Jump to content

Four Engines No Safer than one Engine


Piloto

Recommended Posts

8 hours ago, Shadrach said:

Wow.  It's not often that a report reflects that poorly on a military crew.  This should have been a pretty benign exercise. RIP

Actually, it reads like just about every Air Force Accident Investigation Board report (AIB).  Tow reports are published by two separate investigations.  There is the AIB and also the Safety Investigation Board (SIB) report.  They each have a separate goal.  The AIB like the one posted here is used to lay blame to include possible criminal action.  The SIB is completely different, its goal is to determine errors and how to avoid these errors in the future.  The SIBs are privileged information and as such not released to the public.  

I won't comment of any specifics of this accident as I have also read the SIB.  I also have about 1500 hours in C-130s.  The co-pilot (MP2 in the report) was a very recent graduate of pilot training and went through the unit I am assigned to currently, so obviously this report hits close to home.

As for being "benign"...well everything is...until it isn't.

  • Like 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

16 hours ago, kpaul said:

Actually, it reads like just about every Air Force Accident Investigation Board report (AIB).  Tow reports are published by two separate investigations.  There is the AIB and also the Safety Investigation Board (SIB) report.  They each have a separate goal.  The AIB like the one posted here is used to lay blame to include possible criminal action.  The SIB is completely different, its goal is to determine errors and how to avoid these errors in the future.  The SIBs are privileged information and as such not released to the public.  

I won't comment of any specifics of this accident as I have also read the SIB.  I also have about 1500 hours in C-130s.  The co-pilot (MP2 in the report) was a very recent graduate of pilot training and went through the unit I am assigned to currently, so obviously this report hits close to home.

As for being "benign"...well everything is...until it isn't.

KP,

I am very sorry for your loss. I meant no disrespect to anyone. My interpretation of the events described in that report have little relevance in the whole scheme of things.  Had I known that we had a member so close to the incident, I'd have kept my thoughts to myself. Thank you for serving.

Edited by Shadrach
  • Like 3
Link to comment
Share on other sites

16 minutes ago, Andy95W said:

No, he's been saying dumb crap like this for years...

its almost as if he is not a pilot at all....has anyone actually ever seen him on the road in a plane?  or is he a 15 year old kid who likes to stir the pot with a bunch of bullshit?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

As the MC retracted the landing gear, they identified the engine one RPM and torque malfunction and MP1 called for engine shutdown.  However, the MC failed to complete the Takeoff Continued After Engine Failure procedure, the Engine Shutdown procedure, and the After Takeoff checklist as directed by the Flight Manual, and the MA’s flaps remained at 50 percent.  Additionally, MP1 banked left into the inoperative engine, continued to climb, and varied left and right rudder inputs.  At an altitude of approximately 900 feet mean sea level and 131 knots indicated air speed, MP1 input over nine degrees of left rudder, the MA skidded left, the left wing stalled, and the MA departed controlled flight and impacted the terrain on Georgia State Highway 21. 

It appears the erratic power behavior of engine one motivated MP1 (captain) to apply left and right rudder to correct for asymmetrical thrust. If the flight engineer would had shutdown engine one it would had been easier for the captain to control the plane. Because of the engine erratic behavior it would have been difficult to asses which engine to shutdown. Or there was no control continuity to the engine.

Not mentioned on the maintenance report of continuity of power control system (hydraulics).  Bubbles on hydraulic lines can cause erratic behavior.

José

Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, Jim Peace said:

its almost as if he is not a pilot at all....has anyone actually ever seen him on the road in a plane?  or is he a 15 year old kid who likes to stir the pot with a bunch of bullshit?

Just look for rain coming out of a Mooney when I am overhead.:P

José

  • Like 1
  • Thanks 1
  • Haha 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, Piloto said:

As the MC retracted the landing gear, they identified the engine one RPM and torque malfunction and MP1 called for engine shutdown.  However, the MC failed to complete the Takeoff Continued After Engine Failure procedure, the Engine Shutdown procedure, and the After Takeoff checklist as directed by the Flight Manual, and the MA’s flaps remained at 50 percent.  Additionally, MP1 banked left into the inoperative engine, continued to climb, and varied left and right rudder inputs.  At an altitude of approximately 900 feet mean sea level and 131 knots indicated air speed, MP1 input over nine degrees of left rudder, the MA skidded left, the left wing stalled, and the MA departed controlled flight and impacted the terrain on Georgia State Highway 21. 

It appears the erratic power behavior of engine one motivated MP1 (captain) to apply left and right rudder to correct for asymmetrical thrust. If the flight engineer would had shutdown engine one it would had been easier for the captain to control the plane. Because of the engine erratic behavior it would have been difficult to asses which engine to shutdown. Or there was no control continuity to the engine.

