Airliner. Aisiana 777 crashed at SFO at 11:30 today.

[jetdriven]

Hasn't anybody just interview the pilots to find out what was going on. There is the possibility that the speed displayed on the PFD was frozen momentarily but the data going to the FDR was the actual speed. This would explain why the pilots did not increase thrust power. PFDs can lock up momentarily under certain combination of inputs not anticipated. This is what the watchdog is for. If this is the case it will be very difficult to recreate the failure. I just can't imagine two experienced pilots ignoring airspeed on landing.

 

José

Jose, that possibility is so remote as to not even be possible. The avionics in modern transport jets are not simply an enlarged Aspen or an iPad. The 777 Displays are driven by three independent ADIRU's (over 1M$ each) which all 3 crosstalk along with separate primary flight displays which are also compared by the independent EICAS control units. Any data corruption or disagreement triggers an EICAS message and there is a procedure to deal with that as well. If the data is too corrupted then the display may red X. You also have a separate, independent, integrated standby instrument with airspeed, altitude, attitude, and navigation.

[mulro767]

This is a country that doesn't support general aviation. Pilots come from the military routes or they are hired ab initio into an airline seat with little real stick and rudder flying skills. There are many countries like Korea that will fill their national airline seats with the best their country has to offer. There will be more accidents like this. I said the same thing after AF447.

[Oscar Avalle]

I was watching TV yesterday night and they started asking why the pilot disconnected the autopilot and did not use the autoland function to land the plane as if that was the normal procedure...amazing the lack of understanding of some media "aviation experts"...

[aaronk25]

I think the boys up front got distracted for the final landing phase and screwed up big time......we've all got distracted before some have paid a price some haven't, these guys paid big, and it makes matters worse there supposed to be the best in the world, meaning they should never make mistakes, at lease not 4 of them all at once.

[aviatoreb]

....meaning they should never make mistakes, at lease not 4 of them all at once.

 

Somehow, I have a feeling that there were 4 of them may have made the loss of attention worse than if there was just one of them.

 

Still surprised though that this could happen with a check airman right there.

[201er]

It was just too easy. Clear skies, light winds, etc. It couldn't have been easier which is why they let the trainee fly it and had the attitude that nothing could possibly go wrong.

[aaronk25]

Somehow, I have a feeling that there were 4 of them may have made the loss of attention worse than if there was just one of them.

Still surprised though that this could happen with a check airman right there.

That's true 4 people to distract each other!

[Marauder]

I often wonder about the CRM dynamics of that cockpit. The flight crew was experienced but I wonder if there was a pecking order issue that went on. Even at my lowly level, when I fly with someone in the right seat, I am monitoring the airspeed on approach, parallax and all. I find it hard to believe that experienced 777 pilots would have allowed the speed situation to decay. They had to have known based on the configuration of the plane and their experience flying it that they were headed for trouble.

[flyboy0681]

I often wonder about the CRM dynamics of that cockpit. The flight crew was experienced but I wonder if there was a pecking order issue that went on.

 

After reading a story yesterday about a Korean Airlines 747 crash in the mid 90's I was wondering this too. The report from that incident said that Asian social authoritarianism may have played a role because the FO did not feel he could question or challenge the captains authority or decision making even though he knew things were degrading.

[Piloto]

Jose, that possibility is so remote as to not even be possible. The avionics in modern transport jets are not simply an enlarged Aspen or an iPad. The 777 Displays are driven by three independent ADIRU's (over 1M$ each) which all 3 crosstalk along with separate primary flight displays which are also compared by the independent EICAS control units. Any data corruption or disagreement triggers an EICAS message and there is a procedure to deal with that as well. If the data is too corrupted then the display may red X. You also have a separate, independent, integrated standby instrument with airspeed, altitude, attitude, and navigation.

 

I agree with you. But why an experienced pilot would ignore airspeed. On a digital display is possible to stop the refresh rate so the last image will be retained. If the display cannot refresh there is no way to display the big red X on it. In this case the pilot has no reason to look at the standby instrument since he does not see the big red X.  So how a smart pilot knows that it has a frozen image? Simply look at DIST to WPT field. If it is not changing you have a frozen image. Screen lock up can be caused either by hardware or a software glitch. In most cases they are momentary events transparent to the pilot. I remember a similar event that only happened at certain airports and not all the time. Finally I figured out. It was caused when the ADC was reading below sea level pressure altitude. Which only happens at low elevation airports under a high barometric pressure condition. A miss calculation of the two's complement on the software was the culprit. Something as simple as dividing by zero can halt a program flow. 

