's distraction due to weather and traffic.

11/26/17 – non-fatal. fuel starvation, ran right tank to empty in pattern, switched tank, engine came back, but plane too low and collided with the ground.

11/23/17 – fatal. Possible loss of control/spatial disorientation

11/06/17 – non-fatal. CFIT. Pilot realized plane was short of runway, applied power and plane rolled left and impacted the ground. NTSB listed probable cause: “The pilot's improper glidepath during a night approach, which resulted in impact with terrain short of the runway.”

10/07/17 – non-fatal. Loss of control. Abrupt pitch-up on takeoff to get to Vx, pulled past into power-on stall, airplane rolled left and impacted terrain. NTSB listed probable cause: The pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during takeoff, which resulted in a departure stall.

9/22/17 – non-fatal. Fuel exhaustion.

9/16/17 – fatal. Engine loss, cause unknown. Possible fuel system issue.

9/9/17 – non-fatal. Hard landing. NTSB listed probable cause: The pilot's unstabilized approach while landing with a tailwind and his subsequent failure to go around, which resulted in a hard landing.

8/20/17 – Non-fatal. Engine loss due to No. 4 cylinder failure causing in-flight fire (possible shearing of fuel line into carburetor (my analysis)).  

8/2/17 – non-fatal. Fuel starvation. Pilot elected to takeoff with less than fuel required for route of flight. Also did not adhere to 91.151 which states pilot must plan to arrive at VFR destination with at least 30 min of fuel. NTSB listed probable cause: The pilot's improper decision to conduct the flight despite the fuel gauges indicating that there was insufficient fuel for the flight, which resulted in the low amount of fuel in the right tank becoming unported during the multiple turns, and his subsequent improper decision to switch to the nearly empty left tank, which led to a loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.

7/29/17 – non-fatal. Gear up landing. NTSB listed probable cause: The pilot's distraction before landing by a helicopter that was transitioning to the airport and his subsequent failure to extend the landing gear before touchdown.

7/14/17 – non-fatal. Loss of control on ground. NTSB listed probable cause: The pilot's failure to maintain directional control during landing in gusting crosswind conditions.

7/15/17 – non-fatal. CFIT. The pilot's failure to maintain a proper approach path, which resulted in impact with trees.

5/28/17 – non-fatal. Long landing resulting in exiting runway and impacting a mailbox. NTSB listed probable cause: The pilot's failure to attain a proper touchdown point during landing, which resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impaired vision due to his broken eyeglasses.

5/15/17 – non-fatal. Instrument malfunction. Pitot tube partially clogged by insect led to airspeed reading lower than actual airspeed. NTSB probable cause: Inaccurate airspeed indications due to contamination of the pitot-static system with insect remains, which resulted in a high approach and landing speed and subsequent runway overrun. **I disagree with NTSB findings. Causal factor is pilot decision to take aircraft with a known abnormal airspeed reading back in the air.

5/12/17 – non-fatal. Engine failure due to unknown cause. NTSB did not fully test the engine therefore no cause is listed. NTSB probable cause: The total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined based on the available information.

5/9/17 – non-fatal. Engine failure, cause unknown. Post-crash interview with pilot suggested some sort of catastrophic mechanical failure.

5/2/17 – non-fatal. Fuel starvation. Fuel selector switch malfunctioned and did not actually switch valve. NTSB probable cause: The loose fuel tank selector knob set screw, which prevented the fuel selector from moving to the fuel tank position for the tank with usable fuel and resulted in fuel starvation and the subsequent total loss of engine power.

4/28/17 – non-fatal. CFIT. Late decision to go-around, combined with misapplied go-around procedure caused plane to stall and impact ocean. NTSB probable cause: The pilot's failure to follow the manufacturer's go-around procedure, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.

3/28/17 – fatal. Loss of control due to possible spatial disorientation at night. NTSB probable cause: The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from terrain after takeoff in dark night conditions for reasons that could not be determined based on the available information.

3/3/17 – non-fatal. Loss of control on landing during touch-and-go practice. Cause unknown due to plane being sold for salvage prior to investigation. NTSB probable cause: A loss of directional control during landing for reasons that could be determined based on the available information.

2/2/17 – non-fatal. Carbon monoxide poisoning incapacitated pilot. Plane subsequently flew until fuel starvation and then crashed. Not listed in the report, but causal was pilot’s lack of recognizing CO2 poisoning symptoms (headache, disorientation, lethargy, etc.). Accident flight was the pilot’s third flight of the day. NTSB probable cause: The pilot's incapacitation from carbon monoxide poisoning in flight due to cracks in the exhaust muffler, which resulted in the airplane's continued flight until it ran out of fuel and its subsequent collision with terrain.

1/12/17 – fatal. CFIT due to VFR pilot flying into IMC conditions and not on a flight plan. Plane impacted terrain in the weather. NTSB probable cause: The pilot's controlled flight into mountainous terrain while attempting to operate under visual flight rules in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).

1/4/17 – engine loss due to possible air in fuel line. Could not be verified or duplicated during post-crash analysis, therefore listed cause unknown. Plane recently had fuel selector valve work performed (replaced O-rings). Post Mx tests were conducted and plane returned to service.

CFIT definition: When an airworthy aircraft under the control of the flight crew is flown unintentionally into terrain, obstacles or water, usually with no prior awareness by the crew.

Six feet under.

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My vote is retest compressions and borescope if it comes back low. Just went through this a few months ago.

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Already in AL. Next weekend is another opportunity.

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I'm leaving for AL this afternoon. I'm in SAT and if you're paying for fuel to AR, I can fly you.

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It's a great step forward and gets the rest GA closer to the Cirrus Chute, but not all the way. In order to get all the way there, Garmin needs an engine-out autonomous profile. Here's my suggestion:

Plane detects engine failure and does:
1. Turn - towards nearest airfield
2. Climb - zoom to capture best glide
3. Clean - leave up to pilot discretion?
4. Check - checklist for restart, check to see if inside glide profile, checklist for off-field landing

If we can get to autonomous engine out profiles, it will make it that much safer, especially in low wx situations.

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Depends on how much you want to spend. My first Mooney was a '65 E. It was awesome and perfect for 350NM XCs. That thing cruised at 155kts burning 10.5 gph ROP. The C is also great. F has a little more room.

If you've got the money to spend Mooney's only get faster from there.

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