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SUMMER ICE!


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28 minutes ago, StevenL757 said:

Huh?  Let's go back to a novel concept we all supposedly learned in Private Pilot 101.  How about the pilot's planning skills using "all available resources" to avoid a route segment that could put him/her into a known icing condition using an aircraft not approved for flight into known ice conditions?

The controller isn't the one flying the airplane here.

Steve

So every icing / turbulence / precip forecast is 100% accurate 100% of the time? In that case why do we need pirep / SPECI then? And I take it that you've never flown into a weather system that's much worse than the forecast? 

Read NTSB report on N731CA closely. It was only forecast to be light icing condition and that would've been what the pilot got before he took off and his TBM-700 is more than capable of dealing with that. Multiple pirep's of severe icing weren't made available to him even when he was climbing through it because his planned level was 260 not between 140 and 170. 

So tell me, how was he going to know that he was flying into severe instead of light / moderate icing as forecast? 

And are you insinuating that the OP and Brad both had failed Private Pilot 101 when they were caught by surprise with the fast building rime ice?

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56 minutes ago, peevee said:

I hear a lot of everyone else should do this for the pilot and not a lot of hey let's not out airplanes in avoidable dangerous situations in here.

This is my reply to Steven which also applies to your statement - 

So every icing / turbulence / precip forecast is 100% accurate 100% of the time? In that case why do we need pirep / SPECI then? And I take it that you've never flown into a weather system that's much worse than the forecast? 

Read NTSB report on N731CA closely. It was only forecast to be light icing condition and that would've been what the pilot got. Multiple pirep's of severe icing weren't made available to him even when he was climbing through it because his planned level was 260 not between 140 and 170. 

So tell me, how was he going to know that he was flying into severe instead of light / moderate icing as forecast? 

And are you insinuating that the OP and Brad both had failed Private Pilot 101 by "deliberately" putting their plane in "avoidable" dangerous situations? I am pretty sure Brad can read the forecast as well you do.

By requesting higher, Brad was trying to get out a potentially dangerous situation but denied by the ATC.

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17 minutes ago, SkepticalJohn said:

Reminder - If you can't shed the ice, you're looking at a zero flap landing with increased speed.

Flaps with icing in our birds = tail stall.

Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-G935A using Tapatalk
 

No more than takeoff flaps in the Acclaim.  

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15 minutes ago, Tommy said:

This is my reply to Steven which also applies to your statement - 

So every icing / turbulence / precip forecast is 100% accurate 100% of the time? In that case why do we need pirep / SPECI then? And I take it that you've never flown into a weather system that's much worse than the forecast? 

Read NTSB report on N731CA closely. It was only forecast to be light icing condition and that would've been what the pilot got. Multiple pirep's of severe icing weren't made available to him even when he was climbing through it because his planned level was 260 not between 140 and 170. 

So tell me, how was he going to know that he was flying into severe instead of light / moderate icing as forecast? 

And are you insinuating that the OP and Brad both had failed Private Pilot 101 by "deliberately" putting their plane in "avoidable" dangerous situations? I am pretty sure Brad can read the forecast as well you do...

In my case, I did know the forecast.   And I did see the narrow wall in front of me.   It was the top of a build-up.  As @kortopates commented, that is very commonly where you will find ice.   I full expected it and had the TKS on when I went in.   I asked for 190 to be proactive and stay out of it, but I knew that it was a very short distance through for me.     A little flip of the switch to max on the TKS took care of the problem.    

 

A few key points about ice:

1) TKS is great for when you need it, but I would never plan on using it to fly in sustained icing conditions

2) Always have an out.  In this case, I knew that 2000 above was clear air and I could have it if I really needed it.  4000 below me was plenty warm, but in bumpy clouds.  180 turn was also available to me.

3) Forcasts are good.  Combine with Skew-T charts for an even better picture of what to expect.   

4) Moderate ice on a B737 is probably more than what I would call moderate on my Mooney.  View Pireps with a little perspective.

5) Icing is where you find it.

6) Communicate.  Don't Panic.

