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Mooney down in Norfolk


par

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From the preliminary, they reported that there was fuel in the fuel distributor and the detailed report of the twisting of the propellor blades, et cetera, seems to be evidence that the engine was making power, so I don't think that he ran out of gas, but I would bet he was concerned about it. There was also mention of the plane first impacting a tree at 80 ft and that the pilot had visually identified the runway. 

 

I think the pilot was north of the runway, had visually identified it and was heading towards it. I would bet that the fuel situation was such that he did not want to try to go for another approach and, having visually identified the runway, was making a run for it. He may have had things made and didn't even see that tree with the poor visibility. 

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  • 1 year later...

That is a very brutal read. I cannot imagine making the decision to fly that leg, after midnight, into terrible weather. He may have been a well-respected member of the community, but frankly that was a really bad decision. I can't see any reason why he launched, and why he kept going if he knew the forecasts and monitored weather en route. Get-home-itis is powerful, or he didn't really get the weather?

 

I have a little more total time/experience than he did, and I hope I never make such a decision to launch, or carry on into bad conditions at night. Within the last year I took off during a presumed window between storms, but it deteriorated pretty quickly as things were happening faster than advertised. Fortunately I overcame that bad choice with the better decision to divert to a new destination entirely and a safe landing after a benign instrument approach as the sun was setting. The penalty was an extra expense for a rental car, and several hours of driving that ate into our fun time that weekend. But we lived.

 

The last bit of that report mentions amphetamine was found in the pilot's urine and blood..is there any real medication that presents that way post-mortem, or is that why the flight went thru the night?

 

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24 minutes ago, KSMooniac said:

That is a very brutal read. I cannot imagine making the decision to fly that leg, after midnight, into terrible weather. He may have been a well-respected member of the community, but frankly that was a really bad decision. I can't see any reason why he launched, and why he kept going if he knew the forecasts and monitored weather en route. Get-home-itis is powerful, or he didn't really get the weather?

 

I have a little more total time/experience than he did, and I hope I never make such a decision to launch, or carry on into bad conditions at night. Within the last year I took off during a presumed window between storms, but it deteriorated pretty quickly as things were happening faster than advertised. Fortunately I overcame that bad choice with the better decision to divert to a new destination entirely and a safe landing after a benign instrument approach as the sun was setting. The penalty was an extra expense for a rental car, and several hours of driving that ate into our fun time that weekend. But we lived.

 

The last bit of that report mentions amphetamine was found in the pilot's urine and blood..is there any real medication that presents that way post-mortem, or is that why the flight went thru the night?

 

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There are a whole host of prescription meds that present as amphetamines because they are amphetaminess. Most of the ADHD drugs are amphetamines.  The most well know are Adderall, Vyvanse and Ritalin but there are many others.

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49 minutes ago, Shadrach said:

There are a whole host of prescription meds that present as amphetamines because they are amphetaminess. Most of the ADHD drugs are amphetamines.  The most well know are Adderall, Vyvanse and Ritalin but there are many others.

Non of which are on the FAA approved drug list.

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The informative, heartfelt posts in this thread have been very valuable to me. Thanks to all of you for the education.

 

The pilot was a clinical psychologist, most states do not allow CPs to prescribe meds, that's a job for psychiatrists. I find it interesting that Dr. Buxton testified at a Virginia Board of Medicine committee six months before the crash. The committee was reviewing a case against two psychiatrists and it involved 'Gaming the system' to get Adderall.

http://pilotonline.com/news/local/health/doctors-say-they-were-duped-in-beach-adhd-suicide/article_eb0f3f75-7b29-5160-a457-79f583658c6c.html

I sent the NTSBs report to a few members of the Buffalo music community who still honor the life of Ted Reinhardt, one of Buxton's passengers. 

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5 hours ago, kmyfm20s said:

Non of which are on the FAA approved drug list.

And all of which are frequently used as performance enhancers by individuals that have not been diagnosed ADHD or prescribed the meds. Was it a factor in the crash? No one can say. Amphetamines have a pretty short half life 9-11hrs), so it's likely he had used in the preceding 48hrs.  However, the report reads like he didn't bother to get a thorough picture of the weather at his destination. Many crashes can be attributed to poor decision making. It's tough to say that poor decision making was a symptom of amphetamine use. However, one could say that the use of non-approved medications (possibly obtained through illegal activities) in the hours leading up to the accident flight indicates a history of poor decision making.

