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On 2/21/2020 at 8:58 AM, Blue on Top said:

@N201MKTurbo  Thank you!  Wonderful observation.  You are correct.  … I knew I wouldn't think of all of them :) 

If a pilot would takeoff with the flaps full (landing configuration), would the force be high?  … to a new to this aircraft pilot?

When I was doing my transition training my CFI had me do a takeoff with full flaps to see how the plane acted. The ground roll and take off seemed fairly normal,but when it came off the ground it did not want to climb, I think I was seeing a couple hundred FPM and should have been seeing close to 1000 FPM (winter time). 

There was not any excess force like on a go-around but I had trim set for take-off where on a go-around I have almost full up trim. If you forget to reset your trim and then try to take off with full flaps I think you would have your hands full. 

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8 hours ago, Skates97 said:

When I was doing my transition training my CFI had me do a takeoff with full flaps to see how the plane acted. The ground roll and take off seemed fairly normal,but when it came off the ground it did not want to climb, I think I was seeing a couple hundred FPM and should have been seeing close to 1000 FPM (winter time). 

It is a good exercise, getting excess of speed to climb (or raise 1/2 flaps) is tricky, trying to do anything early eats 1000ft of the runway and sets one back into ground effect, hard to see how that can be achieved without a sensible trim position (most likely close to full forward nose trim), also, how long was the takeoff roll?

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7 hours ago, Ibra said:

It is a good exercise, getting excess of speed to climb (or raise 1/2 flaps) is tricky, trying to do anything early eats 1000ft of the runway and sets one back into ground effect, hard to see how that can be achieved without a sensible trim position (most likely close to full forward nose trim), also, how long was the takeoff roll?

Honestly I don't remember exactly how long the roll was. It wasn't so much longer than normal that either my CFI nor I really noticed. If he did, he didn't mention it, but then again, if something wasn't going according to plan or I wasn't doing something right he would let it progress as long as it wasn't presenting a significant safety of flight issue. It was after that he would bring up the error and talk about what should have been done differently and what I should have been seeing or paying attention to so that I would have recognized the issue. Those were the lessons that really stuck.

 

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The one system that Mooney has no warning for that seems to kill mooney pilots again and again is stab trim. 
 

Have <40% and >60% of takeoff trim with trim warning when weight on wheels.  That would save a few pilots over the years.  

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Takeoff with full flaps and landing trim. Hmmmmm, I think that is called an aborted landing. i.e you touchdown as wildlife wanders onto the runway. You should be able to perform that easily. No warning device required. 

Here is the thing guys. Every takeoff I make, even in a wide body jet the last words out of my mouth  is "flaps set, trim set, spoilers down, airplane should fly.". I also never set the parking brake on the runway. These systems fail both ways. I have saved myself two high speed aborts by my final verification, knowing indeed the airplane was properly configured. Equally so, Delta 1141 DFW. System failed to warn and pilots crashed the airplane.My point is too many pilots rely upon these systems rather than secure knowledge.

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On 2/22/2020 at 11:49 PM, GeeBee said:

In short there is insufficient kill potential in these items in a Mooney to warrant such systems.

@GeeBee  Although I agree that your statement should be correct, especially if we are all cognizant 100% of the time, but we, as human pilots, are not.  How many pilots gear up their retractable gear airplanes a year?  Yes, a gear up is not fatal … except to the airplane and pilot's pride.  How many people die in fatal stall/spin/spiral accidents a year?  But can't everyone recognize an impending stall and stall perform a stall recovery if it goes that far?  Yes, all of us have been trained to perform flawlessly … during training.  There is definitely a reason these backup systems are required in Part 25.  They also have the ultimate backup device - another pilot.

Thank you for your observations.  They are both wonderful and appreciated.  Thanks! 

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17 hours ago, Skates97 said:

When I was doing my transition training my CFI had me do a takeoff with full flaps to see how the plane acted. The ground roll and take off seemed fairly normal,but when it came off the ground it did not want to climb, I think I was seeing a couple hundred FPM and should have been seeing close to 1000 FPM (winter time). 