 

It also puzzle me no mention of the EGPWS warnings or the RALT call outs on the CVR. These would have alerted the pilots of loosing altitude.

 

José 

[aaronk25]

I wish they would release the cockpit voice recordings and we would have it nailed....

[jetdriven]

I was watching TV yesterday night and they started asking why the pilot disconnected the autopilot and did not use the autoland function to land the plane as if that was the normal procedure...amazing the lack of understanding of some media "aviation experts"...

Autoland is a normal procedure.  But you must have a functioning localizer and glideslope to do it.

[jetdriven]

I agree with you. But why an experienced pilot would ignore airspeed. On a digital display is possible to stop the refresh rate so the last image will be retained. If the display cannot refresh there is no way to display the big red X on it. In this case the pilot has no reason to look at the standby instrument since he does not see the big red X.  So how a smart pilot knows that it has a frozen image? Simply look at DIST to WPT field. If it is not changing you have a frozen image. Screen lock up can be caused either by hardware or a software glitch. In most cases they are momentary events transparent to the pilot. I remember a similar event that only happened at certain airports and not all the time. Finally I figured out. It was caused when the ADC was reading below sea level pressure altitude. Which only happens at low elevation airports under a high barometric pressure condition. A miss calculation of the two's complement on the software was the culprit. Something as simple as dividing by zero can halt a program flow. 

 

It also puzzle me no mention of the EGPWS warnings or the RALT call outs on the CVR. These would have alerted the pilots of loosing altitude.

 

José 

Perhaps a breakdown in basic flying skills is to blame here. The NTSB will figure it all out.

 

With regard to frozen screens, you would know if you had one, if it was even possible. The airspeed is presented as a tape and also as a number, and that number rolls over like a car odometer. Now they are very sensitive and are always moving. You can detect a 1/4 knot difference in airspeed by viewing it. Further, the pitch and bank presentation is always moving.

 

Find me one single instance in the 18 million flight hours of the B777 and I'll even throw in the B747-400 which has  another 20 million flight hours and has the older generation of glass.   Just one report in 38 million hours.

 

There's a reason each screen costs a hundred grand.

[Piloto]

Byron 

 

You need to get to the Iron Bird at Everett. I worked on the B7J7 (B777 precursor) Flight Control Computer FCC and at times I was frustrated by lock ups. They can happen under different input combinations normally not experienced in-flight, but they can happen. To overcome the un anticipated event systems are designed with safeguards such as watchdog timers, voting scheme, auto reconfiguration and others. I am glad you have not seen any of these reported. But when you download the maintenance data from some of these systems you occassionaly see the safeguards events recorded. 

 

Here http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/777DataFailure.htm is a B777 PFD reported problem of displaying misleading data.

 

José 

[jetdriven]

Byron 

 

You need to get to the Iron Bird at Everett. I worked on the B7J7 (B777 precursor) Flight Control Computer FCC and at times I was frustrated by lock ups. They can happen under different input combinations normally not experienced in-flight, but they can happen. To overcome the un anticipated event systems are designed with safeguards such as watchdog timers, voting scheme, auto reconfiguration and others. I am glad you have not seen any of these reported. But when you download the maintenance data from some of these systems you occassionaly see the safeguards events recorded. 

 

Here http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/777DataFailure.htm is a B777 PFD reported problem of displaying misleading data.

 

José 

 

Glad engineers worked all those bugs out and they arent present in production aircraft. Perhaps Airbus could hire a few.

 

The display was fine, it was an ADIRU failure.  Not a frozen display, I'm still waiting.

 

The memory procedure for the 747-400 (I believe 777 is the same) for

 

"AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE or IAS DISAGREE"

Condition: One"or"more"of"these"occur:

-the captain's and first officer's airspeed indications disagree by 5 knots or more

-the airspeed or mach indications are suspected"to"be"unreliable"(items which may indicate mach or airspeed

unreliable are found in the "additional information" section.

 

Objective: To maintain control using manual pitch and thrust

 

1. Check pitch attitude and thrust.

2. If pitch attitude or thrust are not normal for the phase of flight.

3. Autopilot disengage switch................................................................Push

4. Autothrottle disconnect switch ........................................................... Push

5. F/D switches  (both)...........................................................................OFF

 

Establish"normal"pitch"attitude"and"thrust settings for phase of flight.