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5 hours ago, Marauder said:

What caught my attention was that he flew an RNAV approach without a panel mounted GPS and did the same with the owner when they flew practice approaches.


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Is it no longer legal to fly an RNAV approach with a KNS80 or KNS81 interfaced to DME? 

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11 minutes ago, Shadrach said:

Is it no longer legal to fly an RNAV approach with a KNS80 or KNS81 interfaced to DME? 

Not relevant in this case, since they were equipped with only basic NAV/COM, no GPS or DME.  While probably not relevant in tis case, this F had not installed shoulder belts WHICH SHULD BE THE FIRST UPGRADE FOR ANY VINTAGE MOONEY.

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13 minutes ago, neilpilot said:

Not relevant in this case, since they were equipped with only basic NAV/COM, no GPS or DME.  While probably not relevant in tis case, this F had not installed shoulder belts WHICH SHULD BE THE FIRST UPGRADE FOR ANY VINTAGE MOONEY.

Agree on the shoulder harness and they may well have changed the outcome of this accident. I know that this aircraft was not legally equipped for RNAV approaches. It seemed Chris was implying that the only legal equipment for said approach was panel mounted IFR GPS. I was curious if that was now the case.

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8 minutes ago, Shadrach said:

I know that this aircraft was not legally equipped for RNAV approaches. It seemed Chris was implying that the only legal equipment for said approach was panel mounted IFR GPS. I was curious if that was now the case.

It is my understanding that, depending upon the approach, not only an IFR approved GPS but WAAS is required for precision (vertical) approaches.

"GLS (Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Landing System) Must have WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System) equipment approved for precision approach."

http://www.jeppesen.com/download/briefbull/den00-arnav.pdf

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Agree on the shoulder harness and they may well have changed the outcome of this accident. I know that this aircraft was not legally equipped for RNAV approaches. It seemed Chris was implying that the only legal equipment for said approach was panel mounted IFR GPS. I was curious if that was now the case.

 

 

The NTSB provided what equipment was in the plane "The airplane was also equipped with a King KX155 VHF navigation/communication radio, a Narco COM 120 VHF communication radio, and a JPI EDM-830 engine data management system. No distance measuring equipment (DME) receiver was installed. The airplane was not equipped with an instrument panel-mounted GPS receiver."

 

They also spoke about obtaining GPS information from a portable unit in the plane. Unless they didn't mention an RNAV unit by mistake, it sounds like he flew the RNAV GPS 22 approach to SFQ using a handheld unit. We had a discussion about doing this in an emergency. Practicing approaches using a handheld doesn't sound like an emergency.

 

"According to air traffic control (ATC) voice communication and radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), along with data recovered from a handheld GPS receiver"

 

 

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It also is probably the reason he had trouble flying the missed approach for the GPS approach. He probably was expecting to land and without GPS guidance for the missed, he declared he was off course and was asking for a vector.

 

 

"The controller responded that he needed the pilot to climb to at least 1,600 ft before he could provide a vector. The pilot responded that he was currently flying at 900 ft and again asked for a radar vector. The controller again responded that the pilot should continue to fly the published missed approach procedure and climb to 3,000 ft. The pilot then responded, "I can't, I'm off course." The controller then provided the pilot with a radar vector of 090°."

 

 

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This part confuses me: "Control continuity was traced though separations consistent with overload from the cockpit controls to each of the flight control surfaces. "

Are they implying that the pilot caused the flaps/elevator/rudder to become disconnected? I thought these things were bulletproof with their pushrod controls. I descended through a broken cloud layer at 4,000 the other day and it felt like the wings were going to rip off - was bouncing around like a "washing machine" like the victim pilot at stated to ATC. Of course, I was in the yellow zone and trying to slow it down too.

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This part confuses me: "Control continuity was traced though separations consistent with overload from the cockpit controls to each of the flight control surfaces. "
Are they implying that the pilot caused the flaps/elevator/rudder to become disconnected? I thought these things were bulletproof with their pushrod controls. I descended through a broken cloud layer at 4,000 the other day and it felt like the wings were going to rip off - was bouncing around like a "washing machine" like the victim pilot at stated to ATC. Of course, I was in the yellow zone and trying to slow it down too.