 

Brad

 

Not a CFI or even an experienced pilot. Just thoughts of a PPL that still has more to learn.

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Some PP thoughts that come to mind...

1) The Best ATC people in the US and Canada also fly Mooneys.  :)

2) Do we have any ATC MSers from Australia?

3) I prefer PIC than ATC-IC.  There is always going to be some unknowns.

4) When safety is the ultimate driver, freedom gets lost in the shuffle.  GA gets grounded for our own good.

5) Teamwork rules!  Mooney pilots and ATC working together.  Gets what you need, when you need it... don't be afraid to speak up.

6) Priority handling for PPs... without paying extra... hmmmmmmm.  :)

Best regards,

-a-

 

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On 7/24/2017 at 2:56 AM, BradB said:

In my case, I did know the forecast.   And I did see the narrow wall in front of me.   It was the top of a build-up.  As @kortopates commented, that is very commonly where you will find ice.   I full expected it and had the TKS on when I went in.   I asked for 190 to be proactive and stay out of it, but I knew that it was a very short distance through for me.     A little flip of the switch to max on the TKS took care of the problem.    

 

A few key points about ice:

1) TKS is great for when you need it, but I would never plan on using it to fly in sustained icing conditions

2) Always have an out.  In this case, I knew that 2000 above was clear air and I could have it if I really needed it.  4000 below me was plenty warm, but in bumpy clouds.  180 turn was also available to me.

3) Forcasts are good.  Combine with Skew-T charts for an even better picture of what to expect.   

4) Moderate ice on a B737 is probably more than what I would call moderate on my Mooney.  View Pireps with a little perspective.

5) Icing is where you find it.

6) Communicate.  Don't Panic.

 

Brad

 

Not a CFI or even an experienced pilot. Just thoughts of a PPL that still has more to learn.

Agree. The point I was trying to make is that the best ATCs are the ones that know the capabilities of many different types of aircraft / pilot as well as the critical and time-limiting nature of things like icing in a small aircraft, spatial disorientation, etc and takes a pro-active steps to prevent tragedies from happening. 

Many pilots, when they read an accident report like N731CA, are quick to blame the pilots but when you look at it closely, often ATCs played a role too. In N731CA's case, pirep reports of severe icing could've made known to the pilot or instruct him to stay below or he could've noticed the deteriorating ground speed as the A/P struggling to maintain the climb rate. Sure, he wasn't legally required to do any of these but I wonder if these 4 people + a dog would still be alive today.

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Now tell me, Steven and Peevee, if you are in Brad's shoes, do you want an ATC that knows how quickly ice can get out of the hand in a Mooney, assumes that you will be cloud in for a good 30 minutes, notices your GS is diminishing, diverts the descending plane by 2 mile right of track, and gives you the clearance to climb to FL190? 

Or you prefer an ATC that thinks you are a 737 with a state of the art WAI and a climb rate of 3000fpm, denies you the clearance, and then asks you to maintain altitude when you're plunging at the rate of 8000fpm and declaring?

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Brad,

Do you have a reference for this?

It seems counter-intuitive. The wing's center of lift moves aft when flaps are lowered, requiring greater negative lift from the horizontal stabilizer to compensate for the greater distance between the center of lift and center of gravity. The horizontal stab's ability to produce negative is hampered because it is also iced. These factors combine to increase the likelihood of a tail stall.

I know no flap landings are recommended for iced landings in the M20K (scroll to the end of the page and then go back up 4 or 5 paragraphs http://www.mooneypilots.com/mapalog/M20K231%20Eval%20Files/M20K231_Eval.htm ) and IFR Magazine blanket recommends no flap landings ( http://www.ifr-magazine.com/issues/1_39/features/Ice-and-Tail-Stalls_478-1.html ).
Aviation Safety recommends retracting flaps in icing because of the possibility of a tail stall ( http://www.aviationsafetymagazine.com/issues/36_8/features/Tailplane-Stalls_11218-1.html ).

I find it hard to believe Mooney would recommend any amount of flaps for landing an iced up bird. I stand by to be proven wrong.