 

 

DING DING DING....fly the airplane.

[fantom]

<<DING DING DING....fly the airplane.>>

No shit....can't tell you how disappointed I am with those four 'pilots' who, like many, probably spend all their time on the glass to the detriment of flying the freaking plane.

I recently caught a ride with a foreign student from the biggest school at my home drome. He was English challenged, had just gotten his IFR ticket (a gift) and was soon headed home to a guaranteed airline job. Shooting an ILS, with ATC giving him an intersection vector to final, he merrily goes on his way...flying the full approach, procedure turn and all...just like he was taught in training. Both ATC and I mentioned this to him multiple times to no avail. ATC, after I talked to them, finally told him to fly whatever he wanted, and I convinced him to turn to final. Luckily MIFR and no other traffic. I mentioned this to the school owner, who surprisingly was oblivious, and yes, he was the kids primary instructor.

Be very careful up there, my friends!

PS: Glad to see the poster who was chastising us for 'speculating' and was planning to wait for the NTSB report has joined in.

[fantom]

This just in, I agree of course, and why I only fly American carriers, and not commuters if at all possible.

 

 

 

From: Tom Brown

 

 

After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

 

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

 

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

 

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

 

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

 

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

 

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

 

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

 

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

 

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

 

[flyboy0681]

 

 

From: Tom Brown

 

 

After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400....

 

 

 

Amazing the speed at which stuff like this travels. A friend sent me this same thing about 20 minutes ago.

[FlyDave]

 

This just in, I agree of course, and why I only fly American carriers, and not commuters if at all possible.

 

 

 

From: Tom Brown

 

 

After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

 

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

 

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

 

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

 

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

 

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

 

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

 

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

 

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

 

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

 

 

Gary,

 

I received this yesterday from a friend but was reluctant to post it. Thank you for doing so - I'm glad it's out in the open at this point.

His commentary echos what my other professional pilot friends have said about Asian pilots. These comments are not bigotry but comments made on direct observations and experience. One guy even had an acronym: FWK.

I will NOT fly Asian carriers and I have made sure my wife doesn't when she travels. This email has more than solidified my resolution!

 

Dave

[flyboy0681]

I will NOT fly Asian carriers and I have made sure my wife doesn't when she travels. This email has more than solidified my resolution!

 

Dave

 

There may be one exception, Cathay Pacific, which is known for their notorious hiring of British, American, Canadian and Australian flight crews.

[Skywarrior]

Now, one of the Asiana pilots said a bright light was shining in his eye.

 

That's the ticket.

[FlyDave]

An article I saw this afternoon stated that the after the plane came to rest the captain got on the intercom and told the crew/passengers to stay seated for 90 seconds.

 

I don't know about you but I would have said F U pal and headed for the closest exit, popped the door and got the hell out of that freaking plane!

[stevesm20b]

An article I saw this afternoon stated that the after the plane came to rest the captain got on the intercom and told the crew/passengers to stay seated for 90 seconds.

 

I don't know about you but I would have said F U pal and headed for the closest exit, popped the door and got the hell out of that freaking plane!

I heard the same thing. I sure hope they don't let the crew responsible for this to continue to fly.

[flyboy0681]

 

I don't know about you but I would have said F U pal and headed for the closest exit, popped the door and got the hell out of that freaking plane!

 

Easy to say from where you are standing but that would make you the only one of 300+ people (including flight attendants) to do that. Add to the mix shock and disorientation. Obviously my point is that under the circumstances one doesn't know how they would react when faced with a situation of this type, but yes, every thinking man (and woman) would say the same thing - including me - get out.

 

In addition to the 90 second evacuation delay, I also read that the passengers in business class had a three-point seat belt and that they did not sustain back and spinal injuries that were experienced en mass in the coach section. Lastly, the NTSB is also investigating why some passengers were seen (and photographed) walking away from the scene with their luggage.

[Marauder]

An article I saw this afternoon stated that the after the plane came to rest the captain got on the intercom and told the crew/passengers to stay seated for 90 seconds. I don't know about you but I would have said F U pal and headed for the closest exit, popped the door and got the hell out of that freaking plane!

Isn't the FAA required evacuation requirement 90 seconds? I wonder if in a state of shock he blurted out the requirement. Why else would you tell people to stay seated for that long?