The way I read that is the control surfaces were intact but became separated during impact. Would be helpful if simple English was used.


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3 hours ago, tigers2007 said:

This part confuses me: "Control continuity was traced though separations consistent with overload from the cockpit controls to each of the flight control surfaces. "

Are they implying that the pilot caused the flaps/elevator/rudder to become disconnected? I thought these things were bulletproof with their pushrod controls. I descended through a broken cloud layer at 4,000 the other day and it felt like the wings were going to rip off - was bouncing around like a "washing machine" like the victim pilot at stated to ATC. Of course, I was in the yellow zone and trying to slow it down too.

I read it as control continuity from cockpit to control surfaces was traced and found to be compromised due to control surface overload. The separations were consistent to surface overload.

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4 hours ago, Shadrach said:

And all of which are frequently used as performance enhancers by individuals that have not been diagnosed ADHD or prescribed the meds. Was it a factor in the crash? No one can say. Amphetamines have a pretty short half life 9-11hrs), so it's likely he had used in the preceding 48hrs.  However, the report reads like he didn't bother to get a thorough picture of the weather at his destination. Many crashes can be attributed to poor decision making. It's tough to say that poor decision making was a symptom of amphetamine use. However, one could say that the use of non-approved medications (possibly obtained through illegal activities) in the hours leading up to the accident flight indicates a history of poor decision making.

 Amphetamines can have a slightly shorter or longer elimination time depending on diet and other factors.  But it is true that they should be excreted by 48 hours.  

Examples of amphetamines:

Amphetamine pharmaceuticals
Brand
name
United States
Adopted Name
(D:L) ratio Dosage
form
Marketing
start date
 
Adderall 3:1 (salts) tablet 1996  
Adderall XR 3:1 (salts) capsule 2001  
Adzenys XR amphetamine 3:1 (base) ODT 2016 ]
Dyanavel XR amphetamine 3.2:1 (base) suspension 2015  
Evekeo amphetamine sulfate 1:1 (salts) tablet 2012  
Dexedrine dextroamphetamine sulfate 1:0 (salts) capsule 1976  
ProCentra dextroamphetamine sulfate 1:0 (salts) liquid 2010  
Zenzedi dextroamphetamine sulfate 1:0 (salts) tablet 2013  
Vyvanse lisdexamfetamine dimesylate 1:0 (prodrug) capsule 2007  
tablet

(Taken from my favorite medical textbook, Wickipedia)

There are two other brands for Phenteramine ( Adipex-p and Suprenza) that are used for weight loss. This can also show up an anphetamines in tests.  

 

As Shadrach said, none are on list list of FAA approved meds.  ADD medications are on the do not issue list for AMEs.

 

not an AME.

It's been a long time since I've done any of that medical stuff.

I do brain surgery to pay for 100LL.

 

Brad

 

 

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They never stated traced, it would be better if they were clear they tried to be concise  but failed. It's hard to believe that control's were compromised at the low speeds traveled, unless the turbulence was severe enough to damage the aircraft. ?? Who knows

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36 minutes ago, Danb said:

They never stated traced, it would be better if they were clear they tried to be concise  but failed. It's hard to believe that control's were compromised at the low speeds traveled, unless the turbulence was severe enough to damage the aircraft. ?? Who knows

The low airspeeds didn't overload the controls, that was done by trees and ground. This is typical NTSB verbiage when describing impact damage, includingvtge bit about no mechanical anomalies found prior to impact. 

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1 hour ago, tigers2007 said:

This part confuses me: "Control continuity was traced though separations consistent with overload from the cockpit controls to each of the flight control surfaces. "

Are they implying that the pilot caused the flaps/elevator/rudder to become disconnected? I thought these things were bulletproof with their pushrod controls. I descended through a broken cloud layer at 4,000 the other day and it felt like the wings were going to rip off - was bouncing around like a "washing machine" like the victim pilot at stated to ATC. Of course, I was in the yellow zone and trying to slow it down too.

My guess is it was just poorly written on the part of the investigator. Not the first time I've encountered confusing sentences in an NTSB (or any other Gov document) report.  I had assumed that damage from impact compromised both the structure and the controls.  Flying into trees at 105kts will cause structural failure as will descending into a class 5 thunderstorm while above redline, but not in the same way.