There was not any excess force like on a go-around but I had trim set for take-off where on a go-around I have almost full up trim. If you forget to reset your trim and then try to take off with full flaps I think you would have your hands full. 

@Skates97  Thank you!  This is a fantastic data point and wonderful observations!

I believe that practicing (as you have done) is a great way to be more aware of what could happen and how to deal with it.  Practicing go-arounds are an eye-opener too.

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1 minute ago, chriscalandro said:

If you make new and creative ways for the airplane to warn the pilot, the pilot will come up with new and creative ways to ignore the warning. 

@chriscalandro  LOL.  So true.  As we say (less politically correctly) in the industry, if we design an idiot-proof system, a better idiot will come along.

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11 minutes ago, Blue on Top said:

@GeeBee  Although I agree that your statement should be correct, especially if we are all cognizant 100% of the time, but we, as human pilots, are not.  How many pilots gear up their retractable gear airplanes a year?  Yes, a gear up is not fatal … except to the airplane and pilot's pride.  How many people die in fatal stall/spin/spiral accidents a year?  But can't everyone recognize an impending stall and stall perform a stall recovery if it goes that far?  Yes, all of us have been trained to perform flawlessly … during training.  There is definitely a reason these backup systems are required in Part 25.  They also have the ultimate backup device - another pilot.

Thank you for your observations.  They are both wonderful and appreciated.  Thanks! 

If you look at the current Boeing MCAS debacle, you see Boeing arriving at the position of "warning overload" in critical flight situations. There is no need to create a configuration warning in an airplane that can be safely flown in bad configurations. You only add to confusion.

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17 minutes ago, Blue on Top said:

@Skates97  Thank you!  This is a fantastic data point and wonderful observations!

I believe that practicing (as you have done) is a great way to be more aware of what could happen and how to deal with it.  Practicing go-arounds are an eye-opener too.

Yup agree.  It seems somewhat dependent on model.  My J does not climb full flaps.  Found that during a go around on a hot day (not heavy).  Totally anemic 200-300 fpm climb when I should have been hitting 1000 fpm. 
 

Could a sensor based IO suite be developed under NORSEE?  

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17 minutes ago, GeeBee said:

If you look at the current Boeing MCAS debacle, you see Boeing arriving at the position of "warning overload" in critical flight situations. There is no need to create a configuration warning in an airplane that can be safely flown in bad configurations. You only add to confusion.

@GeeBee  The Boeing MCAS debacle is much, much more complicated than what is known on the surface by the general public (me included ... but I know certification and of these systems in particular very well), but the MCAS system is also a great example of NO WARNING.  The system just takes over control without any warning.

To support your viewpoint and in the MCAS case specifically, these 2 fatal accidents should have easily been avoided and not been a problem at all.  The crew could have handled the situation easily by simply turning off power to the stabilizer trim motor (not the autopilot, not the trim system, the electric motor that drives the stabilizer).  The flight crews on a few flights before the accident did exactly that on this exact same airplane.

PS. I am a big fan of "dark cockpit" design philosophy.  Don't tell the pilot anything that he/she can't do anything about.

PS2.  I am also a big fan of simplicity, lightness and robust systems that tell the pilot/mechanic what is wrong (or causing the issue).

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28 minutes ago, bradp said:

Could a sensor based IO suite be developed under NORSEE?  

@bradp  Great observation!  Yes, but it kind of depends on what all the system does.  Here's a simple way to look at it.  If the original device was required to certify the airplane, no; it cannot be installed under NORSEE (Non-required Safety Enhancing Equipment).  If it is additional information, yes it can be installed under NORSEE.  I'll try to give an example.

A device that looks at flap position and throttle position as a "takeoff" or "go-around" warning system can be NORSEE installed.  IF that same system is used to show flap position (replaces the mechanical cable in the case of a Mooney) it must have an STC and cannot be installed as NORSEE.   IOW, the flap indicator is required by regulation.