Not mentioned on the maintenance report of continuity of power control system (hydraulics).  Bubbles on hydraulic lines can cause erratic behavior.

José

First, my apologies to anyone associated with this incident.  Perhaps I am speaking out of turn, but I really think there is a lesson to be learned here.  I find the behavior of the flight crew appalling.  The aircraft had just come out of the shop for engine repairs.  I've been in this boat, and I know what I did.  I watched my engine readings like a hawk, and I was spring loaded to abort the takeoff if anything at all looked amiss.  This is basically my procedure for flying the aircraft after any mechanical work, and to be honest should be yours too.  Mechanics are human and make mistakes all the time.

These guys had obvious engine anomalies and they just kept going.  They should have shut everything the heck down the minute they encountered erratic readings, which I recall from the report happened well before they hit Vr.  I'm just a dumbshit private pilot, but I think this is something we should all be ready to do.  Too damn many things can go wrong in a repair station.

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, steingar said:

First, my apologies to anyone associated with this incident.  Perhaps I am speaking out of turn, but I really think there is a lesson to be learned here.  I find the behavior of the flight crew appalling.  The aircraft had just come out of the shop for engine repairs.  I've been in this boat, and I know what I did.  I watched my engine readings like a hawk, and I was spring loaded to abort the takeoff if anything at all looked amiss.  This is basically my procedure for flying the aircraft after any mechanical work, and to be honest should be yours too.  Mechanics are human and make mistakes all the time.

These guys had obvious engine anomalies and they just kept going.  They should have shut everything the heck down the minute they encountered erratic readings, which I recall from the report happened well before they hit Vr.  I'm just a dumbshit private pilot, but I think this is something we should all be ready to do.  Too damn many things can go wrong in a repair station.

You are very right. However there is a big difference on sensing engine problems in a Mooney vs a C130. A misfiring engine in front of the pilot is easier and quicker to perceive than one 30ft away muffled by three other engines. It is not unusual for engine instruments to have momentary erratic readings on a good engine that can mislead to shutting down a good engine. 

José

Link to comment
Share on other sites

11 hours ago, thinwing said:

What impressed me was the report itself,how detailed with all the illustrations and graphics...much more so than ntsb reports....

Yes- I agree.   Very sad reading, but the report is very well written detailed enough that anyone reading it could learn from it.  So many mistakes.   I've got 0.5 h of multi-engine time and I remember "Dead Engine Dead Foot".  Maybe with four engines that rule doesn't hold, but after reading that report, it would have helped.   The left-seater was an instructor and was considered "ace of the base".   The stack of mistakes that led to that accident is almost inconceivable.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Your comment dead foot ,dead engine points to basic multi engine airmanship.The principles of asymmetric thrust don't change regardless of aircraft type.I assume #1 engine would be the most outboard engine numbering from Pilot/aircraft commanders left seat ,left to right.Its loss would have the most effect (moment) vs an inboard engine failure.As I read it the left seat doesn't really fly the plane until airspeed builds past 70 knots,rather he is ground steering with a control wheel so maybe he can't detect the yaw resulting from the engine failure.Than they elected to continue takeoff roll even though #1 engine is not producing normal power.The book calls for cleaning up the drag producers ,gear and flaps to accelerate to 3 engine speed ,wasn't done...finally aircraft commander realizes he's got a problem and tells the tower I gotta return to airport.He makes his final mistake banking into dead engine which is never done because that wing is now retreating due to yaw and developing less lift.So sad...

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, Mooneymite said:

Similar, but different was the C-5 accident in Dover on a "practice engine out" landing.

Not even close and this certainly was not a practice engine out.

Shortly after take the fully loaded C-5 received a Warning for a thrust reverser unlocked.  This called for a shut down of the engine.  On the return for the approach the crew managed to use the wrong inboard throttle, ultimately making it a 2 engine approach.  Fully loaded C-5s do not fly on two engines.  The plane crashed just short of the runway.

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

13 hours ago, kpaul said:

Not even close and this certainly was not a practice engine out.

Shortly after take the fully loaded C-5 received a Warning for a thrust reverser unlocked.  This called for a shut down of the engine.  On the return for the approach the crew managed to use the wrong inboard throttle, ultimately making it a 2 engine approach.  Fully loaded C-5s do not fly on two engines.  The plane crashed just short of the runway.

 

On multiengine planes maintenance needs to be more through on the engines harness, connectors and indicators. A faulty engine indicator can lead the pilot to take action on the wrong engine. The FDR does not record what the pilot actually see on the instrument panel like a stuck indicator pointer.