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Sad reminders of a couple of Mooney losses and when I first saw the posts I thought oh God not another one. From reading the report and in my very humble opinion it looks like to me that conditions overwhelmed his experience and that the airplane may have been somewhat under equipped for the IMC at hand. This ties to the discussion about IFR and my comments about the increased risks associated with weather and how important it is to your go no go. I'm very sad for the loss here as well as the departure Mooney on the other thread. There are so many things that can bite us doing what we do and it can be very unforgiving 

God bless.

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One of the things I found surprising in reality verses this situation....

1) Some analog needle displays don't work very well in heavy turbulence. Trying to follow a needle that is bouncing around has got to be tough.

 

then there were these other things....

2) Doing a practice approach using a VOR a ways back, didn't lead to the airport. It lead to the shopping mall next door.  Low to the ground, the runway was not easy to find where we weren't looking... Analog VORs are not as good as the GPS counterpart, often... especially if the VOR isn't on the airport.

Our approach Looked very similar to the graphics of the flight path of this situation.  The pilot ended the approach before he got to the airport. He was not aligned with the airport.

3) their portable GPS supplied the data for the flight path graphics.  It seems unknown if the pilot was able to get anything useful from it during the flight...

4) the wind sheer seems to have had an effect on the flight. Significant wind at altitude, not much in comparison near the ground.

5) Low ground speed according to the controller.  High vertical speed prior to impact.  Sounds like the air speed was diminishing as they got closer to the ground. 

6) All the broken stuff was post impact.  The approach is slow enough that a stall would occur prior to bending anything.

7) What I am reminded of in this situation is know how your instruments work in heavy turbulence.  If they are bouncing all around, they are not going to be usable...  this is typical of old worn analog gauges.  The Turn Coordinator is very sensitive to this phenomena on a good day.  So partial panel using a wet compass and TC would be pretty dodgy....

8) bouncing all around at the end of a flight, running lower on fuel, not being able to execute the approach as expected...  sounds pretty stressful.

9) know yourself, know your plane, and be current...

Hoping to maintain a positive light on the situation. There is plenty to learn from this accident.  Let me know if I mis-stated anything...

RIP 

-a-

Edited by carusoam
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One of the things I found surprising in reality verses this situation....
1) Some analog needle displays don't work very well in heavy turbulence. Trying to follow a needle that is bouncing around has got to be tough.
 
then there were these other things....
2) Doing a practice approach using a VOR a ways back, didn't lead to the airport. It lead to the shopping mall next door.  Low to the ground, the runway was not easy to find where we weren't looking... Analog VORs are not as good as the GPS counterpart, often... especially if the VOR isn't on the airport.
Our approach Looked very similar to the graphics of the flight path of this situation.  The pilot ended the approach before he got to the airport. He was not aligned with the airport.
3) their portable GPS supplied the data for the flight path graphics.  It seems unknown if the pilot was able to get anything useful from it during the flight...
4) the wind sheer seems to have had an effect on the flight. Significant wind at altitude, not much in comparison near the ground.
5) Low ground speed according to the controller.  High vertical speed prior to impact.  Sounds like the air speed was diminishing as they got closer to the ground. 
6) All the broken stuff was post impact.  The approach is slow enough that a stall would occur prior to bending anything.
7) What I am reminded of in this situation is know how your instruments work in heavy turbulence.  If they are bouncing all around, they are not going to be usable...  this is typical of old worn analog gauges.  The Turn Coordinator is very sensitive to this phenomena on a good day.  So partial panel using a wet compass and TC would be pretty dodgy....
8) bouncing all around at the end of a flight, running lower on fuel, not being able to execute the approach as expected...  sounds pretty stressful.
9) know yourself, know your plane, and be current...
Hoping to maintain a positive light on the situation. There is plenty to learn from this accident.  Let me know if I mis-stated anything...
RIP 
-a-


There will always be unanswered questions in accidents. And I am not talking just about this one, but the others we know about. As well, this activity we engage in can be unforgiving of mistakes.

The best we can hope for is that we don't find ourselves in the same situation either by our own self doing or by the unexpected.

I think it was one of the old time pilots who I knew early in my flying who said this about flying longevity "train often, know your skill limits and just don't do something stupid".


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