John

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9 hours ago, Tommy said:

Now tell me, Steven and Peevee, if you are in Brad's shoes, do you want an ATC that knows how quickly ice can get out of the hand in a Mooney, assumes that you will be cloud in for a good 30 minutes, notices your GS is diminishing, diverts the descending plane by 2 mile right of track, and gives you the clearance to climb to FL190? 

Or you prefer an ATC that thinks you are a 737 with a state of the art WAI and a climb rate of 3000fpm, denies you the clearance, and then asks you to maintain altitude when you're plunging at the rate of 8000fpm and declaring?

The issue isn't ATC capabilities, but better pilot ADM.  Brad's Acclaim (and my Ovation) are both known-ice equipped and certified, where the OP's F-model is not.  This means Brad and I have the equipment on board to make the decision to fly into a known-ice condition or not legally.  I agree ATC should be educated to give the best guidance possible, but flight into known ice with an aircraft that isn't shows poor decision-making.  The pilot alone owns this responsibility...not ATC.  Making statements about capabilities you feel ATC should possess and demonstrate in order to "cover" for a pilot's poor decision-making speaks volumes about character, and could be misconstrued as a hazardous attitude.  

To your earlier questions:  No, forecasts are never 100% accurate; Yes - I have flown where the WX was worse than forecasts indicated...in many models of aircraft with various capabilities...and have always left myself an out.  Quoting from the NTSB report of "it was only forecast to be light icing" is a statement minimizing a major issue the FAA is trying hard to keep at the front of pilots' minds.

FIKI-equipped aircraft can be defeated by certain icing conditions, so although such aircraft are equipped to mitigate many icing scenarios, we should take the added precaution of using that system to get out of a situation successfully, as Brad's example illustrated.

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4 hours ago, SkepticalJohn said:

Brad,

Do you have a reference for this?

It seems counter-intuitive. The wing's center of lift moves aft when flaps are lowered, requiring greater negative lift from the horizontal stabilizer to compensate for the greater distance between the center of lift and center of gravity. The horizontal stab's ability to produce negative is hampered because it is also iced. These factors combine to increase the likelihood of a tail stall.

I know no flap landings are recommended for iced landings in the M20K (scroll to the end of the page and then go back up 4 or 5 paragraphs http://www.mooneypilots.com/mapalog/M20K231%20Eval%20Files/M20K231_Eval.htm ) and IFR Magazine blanket recommends no flap landings ( http://www.ifr-magazine.com/issues/1_39/features/Ice-and-Tail-Stalls_478-1.html ).
Aviation Safety recommends retracting flaps in icing because of the possibility of a tail stall ( http://www.aviationsafetymagazine.com/issues/36_8/features/Tailplane-Stalls_11218-1.html ).

I find it hard to believe Mooney would recommend any amount of flaps for landing an iced up bird. I stand by to be proven wrong.

John

Acclaim POH.   It is placarded, as well.  

IMG_2293.thumb.PNG.8ff22e066bb0b463f38e4ec1d36befdc.PNG

 

other tidbits:

The placard says minimum speed of 120kts when carrying ice.    But there is a maximum speed in icing conditions.   Starting at 173 kias at 11k decreasing to 140 kias at 22k and above.   Starting at 11k decrease 3kts for every 1000 feet.   

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Acclaim POH.   It is placarded, as well.  
IMG_2293.thumb.PNG.8ff22e066bb0b463f38e4ec1d36befdc.PNG
 
other tidbits:
The placard says minimum speed of 120kts when carrying ice.    But there is a maximum speed in icing conditions.   Starting at 173 kias at 11k decreasing to 140 kias at 22k and above.   Starting at 11k decrease 3kts for every 1000 feet.   


Thanks for the reference Brad!

Looks like the POH still calls for a no flap landing with an inch or more ice on the Acclaim. Not trying to sharp shoot, just trying to remind the collective group.