José

 

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 minute ago, Piloto said:

On multiengine planes maintenance needs to be more through on the engines harness, connectors and indicators. A faulty engine indicator can lead the pilot to take action on the wrong engine. The FDR does not record what the pilot actually see on the instrument panel like a stuck indicator pointer.

José

 

 

Very true, however in the case of the C-5 it was not an indication problem, the thrust reverser for the number 2 engine came unlocked.  Having an engine go into reverse in flight is a bad situation.  The crew did the correct initial action of shutting down the engine.  On the approach the pilot accidently swapped the throttles he was using.  He went from using the 3 operating engines numbers 1,3,4 and started using the throttles for 1,2,4.  Number two was shut down, and now #3 was at idle.  Engines 1 &4 were unable to keep the heavy weight aircraft airborne.

Without a doubt this was a crew mistake and poor CRM was high on the list.

In the case of the C-130 there was a long chain of mistakes from both maintenance and the flight crew.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

One year after my M20J engine overhaul on run up I noticed oil drops streaking on the windshield. I checked oil pressure and it was good. I shut down the engine and had the plane towed to my hangar. Found that the prop governor metal spacer was missing and the high pressure leak was all over. Had this been  a twin I would have never noticed the leak before takeoff which would have resulted on engine failure on takeoff.   

José

Link to comment
Share on other sites

5 hours ago, Piloto said:

One year after my M20J engine overhaul on run up I noticed oil drops streaking on the windshield. I checked oil pressure and it was good. I shut down the engine and had the plane towed to my hangar. Found that the prop governor metal spacer was missing and the high pressure leak was all over. Had this been  a twin I would have never noticed the leak before takeoff which would have resulted on engine failure on takeoff.   

José

And, had you flown the airplane correctly, you would have returned for a fairly uneventful landing.  Flown properly, multi-engine airplanes are still safer than singles.

  • Like 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

On 11/14/2018 at 2:25 PM, Mooneymite said:

They just needed more engines:

 

WOW - I love that thing.  10 engines!  Piston and Jets.

What movie is that from? I want to watch that movie.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

5 hours ago, Andy95W said:

And, had you flown the airplane correctly, you would have returned for a fairly uneventful landing.  Flown properly, multi-engine airplanes are still safer than singles.

 

From the V speeds table below Vmc is just one Knot below Vr. A very narrow margin if an engine fails on takeoff and climb, specially from high altitude runways.

Beechcraft B58 Baron (N658RA)

 

Normal Checklist

 

V- Speeds (KIAS):

 

 

 

Vso...................................................................... 74

Vmc..................................................................... 84

Vs1...................................................................... 84

Vr........................................................................ 85

Vx........................................................................ 92

Vxse..................................................................... 95

Vsse..................................................................... 88

Vy...................................................................... 105

Vyse................................................................... 100

Vfe.............................................................. 152/122

Vlo..................................................................... 152

Vle..................................................................... 152

Va......................................................... 156 (MAX)

Vno.................................................................... 195

Vne.................................................................... 223

Approach.......................................................... 100

Glide.................................................................. 115

Crosswind............................................... 22 (MAX)

 

 

 

 

Icing Conditions          130 (MINIMUM)

Defining Vmc

When the manufacturer—Piper Aircraft Corporation—originally applied to the US FAA for certification of the Seneca, it did so under performance conditions established by the FAA for aircraft weighing less than 6,000 lbs.—aircraft typically not used in commuter or airline transport operations.  “Light Twins,” including the Seneca, are not required to climb with an engine failed, nor are they required to maintain altitude.11  The Seneca POH advises us that this aircraft is able to maintain certain parameters pertaining to singe-engine performance—a single-engine service ceiling of 3650’ ASL, at maximum gross weight, or 5000’ ASL, with a gross weight of 4030 lbs.—so it would appear that we are, at least, not in the category of “climbless” single-engine performance aircraft.12  Nevertheless, all manufacturers of light twins have to demonstrate and publish an accurate Vmc speed in accordance with the FAA’s definition.  Essentially, Vmc is defined as the speed below which the aircraft will go out of control when the following conditions exist:

 

Edited by Piloto
Link to comment
Share on other sites

You're making my point for me, Josè.  

If you lose an engine at 84 knots, you will reject the takeoff before reaching Vr.  Beechcraft designs good airplanes. They probably did that on purpose.  I said it before, Flown properly, a multi-engine airplane is safer than a single.  

I do agree with your basic point: flown improperly, you're better off in the single.  Fewer options means fewer opportunities to make the wrong decision.  

On the other hand, what is your likelihood of survival if you lose the engine in your Mooney after takeoff from a high altitude airport?

 

 

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

We have placed cookies on your device to help make this website better. You can adjust your cookie settings, otherwise we'll assume you're okay to continue.