Another really good example (and I am saying this to help people understand NORSEE … and not get off topic) is the new electronic attitude indicators.  The new attitude indicator function itself is not NORSEE (an attitude indicator is a required instrument).  All the information around it (airspeed, altitude, slip indicator , etc.) is NORSEE.  Here's the kicker.  NORSEE information is not required to be correct … nor to even function or be there.  IOW (and different units/companies do this differently) for example, airspeed on a new all-in-one unit is not required to be correct (you are required by law to still have a TSOd airspeed indicator) … unless the company that made your all-in-one has TSOd and certificated the airspeed function of that unit.  This is true of all the surrounding data.

Confusing I know, but once people understand it is very straight-forward.

Did this help?

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I have an Icarus SAM, and it can be set up to give you just about any warning you want. No, it is not wired into the landing gear system to give "Gear Not Down" warnings or things of that nature, its warnings are triggered by altitudes.  At start up you set a Destination altitude, a Target altitude, and if you are flying an approach you can set a DA altitude. I have had this system for around ten years, have used it quite a bit, and here is my take on it.

First, it is well suited to use when taking a trip from departure airport A to destination airport B.  The amount of stuff that needs to be set up is minimal and you get all the warnings you really need.  When you set an altitude to ascend to, it warns you that you are approaching that altitude, and once there, it warns you if you are departing from that altitude by more than about 100 feet.  Good to have on an IFR trip.  When descending you can set a "descend to" altitude, it warns when you are approaching that.  If you have properly set the destination altitude it give you a "Gear" or "GUMPS" warning (you choose which you want) at, I think it is 400 or 500 AGL.

Second, though, it is not very well suited to flying a bunch of consecutive practice approaches.  Too many things to set up too fast, and it is talking to you too much.  Easiest to just get rid of it.

And along those same lines, even in the "Single trip" scenario it seems to use the exact same altitudes AGL, to give you a warning, as ATC or Tower does.  So invariably you get two voices at the same time wanting different things.  I wouldn't say this gets confusing, but what happens is you ignore one, usually the SAM aural alert, and deal with the other, usually ATC/Tower.  This happens quite a bit in low altitude, approach-to-airport situations.  If you are an airline crew and you have someone else to handle one of the two things, that would work.  For single pilot not so much, and it becomes too easy to disregard an important alert.  

Having good checklist or flow habits ground in to the point where you don't vary from them, is still the best defense.  

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EI has a display that has many status options... Similar to the CGR series...

 

As far as T/O run with full flaps... things won’t be noticeable until the end...

The drag caused by the deployed flaps won’t be very large until the speed2 comes up...

By then, the pilot is fully occupied with centerline and airspeed...

Followed by a sudden nose high and over-rotating tendency...

 

The stall alarm and instrument panel in your face are not very subtle... either.

Proper reaction needs to be quick...

Lower the nose, lower the power, lower the trim, are all possibilities...

PP thoughts only, not a CFI...

Best regards,

-a-

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So the 2019 Subie.  Gas Cap got left off.   Check Engine light is on.   That shuts down ALLL the other systems including cruise Control.   The dealer is 11.5 miles away.    The system does a check every 12 miles to see if the huge vacuum leak has been resolved.

Needed oil changed and 2 recalls - just had not planned to go to the dealer that day.

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@Yetti  Yep.  Total integration is not always a good thing.

The Hawker Beechcraft Corporation "Hawker Horizon/4000" and the Cessna Citation Sovereign both have the Honeywell EPIC system in them.  One is fully integrated; the other is not.  One airplane is still in production; the other is not.  Same stuff on my Honda "Pilot" (but I love her still).

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11 minutes ago, Blue on Top said:

@Yetti  Yep.  Total integration is not always a good thing.

The Hawker Beechcraft Corporation "Hawker Horizon/4000" and the Cessna Citation Sovereign both have the Honeywell EPIC system in them.  One is fully integrated; the other is not.  One airplane is still in production; the other is not.  Same stuff on my Honda "Pilot" (but I love her still).