John
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1 hour ago, StevenL757 said:

The issue isn't ATC capabilities, but better pilot ADM.  Brad's Acclaim (and my Ovation) are both known-ice equipped and certified, where the OP's F-model is not.  This means Brad and I have the equipment on board to make the decision to fly into a known-ice condition or not legally.  I agree ATC should be educated to give the best guidance possible, but flight into known ice with an aircraft that isn't shows poor decision-making.  The pilot alone owns this responsibility...not ATC.  Making statements about capabilities you feel ATC should possess and demonstrate in order to "cover" for a pilot's poor decision-making speaks volumes about character, and could be misconstrued as a hazardous attitude.  

To your earlier questions:  No, forecasts are never 100% accurate; Yes - I have flown where the WX was worse than forecasts indicated...in many models of aircraft with various capabilities...and have always left myself an out.  Quoting from the NTSB report of "it was only forecast to be light icing" is a statement minimizing a major issue the FAA is trying hard to keep at the front of pilots' minds.

FIKI-equipped aircraft can be defeated by certain icing conditions, so although such aircraft are equipped to mitigate many icing scenarios, we should take the added precaution of using that system to get out of a situation successfully, as Brad's example illustrated.

Brad had an out in case the icing forecast was wrong - quickly climb or descent to a safer altitude. Denied by the ATC. 

N731CA also had an out if you listened to the ATC recording - he stated that he is getting a bit rattled and would like to expedite the climb. Delayed by the ATC. 

They all had an out but their successes were largely dependent on ATC's knowledge in aircraft performance and the understanding of the time critical nature of the issue. That's the point you kept missing, Steven. To me, it's a poor form - often with catastrophic consequences -  when an ATC denies a pilot's request on time-critical issues like icing in a single IRRESPECTIVE of the pilot's ADM. 

The fact that you think that every pilot who flown into icing condition worse than forecast is making poor ADMs and deserving no favors from ATC also speaks volume about character, and could be misconstrued as apathetic and arrogant attitude.   

 

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That is a graphic reminder of how dangerous ice build ups can be.

by changing flap position with an ice build up, there is risk of something getting jammed, ice leaving the plane in an uneven fashion, or some other type of challenge.

Changing flap settings also changes the AOA.  The current AOA has ice formed by it. Changing the AOA is going to change where and how air is split over the leading edge.  The ice on the leading edge can cause terrible lift problems that are now made worse...

Fortunately we have the guidance of the POH written in modern times. Thanks to Brad for sharing his.

Best regards,

-a-

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1 hour ago, StevenL757 said:

  The pilot alone owns this responsibility...not ATC.  Making statements about capabilities you feel ATC should possess and demonstrate in order to "cover" for a pilot's poor decision-making speaks volumes about character, and could be misconstrued as a hazardous attitude.

And I see you set up a nice straw man there. You are saying that I am advocating ATC bail out for all the terrible ADMs. 

I am still curious how do you know the OP, Brad, and the pilot of N731CA all had made bad ADMs when you didn't have the forecast and you weren't the pilot flying. Stick to the fact, Steven. The fact is all of them were surprised by the icing condition and all of them executed the out. OP's request were granted quickly so he was okay. Brad's TKS held up so he was okay. N731CA, well, his request were delayed and his Anti-ice didn't hold up so he didn't fare as well...

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As the OP, I feel I should chime in! We were at 12k, starting initial approach, OAT was +5c, and began decent to 10k, which put us in the soup at an OAT of 0c. Picked up ice immediately. And immediately requested higher or lower. Lower was not available so I went back up to 12k, clear of clouds. There was no ice forecast...it's just how it works when there's clouds above high mountains...glad I had quick decisions, responsive ATC, and a capable aircraft. 

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On 7/23/2017 at 9:33 PM, Tommy said:

 

And I see you set up a nice straw man there. You are saying that I am advocating ATC bail out for all the terrible ADMs. 

I am still curious how do you know the OP, Brad, and the pilot of N731CA all had made bad ADMs when you didn't have the forecast and you weren't the pilot flying. Stick to the fact, Steven. The fact is all of them were surprised by the icing condition and all of them executed the out. OP's request were granted quickly so he was okay. Brad's TKS held up so he was okay. N731CA, well, his request were delayed and his Anti-ice didn't hold up so he didn't fare as well...