I asked how many loose gas caps the service writter saw per week.  He said about 1 per week.    I asked why they had not put a warning to say.   Hey dummy tighten your gas cap.    No good response.

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7 hours ago, Blue on Top said:

@GeeBee  The Boeing MCAS debacle is much, much more complicated than what is known on the surface by the general public (me included ... but I know certification and of these systems in particular very well), but the MCAS system is also a great example of NO WARNING.  The system just takes over control without any warning.

To support your viewpoint and in the MCAS case specifically, these 2 fatal accidents should have easily been avoided and not been a problem at all.  The crew could have handled the situation easily by simply turning off power to the stabilizer trim motor (not the autopilot, not the trim system, the electric motor that drives the stabilizer).  The flight crews on a few flights before the accident did exactly that on this exact same airplane.

PS. I am a big fan of "dark cockpit" design philosophy.  Don't tell the pilot anything that he/she can't do anything about.

PS2.  I am also a big fan of simplicity, lightness and robust systems that tell the pilot/mechanic what is wrong (or causing the issue).

Nope it could not be easily solved by turning off the stab trim switches. and yes you get a lot of warning, most counter productive. When the MCAS starts to trim down the pilot instinctively pulls back on the yoke. That action in a Boeing airplane will engage the stab trim brake. At that point you have a stab trim down with an up elevator, which will activate a stab trim warning.  The only way at that point to unlock the stab trim brake is regardless if the power trim switches are on or off is to push forward on the yoke. Except if you do,  you got a EPGWS also screaming, "Don't Sink" , a Master Warning, and a Master Caution. Unfortunately, Boeing removed the stab trim brake "pull to release" after the 727. I had a "bound up Boeing" once over Ireland, when the autopilot failed to keep the stab in trim, it just kept adding up elevator. By the time "Stab out of trim" warning came on, the stab could no longer be trimmed, because the back pressure on the yoke engaged the brake. Fortunately, FL370 gives you some room. I had to sit every one down, suspend service, get a block altitude. I was then able to push the yoke forward then trim to elevator, then retrim back to normal flight.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/ntsb-faults-boeing-tests-of-max-system-for-not-assessing-pilot-response-to-multiple-alerts/

I would point out to you Boeing's hodge podge warning systems  system on the 737 flies in the face of even 1980 Boeing EICAS technology with rudimentry prioritization, on the 757/767 series. It certainly is no where near the Airbus ECAM tech which correctly inhibits warning in critical flight regimes. The ECAM system proved its logic a design on QF42, the A380 that had uncontained failure of #2. The ECAM correctly prioritized the warnings, allowed the pilots to correctly ignore inconsequential failures and directed the crew to manage multiple failures in proper sequence. One of the great parts of the ECAM system is it ignores TO warning logic after 100 knots because it knows the pilot reaction to such a warning, even if say a single slat retraction occurred would be counter productive. 

That goes to the heart of A configuration warning on a light airplane. There is nothing that will kill a even modestly proficient pilots. Look you can immunize people with live virus', but you really don't do that unless the disease is lethal. So we immunize smallpox, but not the common cold.

 

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56 minutes ago, GeeBee said:

Nope it could not be easily solved by turning off the stab trim switches. and yes you get a lot of warning, most counter productive. When the MCAS starts to trim down the pilot instinctively pulls back on the yoke. That action in a Boeing airplane will engage the stab trim brake. At that point you have a stab trim down with an up elevator, which will activate a stab trim warning.  The only way at that point to unlock the stab trim brake is regardless if the power trim switches are on or off is to push forward on the yoke. Except if you do,  you got a EPGWS also screaming, "Don't Sink" , a Master Warning, and a Master Caution. Unfortunately, Boeing removed the stab trim brake "pull to release" after the 727. I had a "bound up Boeing" once over Ireland, when the autopilot failed to keep the stab in trim, it just kept adding up elevator. By the time "Stab out of trim" warning came on, the stab could no longer be trimmed, because the back pressure on the yoke engaged the brake. Fortunately, FL370 gives you some room. I had to sit every one down, suspend service, get a block altitude. I was then able to push the yoke forward then trim to elevator, then retrim back to normal flight.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/ntsb-faults-boeing-tests-of-max-system-for-not-assessing-pilot-response-to-multiple-alerts/