The unexpected severe icing encountered by N731CA was of course a terrible card to be dealt to an inexperienced pilot; especially when he is told to expect light icing by the controller. Would the outcome have been different if the controller was able to give him higher sooner? We'll never know for sure. But it really doesn't look like ATC kept him the icing at 17K for very long.

First off the controller was very forthright in alerting the pilot to icing conditions and requested the pilot let him know right away: During the departure climb, while passing 8,000 feet for 10,000 feet, the pilot was directed to climb and maintain 14,000 feet.The controller then advised the pilot of moderate rime icing from 15,000 feet through 17,000 feet with light rime ice at 14,000 feet. The controller asked that the pilot advise him if the icing got worse, and the pilot responded with, “we’ll let you know what happens when we get in there and if we could go straight through, it’s no problem for us.”

With respect to timeline it sure doesn't look like the controller significantly delayed him at 17K beyond 30 sec from climbing: At 1002:17, the ZNY controller advised the pilot that he would be cleared to a higher altitude when ATC could provide it, and that light icing would be encountered at 17,000 feet. The pilot responded with, “I can confirm that light icing…” and stated that, “…light icing has been present for a little while and a higher altitude would be great.” The altitude of the airplane at that time was 16,800 feet and 101 knots ground speed.

Thus the pilot only confirmed light icing so far, no mention of moderate nor certainly severe. But only 15 sec later, the pilot "rattled" from the icing so I would assume it was worse than "light", This is when he makes his first request to get higher asap: At 1002:34, the pilot reported, “we’re getting a little rattle here can we ah get ah higher as soon as possible please.” The ZNY controller responded with “stand by” and coordinated for a higher altitude with an adjacent sector controller.

Less than 30 sec later, the controller gave him higher. At 1002:59, the ZNY controller directed the pilot to climb and maintain FL200 and the pilot acknowledged.

It only took a minute later while climbing to 20K that the pilot and plane are known to be in trouble.:  At 1004:08, the airplane reached an altitude of 17,800 feet before it turned about 70 degrees to the left and entered a descent. At 1004:29, while descending through 17,400 feet, and at 90 knots ground speed, the pilot transmitted, “and N731CA’s declaring…” 

Can we blame the controller for taking 30 sec to coordinate higher with the next sector? I really don't think so. The pilot was way over his head as most of us would be encountering severe ice when we were primed for light-moderate icing. But the the only hope the pilot had was to descend back down to VMC conditions at below 12800-12900 where he reporting entering IMC. Instead he continued to climb into what we assume was severe icing till he either lost control in the climb or lost control descending and the airplane broke up from over stress. Either way he either waited too long or waited till he started loosing control to take action and declare. We could fault him for not declaring an emergency rather than waiting 30 sec for ATC to clear him higher. But it really looks like he needed to start his exit before he even got to 17K or at least declare and descend immediately when he was at 17K picking up ice at too quick of rate rather than place all his hopes on continuing to climb up through it if he was heavily iced (i.e. rattled from the ice accumulation). We just really don't know how much ice he accumulated when but all indications are he was accumulating it through most of his climb to 17K and should have been taking action there to exit. Very sad but I don't see how any of this is the fault of the controllers for holding him at 17K for 30 sec to coordinate higher. 

Also I see no relationship between this accident from severe winter icing and the couple of summer ice encounters reported in this thread. 

Edited by kortopates
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22 minutes ago, kortopates said:

At 1002:34, the pilot reported, “we’re getting a little rattle here can we ah get ah higher as soon as possible please.”

I don't have a dog in this fight, and since I am normally aspirated my only ice protection is avoidance and I have no significant experience except getting out of it once exactly as Brian did.  However, in the transcripts and accident report when the pilot reported "a little rattle" I take that as vibration or perhaps stall buffet rather than the pilot becoming "rattled".  Not poking blame, but a ground speed of 100 in a 300 knot aircraft with visible ice and now having vibration in worsening icing sounds like bad stuff is about to happen.

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1 minute ago, Bartman said:

I don't have a dog in this fight, and since I am normally aspirated my only ice protection is avoidance and I have no significant experience except getting out of it once exactly as Brian did.  However, in the transcripts and accident report when the pilot reported "a little rattle" I take that as vibration or perhaps stall buffet rather than the pilot becoming "rattled".  Not poking blame, but a ground speed of 100 in a 300 knot aircraft with visible ice and now having vibration in worsening icing sounds like bad stuff is about to happen.

That's a very reasonable assumption/interpretation  - If he was describing what he felt as noise, vibration etc it could easily be ice breaking off the the prop and banging on the fuselage and windshield. Vibration would also come from the prop as ice comes off. And if that is a fair assumption, you have to really question the decision to continue climbing up through what was likely another 3 thousand feet or so of icing conditions. Even with much less ice on the airframe, you have to  question a decision to climb without knowing where the tops were, time to get there and likelihood for more icing when you are presently near your limit.  

Agree the ground speeds are likely very telling of lost performance but with out any knowledge of winds aloft or IAS we really can't conclude much. 

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On 7/26/2017 at 3:19 AM, kortopates said:

The unexpected severe icing encountered by N731CA was of course a terrible card to be dealt to an inexperienced pilot; especially when he is told to expect light icing by the controller. Would the outcome have been different if the controller was able to give him higher sooner? We'll never know for sure. But it really doesn't look like ATC kept him the icing at 17K for very long.

First off the controller was very forthright in alerting the pilot to icing conditions and requested the pilot let him know right away: During the departure climb, while passing 8,000 feet for 10,000 feet, the pilot was directed to climb and maintain 14,000 feet.The controller then advised the pilot of moderate rime icing from 15,000 feet through 17,000 feet with light rime ice at 14,000 feet. The controller asked that the pilot advise him if the icing got worse, and the pilot responded with, “we’ll let you know what happens when we get in there and if we could go straight through, it’s no problem for us.”

With respect to timeline it sure doesn't look like the controller significantly delayed him at 17K beyond 30 sec from climbing: At 1002:17, the ZNY controller advised the pilot that he would be cleared to a higher altitude when ATC could provide it, and that light icing would be encountered at 17,000 feet. The pilot responded with, “I can confirm that light icing…” and stated that, “…light icing has been present for a little while and a higher altitude would be great.” The altitude of the airplane at that time was 16,800 feet and 101 knots ground speed.

Thus the pilot only confirmed light icing so far, no mention of moderate nor certainly severe. But only 15 sec later, the pilot "rattled" from the icing so I would assume it was worse than "light", This is when he makes his first request to get higher asap: At 1002:34, the pilot reported, “we’re getting a little rattle here can we ah get ah higher as soon as possible please.” The ZNY controller responded with “stand by” and coordinated for a higher altitude with an adjacent sector controller.

Less than 30 sec later, the controller gave him higher. At 1002:59, the ZNY controller directed the pilot to climb and maintain FL200 and the pilot acknowledged.

It only took a minute later while climbing to 20K that the pilot and plane are known to be in trouble.:  At 1004:08, the airplane reached an altitude of 17,800 feet before it turned about 70 degrees to the left and entered a descent. At 1004:29, while descending through 17,400 feet, and at 90 knots ground speed, the pilot transmitted, “and N731CA’s declaring…” 

Can we blame the controller for taking 30 sec to coordinate higher with the next sector? I really don't think so. The pilot was way over his head as most of us would be encountering severe ice when we were primed for light-moderate icing. But the the only hope the pilot had was to descend back down to VMC conditions at below 12800-12900 where he reporting entering IMC. Instead he continued to climb into what we assume was severe icing till he either lost control in the climb or lost control descending and the airplane broke up from over stress. Either way he either waited too long or waited till he started loosing control to take action and declare. We could fault him for not declaring an emergency rather than waiting 30 sec for ATC to clear him higher. But it really looks like he needed to start his exit before he even got to 17K or at least declare and descend immediately when he was at 17K picking up ice at too quick of rate rather than place all his hopes on continuing to climb up through it if he was heavily iced (i.e. rattled from the ice accumulation). We just really don't know how much ice he accumulated when but all indications are he was accumulating it through most of his climb to 17K and should have been taking action there to exit. Very sad but I don't see how any of this is the fault of the controllers for holding him at 17K for 30 sec to coordinate higher. 