I would point out to you Boeing's hodge podge warning systems  system on the 737 flies in the face of even 1980 Boeing EICAS technology with rudimentry prioritization, on the 757/767 series. It certainly is no where near the Airbus ECAM tech which correctly inhibits warning in critical flight regimes. The ECAM system proved its logic a design on QF42, the A380 that had uncontained failure of #2. The ECAM correctly prioritized the warnings, allowed the pilots to correctly ignore inconsequential failures and directed the crew to manage multiple failures in proper sequence. One of the great parts of the ECAM system is it ignores TO warning logic after 100 knots because it knows the pilot reaction to such a warning, even if say a single slat retraction occurred would be counter productive. 

That goes to the heart of A configuration warning on a light airplane. There is nothing that will kill a even modestly proficient pilots. Look you can immunize people with live virus', but you really don't do that unless the disease is lethal. So we immunize smallpox, but not the common cold.

@GeeBee  I guess we have a different understanding of the story and how the system works.  In my understanding, MCAS is not part of any trim system (nor are trim systems allowed to run the stabilizer this rapidly).  Fighting the MCAS system will aggravate it and cause it to run the stabilizer at twice the original rate, which the original rate is similar to a stick pusher (except MCAS is not over-ridable). Although MCAS uses the stabilizer actuator, it accomplishes the task through a completely different system (MCAS, not trim).

(quoted from your article) "Schulze said Boeing assumed in its testing that pilots would “immediately identify (the MCAS) unintended trim action” and then “immediately take action” to counter it, by using thumb switches on the control column to pull the nose back up and if necessary to hit two cutoff switches and stop all automatic stabilizer movement."

How should the pilots have identified a system that they didn't know about, nor is it in the Flight Manual?  Again, it is not trim.  Again, the column switches will do nothing to stop MCAS.

(more from the article) Boeing’s assumptions proved wrong. With those distractions in the cockpit— and in the case of the Lion Air flight, with the crew having no prior knowledge of MCAS, which Boeing had omitted from the flight manuals — the pilots did not diagnose the problem they were facing and failed to respond as Boeing expected.

Ironically, the MCAS issue and AF447 (I noticed from your comments that you're an Airbus fan), have nothing to do with configuration warnings.  The AF447 accident was a simple, don't pull the stick back to the aft stop when the airplane is stalled.  We all learned that in our first couple hours of private pilot training.  That very experience crew didn't know that the airspeed system and the stall warning systems are completely independent of each other.

Looking at the NTSB data for fatal accidents, one will find that the vast majority are during takeoff and go-around (not landing) and maneuvering (showing off at low altitude and moose turns).  We need a solution; what are your ideas?

PS.  If you would like to start a thread about MCAS (I believe there already is one) or the AF447 accident, I would be glad to participate in those, too.

PS2. There have been 2 accidents in my state in the past 6 months that I know about that killed two people - one in an M20 and another in a Bonanza.  The Bonanza was trimmed nearly full nose up on takeoff.

 

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No AF447 the aft elevator caused the stab trim to roll full nose up. Even if the pilots had pushed the stick forward to the stops, after FL270 the airplane could not recover because there was not enough down elevator in the whole wide world to save the airplane. A B757 out of Santo Domingo also crashed when it lost pitot static info, only they pitched forward, but the result was the same. The lesson is not to pull back OR pitch forward, but verify synchronous attitude, then fly attitude and power appropriate to condition of flight.

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When we get runaway trim/stuck... we have flap setting that can help us out... combined with power...

Trim stuck full up... add full flaps, and set power...

Full down... raise flaps, send your co-pilot to the back, and don’t run out of arm strength... ?

 

PP thinking out loud, hoping this adds to the conversation...