Also I see no relationship between this accident from severe winter icing and the couple of summer ice encounters reported in this thread. 

Take a look at Aviation Safety Institute's Youtube video and read the NTSB report closely on this incident. First there were numerous pireps on the severity of the icing. In fact, one jetliner captain said he never encountered icing this bad in 38 years of his flying careers. Those were not passed on to the pilot and the controller said it's light to moderate only. What would you do as a 1400-hour pilot in N731CA in a multi-million aircraft that you have logged more than 400+ hours in, equipped with anti-ice system capable of dealing moderate icing, and a climb rate of 1500 ft / minute?

Now question is: would he press on or execute plan "B" if he had the most up to date information? We will never know. 

Also, there was an instruction sent out to the ATC to re-route or re-clear lower level for all flights planned between 14000-17000. He didn't qualify for this because he was planing FL260. However, what the controller did was quite the opposite of what they were instructed to do  by sending and keeping him between those level. 

Have not controller the latest pireps / instruction? If that was the case then his supervisor was responsible. 

Or did the controller forget? If that was case then he was negligent.

Or the controller didn't understand the critical and time-limiting nature of icing in a single and thought it was okay to fly and keep him in severe icing condition? If that's the case, he was responsible but he needs re-training. 

Brad's request to climb higher was rejected because of conflicting traffic despite reporting moderate icing. N731CA stated he was getting rattled and asked for climb but was delayed. And you don't think there is a relationship or similarity here? 

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15 hours ago, Tommy said:

Take a look at Aviation Safety Institute's Youtube video...

Brad's request to climb higher was rejected because of conflicting traffic despite reporting moderate icing. N731CA stated he was getting rattled and asked for climb but was delayed. And you don't think there is a relationship or similarity here? 

I have to admit that after this discussion, I am going to have to pull and watch that video and read more about N731CA.  I am sure that I have seen it before, but I have much more context now.  Thanks to all who are discussing and reminding us about it.

 

I do need to clarify, I asked for FL190 because I saw what was ahead and was going to avoid it if FL190 was available.   I fully expected there to be icing in that cloud before I went in it, and had the TKS on as soon as I was told FL190 was not available.  At this point I was still outside the cloud.   I could have asked for lower or turned around if I didn't have FIKI.  After I went in, I did report the ice as required.   I knew that the duration of exposure would be very short. Once, reporting the ice, I did not ask for any further deviation as the TKS was working and I would be soon be in the clear.  A short blast on MAX and then back to normal kept things reasonable clear with no performance hit.  In the back of my mind I had 3 good outs if I had to use them.  If I felt the safety of the flight wass in question, I would have initiated one of my outs and informed ATC of my situation and actions.  I wouldn't hesitate to use the emergency word if the safety of the flight was at all in question.   

 

Flying straight and level through ice, it is probably easier to notice a performance degredation.   Climbing though ice on an autopilot can probably delay detection based on the autopilot and mode being used.   For those unfamiliar, in Vertical Speed mode, the autopilot will attempt to hold a desired climb rate (500ft/per minute or whatever you put in) no matter what the airspeed.  If not watched, it will fly you right into a stall.  Pay attention to the airspeed for degredation in performance.    Some autopilots have a FLT (Flight level change mode).  In this mode, the autopilot will climb at a certain speed and you get the climb rate that you get.   I always climb in FLT mode.  In this mode, you have to watch your climb rate for a degredation in performance as it will hold the airspeed that you have set.    Many sources suggest handflying in icing conditions so that you can notice the first changes in the required control inputs.

 

Not a CFI.  Just things that I have seen and heard.  When in doubt, chose the safe option. I have left my plane at another airport and gone commercial or rental car.   There is always a way to get your bird home.  And getting it home is often a good excuse for another day of flying.  

 

Thanks all for the good discussion.

 

Brad

 

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