Best regards,

-a-

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19 hours ago, Blue on Top said:

PS. I am a big fan of "dark cockpit" design philosophy.  Don't tell the pilot anything that he/she can't do anything about

MCAS on elevator for pitch did the same job as automatic spoilers on ailerons for roll !

Do you need to know about asymmetric auto spoilers deployment on 30deg climb turn at 6000ft? No, all pilot care about is the roll but pax would notice a spoiler on most twisted wing  
Do you need to know about symmetric auto spoilers deployment on ground at 0ft? Maybe, all pilots care about is the breaking distance
Do you need to know about asymmetric auto spoilers deployment at 200ft? Yes, especially wing down tribe not crabbers   

At minimum pilots should know how to put MCAS off/auto/manual, lot of this has been ignored in cockpit design, pilot docs and training, also, there is a difference between "Dark cockpit" and "Augmented/Emulated cockpit", if I am driving a big truck, some big truck feel in flight controls/dynamics is good :lol:

AF447 & MCAS accidents are much more complicated and fall under human-crew-machine factors, not much of these are relevant to us except LOC and upsets under AP operations or failures? (the only case where I felt upset :( was AP failure on NAV under large crosswind/turbulence, personal AP drill: disconnect, cut power and re-trim)

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What you are saying is you need transparency in control. I agree and you can not get that with mechanical controls with mechanical mixers, nudgers and shakers. We do not want the pilot to stall the airplane, so do we nudge or warn of a stall or do you prevent a stall in the first place? 

Now Blue on Top accuses me of being an Airbus fan. Let me tell you, I did not get there easily. After 33 years in Boeings, I fought the Airbus for 3 years. Then I had my "Road To Damascus" conversion which happened interestingly in Rome. Approaching in rain we had a sudden windshear warning. One aural, cancel, WINDSHEAR on the PFD. Only thing to do was pull back. Power already went to TOGA, no worrying about nibbling the stick shaker, the airplane will fly on the edge of critical AOA no matter how far aft the stick. All there was to do is call the IVSi and the tower.

The mistake Boeing is making is trying to put lipstick on over designed mechanical control systems. Just like putting a config warning on a Mooney is one warning too many.

By the way in an Airbus you will crab in a cross wind. You cannot slip the airplane until below 75 feet :)

 

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8 hours ago, GeeBee said:

1. We do not want the pilot to stall the airplane, so do we nudge or warn of a stall or do you prevent a stall in the first place? 

2. Power already went to TOGA, no worrying about nibbling the stick shaker, the airplane will fly on the edge of critical AOA no matter how far aft the stick. All there was to do is call the IVSi and the tower.

3. The mistake Boeing is making is trying to put lipstick on over designed mechanical control systems. Just like putting a config warning on a Mooney is one warning too many.

1. Yes, we should warn the pilot before the aircraft stalls.  No, I do not want to prevent the airplane from stalling … unless it has really, really bad stall characteristics.  Each airplane is different, and there pros/cons/exceptions on every rule and train of thought.

2. And this is exactly what AF447 flight crew did.  The problem was they didn't train well enough to know that the airplane was not in "normal" mode.  They applied flight controls for the airplane being in "normal" mode (full power, full aft stick for stall recovery), which the airplane was not in "normal" mode.  On a sad note, the airplane gave them exactly what they asked for … full up elevator.  Several good books, at least one TV show (with the NTSB) and the transcripts/flight and voice recorder data are publicly available.

3.  On the Max, Boeing made several big mistakes.  Too complicated to get into here,  Bottom line for me is that those accidents had multiple links in the accident chain.  If any link would have been broken, the accidents would not have happened.  Everyone is now pointing at everyone else saying, "If you would have performed perfectly, you could have prevented this."  That goes for everyone involved: Boeing, FAA, flight crews, maintenance crews, etc.

On a serious note, the more we automate airplanes, the less involved and trained pilots will become.  The "autonomous/autopilots" can no longer give the airplane back to the pilot when something fails because the pilot is the weakest link in those airplanes.  I want to involve the pilot more.

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